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1. Introduction 
Nuclear energy production is a recent technology. The first nuclear reactor demonstrating the 
feasibility of a sustained and controlled chain reaction was built in Chicago in 1942. In 1957 a nuclear 
reactor produced electricity for the first time. In the 60 years since then significant technological 
progress has been achieved. 
Three generations of nuclear reactors have been successively developed and a fourth is currently 
being developed, demonstrating the constant progress and technical and industrial vitality of nuclear 
energy. The technology is mature, with approximately 450 nuclear reactors currently providing 17 % 
of the world’s electricity, without greenhouse gas emissions. 
It must also be stressed that the technological progress and innovations achieved or currently being 
developed are all based on the same fundamental physical principles of nuclear fission, the feasibility 
of which was demonstrated some 70 years ago. 
Heavy nuclides, like uranium, plutonium and thorium, are fissioned by neutrons and release heat 
within the fuel material confining the radioactivity. This heat is extracted while simultaneously 
cooling the fuel by circulating a coolant (water in current European light-water reactors). The heat 
recovered is used to run a turbine and a generator, which produces electricity. 
A lot of effort has been invested in international cooperation to define goals for the nuclear energy 
systems of the future, and also to select the key technologies for achieving them. The effort has been 
made primarily through the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), which the American 
Department of Energy initiated in 2000. 
The technology roadmap developed by GIF is the starting point to identify and organise research and 
development of the new generation of reactors to be built around 2030 to 2040. To do so, four goals 
have been defined. Each of the systems comprises a nuclear reactor, an energy conversion system 
and the necessary fuel cycle, fuel manufacturing, spent fuel and final waste-management equipment. 
The four major goals have been separated out into 15 criteria and 24 performance indicators or 
metrics (Figure 1). These goals are: 
 sustainability 
 economics 
 safety and reliability 
 proliferation resistance and physical protection. 
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Figure 1: Goals and criteria (U.S. DOE Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee and the Gen. IV 
International Forum, 2002) 
A final selection criterion was the degree of technological innovation in the candidate systems — 
which provides excellent grounds for wide-reaching international cooperation — and the possible 
spin-offs for other nuclear systems or for the current or next generation of nuclear reactors. 
The following six systems deemed the most promising at the end of this evaluation exercise were 
called on to rally forum cooperation on development work starting from 2004: 
 VHTR — very high-temperature reactor system, over 1 000 °C, helium-cooled, dedicated to 
hydrogen production or hydrogen/electricity cogeneration; 
 GFR — gas-cooled fast reactor system — Helium-cooled fast reactor; 
 SFR — sodium-cooled fast reactor system; 
 SCWR — supercritical water-cooled reactor system; 
 LFR — lead-cooled fast reactor system — lead or Pb-Bi alloy-cooled fast reactor; 
 MSR — molten salt reactor. 
VHTR scored very well with the exception of sustainability because of its open fuel cycle, which 
requires reprocessing to increase sustainability. From a technological point of view the VHTR is a 
further development of the high temperature reactor (HTR), which was developed in the years from 
1960 to 2001 (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Overview of high temperature reactors 
 Dragon Pech-Bottom AVR Fort St-
Vrain 
THTR300 HTTR HTR10 
Site Winfrith 
(United 
Kingdom
) 
Pennsylvani
a (United 
States) 
Jülich 
(Germany
) 
Colorad
o 
(United 
States) 
Schmehause
n (Germany 
Oarai 
(Japan) 
HT10 
(China) 
Criticality 1964 1966 1966 1974 1983 1998 2001 
Shutdown 1975 1974 1988 1989 1989 - - 
MWth 20 115.5 46 842 750 30 10 
MWel - 40 15 330 300 - - 
He 
pressure 
(bar) 
20 24.6 10 48 40 40 30 
Inlet 
temperatur
e (℃) 
335 343 175 406 262 395 250-300 
Outlet 
temperatur
e (℃) 
835 715 850 785 750 850-950 700-900 
Power 
density 
(MW/m
3
) 
14 8.3 2.3 6.3 6 2.5 2 
Fuel 
elements 
Prisms Prisms Pebbles Prisms Pebbles Prisms Pebbles 
Cycle Varied U/Th U235/Th U235/Th U235/Th Enriche
d U 
Enriche
d U 
 
Two basic fuel element designs of the HTR have been developed and implemented, one in Germany 
and the other in the United States. 
The main characteristic of the German design is the conditioning of compacted microparticles in a 
graphite matrix in the form of spheres with a diameter of 60 mm (Figure 2). They are continuously 
inserted in and extracted from the reactor at a rate of one pebble approximately every 20 seconds. 
When a pebble reaches its maximum depletion rate it is replaced with a new one. 
 
Figure 2: Fuel element of a pebble-bed reactor 
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The first German HTR was the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versuchsreaktor (AVR) built at the Jülich Research 
Centre. This centre has maintained very high competence in this technology. The AVR set new 
records (for HTRs) in terms of performance and operating duration. Its construction began in 1961. It 
was connected to the electric power network in 1966 (15 MWel) and shut down in 1988. It served as 
an experimental platform for fuel technology development within the scope of cooperation between 
the Jülich Research Centre and NUKEM, the fuel industrial manufacturer still considered to be a 
reference today. The core temperature of 850 °C at the start of operation was increased to 950 °C. 
The steel pressure vessel design served to achieve design transients (e.g. core cooling loss) that 
contributed to validating the safety concepts applied in this type of reactor. 
The AVR showed the viability of the pebble bed concept and demonstrated its reliability through 
physical tests for which the plant was not initially designed. A loss of coolant flow without scram was 
simulated in 1970, and a loss of coolant transient was also achieved prior to final shutdown. 
The fuel has undergone significant developments and improvements at the Jülich Research Centre, in 
partnership with NUKEM (manufacturer). 
The second HTR built in Germany was the THTR-300 (thorium high-temperature reactor), which went 
critical in 1983. This was a 300 MWel commercial reactor with a concrete vessel, built by Brown 
Boveri. The operation of the THTR was marked by a number of technical problems that did not seem 
impossible to overcome. In particular, a planned inspection in 1988 revealed the rupture of a number 
of bolts securing hot duct insulation plates, which, combined with an unfavourable political context, 
led to the decision to permanently decommission the facility in 1989 after only 423 equivalent full-
power days 
The American family differs from the German family mainly in terms of core and fuel organisation. 
The core is composed of prismatic graphite blocks containing the fuel compacts (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Fuel element of a block type reactor 
 
The first commercial implementation was Peach Bottom (40 MWel), which went critical in early 1966 
and was shut down in 1974. After the discovery of an increasing number of fuel cladding ruptures, a 
second core was fabricated using more advanced technology, improving the quality of the first 
porous graphite layer and the characteristics of successive layers. 93 % availability was achieved 
during irradiation of this second core, and reactor coolant system activity remained extremely low, 
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indicating the excellent quality of the new fuel. The reactor subsequently operated without major 
problems and was shut down for economic reasons. 
The second implementation was Fort Saint-Vrain (330 MWel), construction of which began in 1968 
and which went critical in 1974. Its operation was marked by technical problems (namely accidental 
water ingress in the reactor coolant system causing accelerated corrosion of steel components and 
poor availability) and it was finally decommissioned in 1989. Despite the negative functional aspects 
of its operation, the excellent leak-tightness of the fuel elements led to very positive radiological 
results for operation and maintenance activities, with the exception of tritium releases due to water 
leaks. 
On the whole, the operating experience from German and American prototypes has largely 
confirmed the technical expectations regarding HTRs, i.e.: 
 very good behaviour of the particle fuel under irradiation, even at high temperatures, and 
low release of fission products in the coolant gas providing very clean reactors; 
 possibility of using high-temperature helium as coolant gas; 
 easy control, high thermal inertia and significant operating safety margins (demonstrated at 
real scale with the AVR). 
The impact of the Three Mile Island accident and the excellent safety characteristics of HTRs (thermal 
inertia, good apparent core conductivity, low power density) have led to research on configurations 
allowing completely passive residual power evacuation. Low-power HTRs are particularly well suited 
to satisfying this new passive safety requirement, like the concept of the German HTR Modular 
reactor which has been developed by Siemens-Interatom. This 80 MWel reactor uses the radiating 
capacity of a metal vessel to ensure passive cooling of the fuel, the temperature of which remains 
below 1 600 °C regardless of accident conditions. This reactor was never built, but a detailed design 
has been completed and some licensing issues have been solved. 
HTR reactors like the HTR Module with an electric power of 100 to 300 MWel set the trend for 
current design, while in current European research projects cogeneration is in favour of electricity 
generation. 
2. The concept of the HTR Module 
The concept of the HTR Module has been developed by Interatom/Siemens as a nuclear heat source 
to deliver not only electricity but also process heat. In the first stage the process-heat production 
should produce process steam with a wide area of applications. In the next stage the process heat 
should be used to supply high temperature processes with the necessary process energy. 
Through a specific core design it becomes possible that, on the one hand, only reflector elements are 
required to shut down the system and, on the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the decay 
heat after a depressurisation accident and the outage of all active decay heat-removal systems can 
be removed from the core through natural processes, and that as a consequence the fuel 
temperature does not exceed a temperature at which fission products are released to the 
environment. Experiments in the past have shown that the critical temperature is 1 600 °C. New 
research indicates that 1 800 °C could be possible. 
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The particles containing the fission material are so called TRISO particles loaded with 7g of uranium 
per fuel sphere and an enrichment of 8.6 % of fissile material. The fuel elements are spheres with a 
diameter of 60 mm, consisting of a spherical fuel zone approximately 50 mm in diameter, in which 
the TRISO-coated particles are randomly distributed in graphitic matrix material (see Figure 2). 
The technology of the HTR Module and its components is based on the experiences of AVR, THTR and 
the general development of HTR in different countries in the world. 
 
2.1. Concept of the plant 
The overall arrangement of the HTR Module power plant is shown in Figure 4. The central part is the 
reactor building, which contains the two modular units. In this central building some auxiliary 
systems are also installed (fuel-handling system, gas purifications, helium storage, helium supply 
systems). 
It consists of two HTR Module units, along with some auxiliary and supporting systems. 
The HTR Module units are separated from each other by a maintenance hall. An external concrete 
building is the enclosure for the inner building. The function of the concrete building is to protect the 
reactor building against external events such as an aeroplane crash, gas-cloud explosion or 
earthquake. 
The reactor auxiliary building, positioned directly beside the reactor building, contains some 
important systems such as circuits for the start-up or shutdown of the reactor, intermediate cooling 
systems and the system provided to depressurise the primary circuit and to condensate the water 
after a strong water ingress accident. 
Between the two modules there is a central channel to separate the two reactor units in the 
common reactor building. 
The reactor building fulfils all current requirements in the nuclear licensing process (e.g. Germany) 
regarding impacts from the outside: 
 aeroplane crash (phantom military machine), 
 gas-cloud explosion (∆pmax = 0.3 bar), 
 earthquake (acceleration: 0.3 g). 
A very important building is used for the intermediate storage of spent fuel elements. Here the 
vessels filled with spent fuel elements are set up and cooled by radiation, conduction and free 
convection. Eventually the operation time of this storage system could be much longer than that of 
the reactor itself. 
The question of how long the intermediate storage time will be is a topic of optimisation between 
the aspects of final storage and intermediate storage. Currently, time schedules of more than five 
decades seem to be advantageous. 
The control room, installations for control and regulation, reactor protection system, emergency 
electrical supply systems and further components (computers, climate and air conditioning plants) 
are located in the switchgear building. 
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The energy conversion takes place in the turbine building. It houses the turbine and the electrical 
generator, all heat exchangers, pipes and pumps of the water/steam circuit and components to 
decouple process steam for process-heat applications. 
A cooling installation, consisting of wet cooling towers operated by forced convection from blowers, 
is also part of the plant. 
 
Figure 4: Arrangement of the buildings of an HTR plant with two modular units 
The numbers denoted in Figure 4 describe the different parts of the plant: 
1. annex to reactor building 
2. reactor building 
3. stack 
4. reactor auxiliary building 
5. central gas supply 
6. intermediate storage for spent fuel elements 
7. control/entrance building 
8. offices 
9. switchgear building 
10. cooling towers 
11. cooling towers 
12. switchgear building 
13. transformers 
14. deionised water storage 
15. turbine hall 
16. connection bridge 
17. channels for cables. 
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Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the vertical and horizontal cross sections of the reactor building. 
 
Figure 5: Vertical cross section of the reactor building (How to obtain an inherently safe power reactor, 
2007) 
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Figure 6: Horizontal cross section of the reactor building (How to obtain an inherently safe power reactor, 
2007) 
The turbine building basically contains the components of the water/steam cycle (Figure 7), with the 
steam turbine and electric power generator and the components for the process-steam system. The 
cooling tower structure (hybrid concept) is placed within a short distance of the turbine building. 
Further auxiliary buildings contain the intermediate fuel elements storage facilities , the gas 
treatment station, the office and general purpose building and the security building. 
As far as protection against strong impacts from the outside is concerned, the following buildings in 
particular need special protection and require an adequate design: 
 the reactor containment building, 
 the intermediate storage building for spent fuel elements, 
 the auxiliary building containing radioactive materials. 
The question of impacts from outside and the measures to govern these undergo a dynamic process 
during the long-time schedule of a nuclear project. The changes of assumptions on aeroplane crashes 
are a characteristic example of these conditions. 
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Figure 7: Principle of the secondary steam cycle of a cogeneration plant containing a heat source 
(module unit as nuclear heat source) 
 
3. Core layout parameter for the HTR Module 
3.1. Overview 
The layout of an HTR core is influenced by a multitude of data. Here qualitative arguments will be 
specified for a few of them to enable assessment of layout data for plants. Important parameters are 
the mean power density of the core, the helium inlet temperature (Tin), the helium outlet 
temperature (Tout), the helium pressure (pHe), the H/D ratio of the core (height/diameter), the burnup 
of fuel, the heavy-metal content in the fuel elements, the particle concept and the manner of fuel 
element handling — the so called OTTO and MEDUL cycle. OTTO is the abbreviation of ‘once through 
then out’ and MEDUL is the German abbreviation of Mehrfachdurchlauf where the fuel elements are 
reloaded in the core until defined burnup is reached. In Table 2 layout data for already operational 
and planned plants are represented. In the following, important aspects to be considered in the 
layout process will be discussed. 
Table 2: Thermodynamic design aspects of pebble-bed reactors 
Parameter AVR THTR HTR Module 
reactor 
HTR100 HTR500 
Fuel element 
handling 
MEDUL MEDUL MEDUL MEDUL OTTO 
Streaming 
direction 
cooling gas 
fuel elements  
Cocurrent Cocurrent Cocurrent Counter 
current 
Cocurrent 
Average core 
power 
density 
2.2 MW/m3 6 MW/m3 3 MW/m3 4.2 MW/m3 5.5 MW/m3 
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Cooling gas 
heating 
270 °C -> 
950 °C 
250 °C -> 
750 °C 
250 °C -> 
700 °C 
250 °C -> 
730 °C 
250 °C -> 
730 °C 
 
3.2. Core power density 
The power density of the core in particular is one of the most important layout parameters, 
influencing many plant characteristics. As shown in Figure 8 the power density influences important 
reactor components as well as characteristic properties of HTR plants. 
 
 
Figure 8: Influences to be considered in view of core power density 
 
The appropriate choice of core power density should consider the following aspects: 
 The core power density should not be too high to prevent the fuel and surface temperatures 
of the elements from being too high and to keep the thermal stresses of these components 
within reasonable limits. The acceptable boundary for HTR fuel elements is relatively high — 
a mean power density of ~ 10 MW/m³ was shown to be reasonable in radiation tests. 
 The core dimensions and the core power density should be chosen in such a way that in 
extreme accidents (‘total loss of active cooling’) the decay heat could be removed from the 
core to the outside of the reactor just by heat radiation, heat conduction and natural 
convection of air or air/helium mixtures. During this process a maximum fuel temperature of 
1 600 °C should not be exceeded. In this case just a very small amount of fission products 
would be released. 
 The loads on fuel elements and reflectors due to irradiation increase with increasing power 
density and limit the mean value to < 8 MW/m³ with a view to a plant lifetime of 30 years, 
which is normally taken as the basis of a general layout. 
 The choice of high power density in the core and therefore of high pressure losses in the 
cooling loop may eventually prevent the use of a single-stage radial blower. Due to this the 
technical costs would be increased. A boundary for the use of single-stage radial blowers is a 
pressure loss greater than 1.3 bar. 
 In order to ensure an economical plant layout the ratio of the blower power and electric 
power (Nblower/Nel) should be bounded. Values of 3-5 % are believed to be acceptable. 
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 The core dimension, and therefore containment dimension, increases with decreasing core 
power density. Through this the costs of investment are increased. Optimisation 
considerations in this context will be described below. 
 The requirements for the shutdown system increase with increasing core power density due 
to increased provision for reactivity reserve and xenon compensation. 
 The conversion rate is very advantageous in core constellations with low power densities due 
to comparable low parasitic absorptions of neutrons in protactinium. 
 The choice of core power density has a special meaning with regard to heat retention in the 
reactor core as a consequence of severe accidents characterised by the depressurisation of 
the cooling loop and the failure of all residual heat removal systems. In this case cores with 
low power density behave very inertly and are characterised by a limitation of the 
temperatures during the accident to non-critical values below 1 600 °C. 
Considering the abovementioned aspects, mean core power densities between 3 and 6 MW/m³ are 
reasonable and can be the base for the design of further plans. The importance of the core power 
density with regard to the economical optimisation of an HTR plant can be seen in the following 
qualitative examination. 
The costs of investment for a complete plant in view of the influence of core power density can be 
approximated from: 
𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑣 = 𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑣
0 +
𝑎1
?̅?
         (1) 
The costs of operation, which are mainly due to the power consumption of the blower, are low: 
𝐾𝑜𝑝 = 𝐾𝑜𝑝
0 + 𝑁𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑇 = 𝐾𝑜𝑝
0 + 𝑎2?̅?
2 ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑇       (2) 
Here, T is the full load operating duration in hours and x is the electricity rate. The total annual cost 
for the plant will be: 
𝐾𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝐾𝑜𝑝 + 𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑣 ∙ ?̅?          (3) 
with ?̅? as a factor covering interest payments, taxes, insurance and maintenance. The dependency of 
the total annual cost from core power density is therefore: 
𝐾𝑡𝑜𝑡(?̅?) = 𝐶1 +
𝐶2
?̅?
+ 𝐶3 ∙ ?̅?
2         (4) 
and with 𝐶1 = 𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑣
0 ∙ ?̅? + 𝐾𝑜𝑝
0 , 𝐶2 = 𝑎1 ∙ ?̅?, 𝐶3 = 𝑎2 ∙ 𝑇 ∙ 𝑥. The conditions to minimise the total 
annual costs are: 
𝜕𝐾𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝜕?̅?
= 0, 
𝜕2𝐾𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝜕?̅?2
> 0          (5) 
From an economic view the optimum of core power density depending on the parameters discussed 
is: 
?̅?𝑜𝑝𝑡  ~ √
𝑎1∙?̅?
2 𝑎2 𝑇 𝑥
3
          (6) 
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One should choose a low power density if the value ?̅? is low (essentially given at low rates of interest 
and long recovery periods). In particular, with a high degree of capacity utilisation and a high 
electricity rate one should also prefer low power densities. Safety considerations especially advocate 
the choice of low power densities. The relationship with regard to the costs, discussed above, is 
shown qualitatively in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Qualitative relationships for optimisation of core power density 
3.3. H/D ratio of the core 
The choice of the height to diameter ratio (H/D) of a reactor core is of primarily importance in 
relation to neutron economics. Practically all reactors built so far aim for an H/D ratio near 1 to keep 
the critical mass and therefore the mass of fissile heavy metal as low as possible. Neutron losses due 
to leakage are minimised using this layout principle. In future HTR plants the principle of inherent 
safety through the removal of residual heat through the reactor vessel surface will gain additional 
importance, and from this a completely different ratio for H/D results. First of all, some remarks on 
optimisation on the base of neutron physics. Based on the criticality condition of a cylindrical core: 
𝐵2 = (
𝜋
𝐻
)
2
+ (
2.405
𝑅
)
2
          (7) 
and the relation: 
𝑉 = 𝜋𝑅2 𝐻           (8) 
in which: 
𝐵 = buckling 
𝑅 = core radius 
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𝐻 = core height 
𝑉 = volume of the core 
the volume of the core can be formulated as: 
𝑉(𝐻) = 𝜋 ∙ (2.405)2 ∙
𝐻
𝐵2−(
𝜋
𝐻
)
2         (9) 
The demand for a minimised core size and a minimised mass of fissile heavy metal leads to an 
optimisation condition of the kind: 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝐻
= 0, 
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝐻2
> 0          (10) 
In detail, the condition for a minimised core size leads to: 
𝐻 =
√3∙𝜋
𝐵
, = √
3
2
∙
2.405
𝐵
, 𝑉 =
148
𝐵2
        (11) 
which yields the ratio: 
𝑅
𝐻
=
2.405
√2∙𝜋
= 0.55          (12) 
From this consideration, the theoretical optimum for the H/D ratio is 0.9 with regard to the condition 
for minimised mass of fissionable fuel. To reach passive removal of heat via the surface of the reactor 
vessel, the heat transport lengths inside the reactor have to be as short as possible, to keep 
maximum fuel temperatures for a given core power density under a certain level in the case of a 
hypothetical severe accident with depressurisation and loss of all cooling systems. Detailed 
considerations concerning this issue yield a ratio for H/D of between 2.5 and 3 for low-power HTR 
plants. Furthermore, the core height should not be too large because, according to the relations: 
∆𝑝 ~ 𝐻3           (13) 
𝑁𝑝 ~ 𝐻
3           (14) 
Pressure loss (∆𝑝) and pump power (𝑁𝑝) increase cubically with increasing core height. For these 
reasons, reactor core heights of greater than 10 m are not efficient. A very important requirement 
for new reactor concepts in the future will be the possibility to construct simple shutdown systems 
for the operation of regulation and shutdown processes from the outer lateral sides of the core. 
Considerations on neutron physics yield an upper limit for the core radius of cylindrical systems of 
about 1.5 m. By using graphite noses, which may contain shutdown elements and extend into the 
core, the core radius could be enlarged to 1.75 m. Apart from that the transition to core geometries 
other than cylinders is possible so as to fulfil the requirement to influence reactivity from the sides. 
High cores, i.e. large H/D ratios, have a positive effect in terms of a uniform sphere flow. If vessel 
steel containers are used to incorporate the reactor core, the limitation of the containment diameter 
< 6 m and the need for a reflector thickness of 1 m lead to core diameters of around 3 m. 
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3.4. Layout of the core of the HTR Module 
Some major requirements had to be fulfilled during the laying out of the core of the HTR Module. In 
part they were very different from those, which until that time were usual in HTR technology. These 
new aspects were mainly introduced to improve the safety of the concept. 
 All control and shutdown procedures are carried out from the side reflector. The penetration 
of rods into the pebble bed is totally avoided. Interactions between shutdown elements and 
fuel elements are excluded. 
 The strong negative temperature coefficient should be sufficient to shut down the reactor 
(hot status); this includes the stopping of the helium circulator, as this has been used in the 
AVR as a normal procedure. 
 The fuel elements pass the reactor often enough (MEDUL cycle) to provide relatively flat 
power density distribution in the axial direction. In the HTR Module this includes 15 runs 
through the core. 
 The uranium content of single fuel elements was limited to small values (7 g/fuel element) to 
provide a large moderation ratio in the core. In this case, during water ingress accidents the 
reactivity gain is relatively small and unimportant. 
 As far as the dimensions of the core of the HTR Module are concerned, the possibility to 
remove the self-acting decay heat and to limit the maximum temperature to a value of 
1 600 °C and the requirement to shut down the system (1st and 2nd system) leads to a core 
diameter of 3 m and an average power density of 3 MW/m3. The fuel management causes a 
peak factor in the power density of 1.7. The core height has some limitations because the 
pressure drop in the core depends cubic from the height of the core. The technical 
requirement to use single stage helium circulators and therefore to limit the total pressure 
drop in the primary helium circuit limits the allowable pressure drop in the core. Together 
with the planned thermal power of 200 MW for one unit, these conditions result in an 
average core height of 9.4 m for the HTR Module. 
Some important data on the core of the HTR Module are given in Table 3. For comparison the data 
on the AVR core and the THTR core are included. This table demonstrates that the main data on the 
core layout of the HTR Module can be evaluated as being fully proven. 
Large differences result from changes to the control and shutdown system. The avoidance of 
graphite noses allows equalisation of the flow of pebbles in the core. The arrangement of all 
absorber elements in borings in the side reflector reduces the forces on fuel elements drastically. 
 
Table 3: Some data on the core layout (AVR and THTR data for comparison) 
Parameter Dimension HTR Module AVR THTR 
Thermal power MW 200 46 750 
Average core 
power density 
MW/m3 3 2.2 6 
Fuel cycle  MEDUL MEDUL MEDUL 
Flow of helium  Downwards Upwards Downwards 
Helium pressure bar 60 10 40 
Helium inlet 
temperature 
Celsius 250 220 220 
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Average helium 
outlet temperature 
Celsius 700 950 750 
Max. helium outlet 
temperature 
Celsius 750 1 050 850 
Mass flow of 
helium 
kg/s 85.5 15 280 
Core diameter  M 3 3 5.2 
Core height 
(average) 
M 9.43 3 5.2 
Shutdown 
elements 
 Inside reflector In graphite 
noses 
Inside 
reflector + pebble 
bed 
Max. temperature 
in LOCA 
Celsius < 1 600 < 1 300 < 2 400 
 
3.5. Helium pressure 
Determining the helium pressure in the primary system (pHe), the following aspect has to be 
considered: increasing pressure increases the efficiency of the plant due to decreasing expenses 
relating to pumping power. The ratio of blower power to reactor power is: 
𝑁𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟
𝑁𝑅
≈
1
𝑝𝐻𝑒
           (15) 
Or for the approximate total efficiency of the power plant: 
𝜂𝑡𝑜𝑡 ≈ 𝜂𝑐𝑝 −
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑝𝐻𝑒
          (16) 
where 𝜂𝑐𝑝 denotes the efficiency of the thermodynamic cycle process. Heat-transfer processes in 
heat exchangers are increased with increasing pressure, i.e. increase the heat flux through pipe walls 
and by this decrease the heat exchange surface. With increasing pressure, flow cross sections or 
pressure losses may be reduced in all parts of HTR plants. However, increasing the system pressure 
will increase the stresses in the primary system due to higher mechanical loads. This would make a 
proportional increase in the thickness of the vessel wall necessary. An increase in system pressure 
would also lead to an increase in helium inventory. The reactor building has to be designed to 
withstand depressurisation due to an accident. Extensive analyses showed pressures in the range 
between 40 and 60 bar to be the best compromise for HTR plants in view of the use of vessel steel 
containers as well as containers from reinforced concrete. 
 
3.6. Helium temperatures in the primary circuit 
The choice of helium inlet temperature (Tin) into the reactor core influences the layout of an HTR 
plant in the following way: depending on the flow path, the inlet temperature determines the 
temperature of the top and bottom reflectors respectively and should always be higher than 200 °C 
to avoid problems connected with the Wigner effect. Specific amounts of energy from irradiation are 
stored in the graphite lattice; these amounts of energy can escape the lattice continuously only at 
temperatures > 200 °C. For a constant helium loop layout the helium mass flux increases with 
increasing Tin. As a consequence, a blower with a higher level of power has to be installed. A simple 
estimate for the dependency reads as follows: 
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𝑁𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 ~ ?̇?
3           (17) 
The layout of the primary circuit becomes more complicated with increasing inlet temperature of the 
cooling gas. The material properties of the steel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) get worse; in the 
case of a reinforced concrete container the expenses for liner insulation would increase. With 
increasing helium inlet temperature the areas of the heater surfaces are reduced, particularly in the 
cooling water pre-heater. In particular, the effect of increasing helium mass flux with increasing 
helium inlet temperature has a disadvantageous impact on all gas-conducting systems, especially on 
the hot gas channels. Either the dimensions increase or increased pressure losses have to be 
accepted. A certain limit for the construction of sensitive reactor structures can be found 
approximately at Tin ~ 400 °C. Considering all of the aspects mentioned above, a reactor inlet 
temperature in a range between 220 and 300 °C is a good compromise for HTR systems. 
In determining the helium outlet temperature (Tout) of the reactor core, the following aspects have to 
be considered: with increasing Tout the mass flux decreases while all other parameters are fixed, and 
we get the already-discussed advantages such as reductions in pressure losses, blower power, 
increase in system effectiveness and advantages for the layout of gas-conducting structures. On the 
other hand, steam generators without helium heated pre-heaters in particular need a helium 
temperature < 750 °C to avoid problems for the layout of the superheater systems due to tube wall 
temperatures being too high. Specific process-heat applications need temperatures as high as 
1 000 °C in the helium loop. 
Especially, in case core rods are to be used, the helium outlet temperature must be examined 
thoroughly. The strength values of highly heat-resistant construction materials considerably decrease 
at temperatures > 700 °C. Complete ceramic materials as fuel elements and structural graphite are in 
the first instance insensitive in view of the temperature choice, however impurities inside the helium 
loop will react faster with graphite surfaces at increased temperatures. Experiences with AVR 
showed that the level of fission-product release depended on the hot gas temperature during normal 
operation. The heating surfaces in steam generators or process-heat exchangers become smaller 
with increasing Tout. Hot gas-conducting pipes can be made of metal; at higher temperatures ceramic 
materials should be used. For electrical power generating plants temperatures of between 700 and 
750 °C and for process-heat-generating systems temperatures of between 900 and 950 °C are 
reasonable compromises. 
 
3.7. Heavy metal and burnup 
The heavy-metal content per fuel element (FE) is in a wide range between 5 g/FE and 15 g/FE and has 
been used successfully for a long time in the AVR reactor. The following aspects are to be considered 
when choosing these parameters: the cost of the production of the fuel elements decreases with 
increasing heavy-metal load; the same aspect is valid for the cost of radioactive waste management, 
due to the proportionality of the cost to the volume of the fuel elements. The heavy-metal load has 
an important role, inversely proportional to the moderation ratio for neutron physics of an HTR core. 
Moderation ratios of between 300 and 500 lead to acceptable core layouts and fuel costs. For water 
ingress incidents, the heavy-metal load plays a role to such a degree that the moderator ratio is 
increased by the penetrating water and therefore an increase in reactivity may be possible. Fuel 
elements with low heavy-metal loads have a positive characteristic with regard to the latter aspect. It 
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is in principal possible to assemble an HTR core from a mixture of pure graphite spheres (‘blind 
spheres’) and fuel element spheres and, by so doing, to lower manufacturing and waste-
management costs. Decades of experience with the AVR reactor and analyses of irradiation 
programmes led to a technologically and economically reasonable compromise for values of 
approximately 100 000 MWd/t of heavy metal for the fuel burnup. Certain shifts result from different 
heavy-metal loads of the fuel elements or from different fuel cycles. In particular, if in future an 
increase in the conversion rate or even fuel breeding systems should be required, the tendency will 
go in the direction of a lower burnup, to keep the influence of parasitic neutron capture in 
protactinium-233 as low as possible while using a thorium cycle. The available particle types today 
are mainly TRISO particles. From an operational point of view, the initially developed BISO-coated 
particles are completely sufficient concerning fission-product release, however they are 
outperformed by the behaviour of TRISO-coated particles in case of hypothetical accident conditions, 
for example with core heat-up to temperatures > 1 500 °C. Advantages seen in nuclear fuel 
processing of BISO particles should not play a role in the next several decades. There are no big 
differences in the production costs for fuel experiments with different particle types. Today, fuel 
elements with BISO and TRISO particles can be seen to be fully tested and commercially deployable 
due to the long-term tests in AVR reactors. 
 
3.8. Feeding principles 
Today, two different feeding systems are available for pebble-bed reactors. The multi-cycle feeding 
process (MEDUL) tested in AVR and THTR reactors, where the fuel elements pass multiple times 
through the reactor core until they reach their final burnup stage, allows the partially burned-up fuel 
elements to be controlled and measured from time to time. As a consequence of this operational 
mode, relatively uniform power generation is reached in the axial direction. The peak factors of the 
power density distribution are low. On the other hand, considerable effort is needed for burnup 
determination, distribution and re-feed of the fuel elements. One of the reasons for developing the 
OTTO mode was to considerably reduce the number of components in the fuel feeding system. At 
the same time it is possible with the OTTO cycle fuel feeding system to keep the temperature 
difference between the cooling gas and the fuel at the core outlet very low, therefore with regard to 
fuel element stresses, a cooling gas temperature > 1 000 °C can be realised technically. On the other 
hand, the OTTO mode increases the effective dose stresses of the top reflector and the upper lateral 
reflectors due to the large increase in fast neutron flux in the upper core region. If core rods are used 
in reactors with an OTTO fuel cycle, attention has to be paid to compacting effects after repeated 
core penetrations of the rods to greater depths, due to the missing possibility of loosening up of the 
pebble bed by recirculation of the spheres. The use of OTTO cycles is not favoured at core heights 
> 6 m due to a very high peak factor in the power density, with negative consequences on, for 
example, core heat-up in case of a hypothetical accident. 
 
3.9. Questions concerning the plant layout 
In addition, it should be mentioned here that, unlike in reactor lines that have been established in 
the long-term such as pressurised or boiling-water reactors, for the technical design of the plant 
layout different ways have been realised. Here only some important aspects are mentioned. Details 
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of individual components linked to design questions can be found in the ‘Components’ section . Out 
of the multitude of possibilities, only a few variants are briefly explained here. 
Vessel concept: Initially applicable here are, as a first principle, a steel RPV, reinforced concrete 
containment or prestressed containers latter made of spheroidal cast iron or cast steel may be used. 
In case of a reinforced concrete vessel, the components of the primary circuit may be incorporated in 
a big cavern, as was the case in the THTR. Or the so-called pod boiler principle may be used, in which 
the reactor core in a central cavity and the heat exchangers in the container wall are located in 
different cavities. Layouts for the primary loop oriented at concepts used for pressurised water 
reactors were developed for the HTR. At this point the layout principles of the modular reactor are 
referred to, in which the reactor and heat exchanger are located in separate steel containers, 
connected via a coaxial pipe. Instead of vessel steel containers, at least for the housing of the 
reactor, prestressed pressure vessels made of spheroidal cast iron, cast steel or even concrete may 
be used in the future. 
Hot gas pipes: These components can consist of coaxial pipes with inner insulation or simple pipes 
with corresponding inner insulation. Also, the flow through ceramic structures as flow conducting 
principle may be beneficially used. This principle was successfully used for two decades in the AVR 
and the concept was also used for the HTR-100 reactor. 
Residual heat removal: For the removal of residual heat, production loops or separate residual heat 
removal loops are under consideration. After a certain time, the liner cooling system can take over 
the removal of residual heat in reinforced concrete vessels. For reactor systems with — to a large 
extent — inherent safety features concrete cell coolers outside the RPV are envisaged, or, after 
failure of the concrete cell coolers, the concrete structures themselves will work as heat sinks. 
Number of loops: Depending on the total power of the plant, and partly also corresponding to the 
intended use of the nuclear heat source loop, between 1 and 8 loops are planned or were put in 
place, respectively. 
Arrangement of blowers: Every loop has its own primary loop blower. These blowers may be placed 
either above or below the steam generator or, as in the case of the THTR, laterally (inside the 
reinforced concrete wall). 
Shutdown elements: In some designs, the use of core rods and reflector rods are provided. 
Particularly for plants in the mid-power range, this diverse implementation of the shutdown system 
was carried out or is planned for new plants, respectively. For plants in the low-power range, all 
shutdown and control processes should be carried out from the core boundary. To achieve this goal, 
reflector rods and absorber systems for small shutdown spheres falling into reflector rod holes will 
be used. 
Reactor safety building: Depending on the layout principle, with regard to severe accidents this 
building can be equipped with or without inner liners. In addition it is possible to construct the 
building above or below the surface, or partly below. 
The above listing of layout principles is given only in a very incomplete manner. These principles 
allow different technical solutions for HTR plants depending on the type of application, installation 
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size and requirements imposed. Optimisation is always possible under consideration of safety 
features and equipment, cost-effectiveness and current state of technology. 
 
4. Fuel and fuel performance 
Originally developed to provide oxidation resistance for carbide fuel kernels, the coated particle has 
advanced into a sophisticated fission product containment system that can operate at the high 
temperatures of a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR). Each coated particle is a miniature 
fuel element with a ceramic kernel that contains fissile or fertile fuel material protected by a 
sequence of ceramic coating layers that perform specific design functions. The fuel kernel is 
commonly an oxide or carbide compound of uranium (with various enrichments), thorium or 
plutonium. The ceramic coatings in most general use are pyrolytic PyC and SiC, although a variety of 
other materials like ZrC continue to be developed. The TRISO-coated fuel particle, shown in Figure 
10, has a dense SiC layer sandwiched between two dense PyC layers. Figure 11 is generally accepted 
worldwide as the reference particle concept for HTGRs. Research and development continues 
worldwide to further improve and extend the TRISO particles’ fuel performance envelope. 
 
Figure 10: Scanning electron microscope photograph of a purposely cracked TRISO-coated particle 
showing the fuel kernel and the coating layers (source: Forschungszentrum Jülich) 
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Figure 11: High-magnification scanning electron microscope photomicrograph of the TRISO coating 
(Rooyen, 2010) (source: Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University) 
 
The low-enriched uranium (LEU) UO2 LTI TRISO particle is often referred to as ‘modern HTGR fuel’. 
Table 4 describes the general characteristics of the reference fuel particle design. 
 
Table 4: German reference coated particle: LEU UO2 with an LTI TRISO coating 
Component Material Dimensions (µm) Density (Mg/m3) 
(as-fabricated) 
Fuel kernel Uranium dioxide 
(UOx, x ≤ 2.015) 
Diameter: 500 ≥ 10.4 
TRISO coating    
Buffer layer Porous Thickness: 95 ~ 1.0 
Inner PyC layer Dense PyC Thickness: 40 1.85 
Fission product barrier Dense SiC Thickness: 35 3.20 
Outer PyC layer Dense PyC Thickness: 40 1.85 
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4.1. Fuel manufacturing 
Fuel elements contain near defect-free UO2 TRISO-coated particles, homogeneously distributed 
within a graphite matrix with very low levels of uranium contamination. The processes used to 
manufacture this fuel are now being used worldwide (China, France, Korea, South Africa, United 
States) to reproduce the German high-quality fuel of the 1980s. 
 
4.1.1. UO2 fuel kernels 
The spherical fuel kernel consists of stoichiometric uranium dioxide (UO2) of near theoretical density. 
The kernel is the primary power source and generates almost all the fission products. The fuel kernel 
also serves as a significant barrier to radionuclide release by immobilising many of the fission 
products as stable oxide compounds and delaying the diffusive release of others, allowing them to 
decay into more stable isotopes. These processes substantially reduce fission-product release from 
particles employing oxide fuel compounds. 
Modern fuel kernels are produced from aqueous heavy-metal solutions. The LEU UO2 fuel kernels 
manufactured for the high-quality fuel particles in the German fuel development programme were 
based on a modified sol-gel external gelation microsphere fabrication process, developed by NUKEM 
and known as the gel precipitation process. Other HTGR fuel-kernel manufacturing processes may 
utilise the internal gelation technique for microsphere fabrication (Vaidya, 2008) (Hunt, 2010). 
LEU UO2 fuel-kernel production was found to be relatively simple, with few process steps and small 
volumes of effluent and waste, and well suited to automated manufacturing (Kadner, 1977) (Venter, 
2004). Similar kernel-fabrication processes are employed to make the LEU UO2 fuel kernels used in 
spherical elements for the HTR-10 and the HTR-PM in China (Fu X., 2004) and as the reference 
kernel-making process for the PBMR project in South Africa (Mueller, 2006). 
 
4.1.2. TRISO coating 
The TRISO coating is composed of four successive ceramic layers and fabricated over a dense heavy 
metal spherical fuel kernel. Each of the layers has one or more design functions as outlined in Table 
5. 
 
Table 5: Design functions of the ceramic coating layers of the TRISO-coated fuel particle 
TRISO particle coating layer Design function 
Buffer 
(50 % dense) 
- Provides void volume for gaseous fission products and 
reaction products (CO, CO2) released from fuel kernel. 
- Accommodates fuel-kernel swelling. 
- Protects PyC and SiC layers from fission product recoil. 
Inner PyC 
(density ≥ 1.85 Mg/m3) 
- Diffusion barrier to fission products, retains gaseous fission 
products. 
- Impermeable layer prevents Cl2 from reaching kernel 
during SiC deposition and prevents CO from interacting 
with SiC during irradiation. 
- Provides mechanical substrate for deposition of SiC layer. 
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- Induces compressive stresses in SiC due to irradiation 
induced shrinkage. 
SiC 
(density ≥ 3.20 Mg/m3) 
- Primary barrier to fission products, retains all gaseous and 
solid fission products (except Ag) at normal operating 
temperatures < 1 250 °C and in accidents up to1 600 °C. 
- Load bearing layer for particle. 
Outer PyC 
(density > 1.85 Mg/m3) 
- Creates compressive stress on SiC due to irradiation-
induced shrinkage. 
- Retains gaseous fission products. 
- Provides bonding layer with carbonaceous fuel element 
matrix. 
 
The first coating is a low-density porous carbonaceous layer called the buffer and it is deposited 
directly over the fuel kernel. The buffer layer provides the necessary void volume for the 
accumulation of gaseous fission products released from the fuel kernel, accommodates fuel-kernel 
swelling and serves as a sacrificial layer for fission fragments. 
The second layer is a high-density, isotropic carbon layer, called the inner pyrocarbon (iPyC). Porosity 
in the iPyC is strictly controlled since the SiC layer deposited on its surface partially extends into the 
surface pores, tightly adhering to this layer. The iPyC is a gas-tight coating that protects the kernel 
from hot gaseous chlorine compounds during SiC deposition and provides a smooth substrate for SiC 
deposition. The iPyC retains the fission gases Xe and Kr and serves as a diffusion barrier to metallic 
fission products. During irradiation, this layer shrinks and the contraction helps to reduce tensile 
stresses on the SiC. 
The third layer is a near theoretical density SiC layer. The SiC layer is sandwiched between two PyC 
layers and serves as the pressure-bearing component of the particle as well as the primary metallic 
fission product diffusion barrier. 
The fourth layer is another high-density, isotropic carbon layer, called the outer pyrocarbon (oPyC). 
This layer serves as a further diffusion barrier for gaseous and metallic fission products, and like the 
iPyC layer it also contracts during irradiation, helping to reduce tensile stress on the SiC. The oPyC 
also protects the SiC during particle handling and sphere/compact formation, and provides a bonding 
surface for the overcoating process. 
The four ceramic coating layers in the TRISO design are prepared by chemical vapour deposition 
(CVD) processes in high-temperature fluidised-bed furnaces. The schematic in Figure 12 shows the 
primary components of a high-temperature fluidised-bed furnace. Deposition conditions such as 
temperatures and rates are shown in Table 6 for each of the constituent layers, along with the carrier 
and deposition gases employed (Brähler, 2008) (Brähler, 2010). They are representative for the 
TRISO-coated LEU UO2 fuel particles produced in the 1980s within the German fuel development 
programme and are similar in recent fuel programmes. 
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Figure 12: Schematic of high-temperature fluidised-bed CVD coating furnace (source: NUKEM 
Technologies) 
 
Table 6: Typical parameters for CVD processes employed to deposit ceramic coating layers on dense 
LEU UO2 fuel kernels to produce TRISO-coated particles (Huschka, 1977; Nothnagel, 2010) 
Layer Source gas/ 
carrier gas 
Deposition 
temperature (°C) 
Coating reactions Deposition rate 
(μm/min) 
Buffer C2H2/Ar 1 300–1 450 C2H2 → 2C + H2 15-25 
IPyC C3H6+C2H2/Ar 1 250–1 400 C3H6 → 3C + 3H2 
C2H2 → 2C + H2 
3-7 
SiC CH3SiCl3/H2 1 500–1 600 CH3SiCl3+ H2 → 
SiC + 3HCl + 3H2 
0.2 
OPyC C3H6+C2H2/Ar 1 250–1 400 C3H6 → 3C + 3H2 
C2H2 → 2C + H2 
3-7 
 
 
4.1.3. Spherical fuel element 
The fuel element for a pebble-bed HTGR (Nabielek, 1984) (Nabielek, et al., 1990) (Tang C.H., 2002) 
(Vaidya, 2008) is a sphere with a diameter of 60 mm consisting of a spherical fuel zone with a 
diameter of ~ 50 mm, in which the TRISO-coated particles are randomly distributed in graphitic 
matrix material. A fuel-free shell of graphite matrix ~ 5 mm thick is then moulded to the fuel zone 
(Figure 13). The matrix material consists of a carbonised organic binder and nuclear-grade graphite 
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material that acts as a fission neutron moderator, heat-transfer medium and protection against 
external forces. The graphitic matrix material exhibits high density, high thermal conductivity, high 
mechanical strength, low thermal expansion, low anisotropy, low Young’s modulus, good corrosion 
resistance, good dimensional stability under neutron irradiation and a very low concentration of 
impurities (Schulze, 1982). 
 
Figure 13: Cross section of German reference 60 mm-diameter spherical fuel element showing TRISO 
particles randomly distributed in the 50 mm-diameter fuel zone (source: NUKEM Technologies) 
 
Spherical fuel elements are used in the core of a pebble-bed reactor that is cylindrical or annular in 
shape and filled with several hundred thousand spherical elements. Fresh fuel elements and graphite 
elements are inserted from the top and slowly sink down through the core under the influence of 
gravity. On-load refuelling during full-power operation is a matter of course. When the fuel elements 
reach the bottom of the core they are funnelled through a mechanical unloading system where the 
irradiated spheres can be withdrawn or recirculated. In recirculating systems like AVR, THTR and HTR 
Module each fuel sphere is tested for mechanical and chemical integrity and a burnup measurement 
is made. Those fuel elements identified for further operations are recirculated and reinserted at the 
top of the core. In once-through systems the fuel spheres are withdrawn completely. 
The fabrication process for spherical elements as developed by NUKEM in Germany, shown in Figure 
14, consists of the following steps: (1) resinated graphitic matrix powder preparation (kneading, 
drying, milling); (2) overcoating of particles; (3) pre-moulding of fuel zone and high-pressure cold 
isostatic pressing of the complete fuel element; (4) machining; and (5) carbonisation at 800 °C and 
final heat treatment at 1950 °C. 
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Figure 14: Process steps in manufacturing the German reference 60 mm-diameter HTGR spheres (source: 
NUKEM Technologies) 
 
Following Germany’s selection of LEU UO2 with a TRISO coating as its reference HTGR particle system 
in 1980, NUKEM Technologies manufactured large numbers of high-quality spherical elements in 
production-scale facilities. In total, 59 400 spherical elements were produced and destined for real-
time irradiation in the AVR and accelerated irradiation performance tests in European MTRs. Table 7 
provides the fuel manufacturing and characterisation details for this massive effort (Hrovat, et al., 
1988) (Schulze, 1982) (IAEA, 1997). 
In 1981 NUKEM fabricated 24 600 spherical fuel elements for AVR Reload 19, with the designation 
GLE-3. These elements were fabricated from fuel particle production sets comprising multiple LEU 
UO2 kernel production runs and TRISO-coated particle batches. The enrichment of the GLE-3 
elements was 9.82 wt % 235U and each spherical element contained 16 400 coated particles. The GLE-
3 elements were all fabricated with A3-27 matrix material with a measured as-manufactured free 
uranium fraction, as designated by the Ufree/Utotal value of < 50.7 × 10
–6. 
Approximately 100 test elements, including 60 mm-diameter spherical elements along with non-
reference test elements (20 mm-diameter spheres and cylindrical compacts), were also produced for 
accelerated irradiation testing in 1981 in the LEU Phase 1 effort. The test specimens selected for 
accelerated testing in the first series of MTR experiments (SL P1, HFR-K3, HFR-P4, FRJ2-K13 and FRJ2-
P27) contained fuel particles with an enrichment of 9.82 wt % 235U. 
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Two additional large-scale fuel element production campaigns were manufactured in 1983 and 1985. 
They were AVR Reload 21, consisting of 20 500 elements designated as type GLE-4/1, and AVR 
Reload 21-2, consisting of 14 000 elements designated as type GLE 4/2. Three GLE-4/1 fuel elements 
were included in accelerated MTR irradiation test FRJ2-K15. The GLE-4 elements were also fabricated 
from particle production sets comprising multiple LEU UO2 fuel-kernel production runs and TRISO-
coated particle batches. The enrichment of the GLE-4 elements was 16.76 wt % 235U and each 
spherical element contained 9 560 coated particles. The GLE-4/1 elements were fabricated with A3 
27 matrix material with a measured as-manufactured free uranium fraction of < 43 × 10 6. The GLE-
4/2 elements utilised A3-3 matrix material. More GLE-4/2 elements were fabricated for AVR than 
actually inserted for AVR refuelling purposes. The remaining elements were made available to 
European test facilities and HTGR research/development in other countries (China), and for future 
irradiation tests (HFR-EUbis (Fütterer M., 2008) in 2004 and HFR-EU1 (Laurie M, 2010) (Tang C.H., 
2010) in 2006) and out-of-reactor testing (HFR Petten and PBMR, South Africa). 
 
Table 7: Production-scale manufacturing details for high-quality spherical elements containing LEU UO2 
TRISO-coated fuel particles during period 1980 to 1988 
 Pre-1985 production Post-1985 production 
Characteristic GLE-3 Phase 1 GLE-4/1 GLE-4/2 Proof Test 
Kernel diameter (µm) 500 497 501 502.2 508 
Kernel density (Mg/m3) 10.80 10.81 10.85 10.86 10.72 
Coating layer thickness 
(µm) 
Buffer 
Inner PyC 
SiC 
Outer PyC 
 
 
93 
38 
35 
40 
 
 
94 
41 
36 
40 
 
 
92 
38 
33 
41 
 
 
92.3 
40.6 
35.9 
39.6 
 
 
102 
39 
36 
38 
Coating density 
(Mg/m3) 
Buffer 
Inner PyC 
SiC 
Outer PyC 
 
 
1.01 
1.86 
3.19 
1.89 
 
 
1.00 
~ 1.9 
3.20 
1.88 
 
 
1.013 
~ 1.9 
3.20 
1.88 
 
 
1.012 
1.87 
3.2 
1.87 
 
 
1.02 
1.92 
3.20 
1.92 
Fuel loading 
Heavy metal (g/FE) 
235U (g/FE) 
Enrichm. (wt % 235U) 
No CP/FE 
 
10 
1 
9.82 
16 400 
 
10 
1 
9.82 
16 400 
 
6 
1 
16.76 
9560 
 
6 
1 
16.76 
9560 
 
9.4 
1 
10.6 
14 600 
Matrix material A3-27 A3-27 A3-27 A3-3 A3-3 
Free uranium fraction 
Ufree/Utotal (× 10
–6) 
50.7 35 43.2 7.8 13.5 
Kernel sets 5 1 2 5 1 
Coating batches 65 1 54 29 8 
Coating batch size (kg) 5 5 3 3 5 
CP batch designation HT232-245 EUO 2308 HT354-383 HT385-393 
HT395-404 
HT406-423 
EUO 2358-
2365 
FE production lots 14 - 11 8 - 
FE produced 24 600 100 20 500 14 000 200 
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The fuel production processes employed to produce the AVR Reload 21-2 resulted in the highest-
quality fuel ever produced in the German fuel development programme. The as-manufactured free 
uranium fraction value for the GLE-4/2 spherical elements was < 8 × 10–6. 
A final fuel production campaign was conducted by NUKEM in 1988 to produce spherical elements 
for a proof test of the HTR Module concept. Approximately 200 reference spheres were fabricated 
from particle production sets comprising TRISO-coated particle batches. The proof test fuel particles 
had an enrichment of 10.6 wt % 235U. Each proof test spherical element contained 14 600 particles 
and utilised A3-3 matrix material. A total of eight spherical elements were selected for irradiation in 
the HTR Module proof test rigs HFR-K5 and HFR-K6 (four elements in each test, HFR — Petten). The 
as-manufactured free uranium fraction value for the proof test spherical elements was < 13.5 × 10–6. 
After irradiation in Petten, these eight spheres were sent to the Jülich Research Centre for PIE and 
later to ITU Karlsruhe for accident condition testing. Since then, fabrication processes based on those 
developed by NUKEM have been used to manufacture spherical HTGR fuel elements in China 
(Huschka H., 1977) and in South Africa (Nabielek, et al., 2010). 
 
4.1.4. As-manufactured fuel quality 
In HTGR coated fuel particles, the SiC layer represents the most important barrier to retain fission 
products. Its material properties and its mechanical and structural integrity are essential during fuel 
element manufacture, irradiation, throughout accidents and in long-term fuel storage at a disposal 
site. The burn-leach test has been established as the safest method to ascertain SiC integrity in oxide 
TRISO-coated particles. 
During the burn-leach test, the graphitic or carbonaceous components of the sample (oPyC in loose 
coated particles, complete spherical fuel elements, compact, coupons) are burnt in a muffle furnace 
at ~ 800 °C under air convection. The residue is treated with nitric acid and the amount of dissolved 
uranium analysed. Since SiC is corrosion resistant, it will withstand the attack. However, a particle 
with an imperfect or weak SiC coating layer will lead to a near quantitative kernel uranium inventory 
in the nitric acid solution. In addition, the uranium content of incompletely coated particles (PyC 
only) will be dissolved and measured in the solution. 
The burn-leach test results are presented as a ratio of the measured uranium (in acid solution) to the 
total uranium content of the original sample (Ufree/Utotal). The detection limit of burn-leach testing on 
unbonded particles and fuel elements is of the order 1 × 10–6 or 0.0001 wt %. 
The quality of the spherical fuel elements manufactured in production-scale facilities by NUKEM 
were characterised using the burn-leach technique. The results are provided in Table 7 and Table 8 
and shown in Figure 15. Blue circles represent measured burn-leach results obtained by NUKEM 
demonstrating the post-1985 improvement in manufacturing quality. The improvements in quality 
these data represent were due to the improved and perfected tabling of kernels and particles and 
the introduction of an automated process for overcoating of particles. The quality level of the 
German fuel produced in the 1980s set a worldwide standard that was later followed by other 
countries active in HTGR fuel development. 
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Figure 15: Number of UO2 TRISO particle defects in sphere manufacture as a function of the number of 
particles in the spherical fuel element 
 
However, for fuel quality, the limitations of failure statistics (Audebeau, 1971) must be considered. 
With the observation of n defects in a sample of N particles, the expected failure fraction x is given by 
the ratio n/N. The quality of this result is strongly dependent on the sample size, N. When the true 
failure fraction is  , then the probability of observing n failures in a sample of N particles is 
proportional to   nNn   1  and this represents the binomial distribution (Abramowitz, et al., 
1965). Given that in a random sample of size N, there are n failures observed, the probability C that 
the true failure fraction will be in the range 
max 0  is given by the incomplete beta function 
(Abramowitz M., 1965b). 
 
 
 
 nN,nB
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max
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o
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11
1
1
1 



      (18) 
 
Therefore, evaluating the one-sided upper 95 % limit of the expected failure fraction n/N can be 
accomplished by computing the inverse, viz.: 
 nN,nB .max 
 111950          (19) 
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The results for the LEU UO2 TRISO fuel burn-leach data are listed in Table 8. In terms of free uranium, 
these are better by an order of magnitude than the earlier BISO fuels (Kania M.J., 1980) for AVR and 
THTR with Ufree /Utotal between 3 and 9 × 10
–4. 
 
Table 8: Failure statistics for LEU UO2 TRISO-coated fuels based on burn-leach results 
 Pre-1985 production Post-1985 production 
Fuel element type AVR 19 AVR 21-1 AVR 21-2 Proof test fuel 
Year of production 1981 1983 1985 1988 
Particles per sphere 16 400 9 560 9 560 14 600 
Spheres tested 70 55 40 10 
Particles tested (= N) 1 148 000 525 800 382 400 146 000 
Defects found (= n) 56 24 3 3 
Defect particle fraction 
expected (= n/N) 
upper 95 % 
 
49 × 10–6 
61 × 10–6 
 
46 × 10–6 
64 × 10–6 
 
8 × 10–6 
20 × 10–6 
 
21 × 10–6 
53 × 10–6 
 
4.2. HTGR fuel performance under accident conditions 
Demonstrating the capability of spherical fuel elements to withstand a severe depressurisation 
accident with no measurable loss of fission product was a primary objective of the German fuel 
development programme. Since the 1970s, irradiated fuel elements retrieved from AVR and from 
MTR tests have been investigated in accident simulation tests. Prior to the mid 1980s, the 
temperature margins explored were up to 2500 °C where fission-product release was massive. 
In response to the reactor designer’s requirement for a passively safe HTGR, the KÜFA (Kühlfinger 
Apparatur, i.e. cold finger device) furnace was designed and installed in the hot cells of the Jülich 
Research Centre for high precision, online fission-product release measurements under simulated 
accident conditions (Gottaut H., 1990). This facility made it possible to demonstrate that modern LEU 
UO2 TRISO-coated fuel particles retain all safety-relevant fission products up to 1 600 °C at a level not 
exceeding release under normal operating conditions, which in itself is very low. 
 
4.2.1. Simulation testing of core heat-up depressurisation under dry conditions 
The maximum expected fuel element temperature evolution in a ‘depressurised loss of forced 
coolant’ (DLOFC) accident in a small modular HTGR is shown in Figure 15 (Reutler, et al., 1984). The 
maximum fuel temperature limit is set at 1 600 °C based upon the estimated maximum core 
temperature of ~ 1 500 °C plus a reasonable estimate of the effect thermal property uncertainties 
have on this maximum temperature estimate. For testing purposes, the temperature range 1 600-
1 700-1 800 °C is of interest for the core heat-up simulation testing programme as illustrated in 
Figure 15. The most relevant fission and activation products include the long-lived strontium (90Sr), 
silver (110mAg), caesium (134Cs, 137Cs) and krypton (85Kr) and the short-lived iodine (131I) and xenon 
(133Xe) fission products. 
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Figure 16: Temperature evolution during depressurisation and core heat-up in small modular HTGRs in 
comparison to the temperature profiles used in KÜFA tests 
 
4.2.2. Fission-product release from UO2 kernels at 1 600 °C 
Little fission product retention can be expected in exposed UO2 fuel kernels at elevated 
temperatures. Figure 17 shows that the release of silver, xenon, iodine and caesium from an exposed 
UO2 fuel kernel quickly approaches 100 % during a 1 600 °C heating test. Early, within the 30-hour 
heat-up phase to the test temperature, significant release has already occurred for 131I, 133Xe and 
137Cs. After 50 to 100 h at 1 600 °C, nearly 100 % of the inventories of these fission products have 
been released. Only the fission product 90Sr is strongly retained in the oxide kernels at this 
temperature, but this is not the case for carbide kernels. The primary barriers to the volatile fission 
products like iodine, xenon and caesium are the coating layers of the TRISO-coated particle, 
especially the SiC layer. 
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Figure 17: Fission-product release from exposed UO2 kernels during 1 600 °C heating test 
 
4.2.3. Comparison of fuel quality at 1 600 °C 
With regard to the measurement of 131I (half-life = 8.02 d) release from various fuel configurations 
during heating at 1 600 °C, Figure 18 illustrates three different release behaviours (Schenk, et al., 
1991): 
 exposed UO2 fuel kernels, ~ 100 % 
131I release; 
 irradiated fuel elements with TRISO-coated fuel particles (cross-contaminated in the AVR by 
older lower-performance BISO fuel from the 1960s and 1970s), 131I release behaviour at 10–5 
level; and 
 irradiated fuel elements with modern TRISO-coated fuel particles, 131I release behaviour at 
the 10–9 to 10–8 level. 
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The experimental results represent iodine release from a UO2 fuel kernel, from a contaminated HTGR 
fuel element and from modern HTGR fuel elements irradiated in a clean environment, and in 
between these are nine orders of magnitude in release. 
 
 
Figure 18: Iodine-131 release from various fuel configurations during 1 600 °C heating tests 
 
4.2.4. KÜFA tests in Jülich 1985-1995 and in Karlsruhe 2005-2010 
In the unrestricted core heat-up simulation tests performed on irradiated spherical fuel elements 
containing LEU UO2 TRISO particles, no single particle failures, nor any noticeable caesium or 
strontium releases, were observed during the first few hundred hours in any of the 1 600 °C heating 
tests. The number of particle failures and the fission-product release inventories do however 
increase as the accident simulation temperature rises to 1 700 °C and 1 800 °C. Figure 19 and Figure 
Page 44 
 
20 show the measured time-dependent krypton and caesium release profiles during isothermal 
heating tests conducted at 1 600 °C to 2 100 °C. The krypton and caesium releases are representative 
of a whole series of fission products. The heating tests demonstrate near 100 % retention at 1 600 °C 
for the accident-specific first hundred hours or more. 
 
 
Figure 19: Krypton-85 release during heating tests with irradiated LEU UO2 TRISO spherical fuel elements 
irradiated in MTRs (HFR, FRJ2) and in AVR 
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Figure 20: Caesium-137 release during heating tests with irradiated LEU UO2 TRISO spherical fuel 
elements irradiated in MTRs (HFR, FRJ2) and in AVR 
 
In particular: 
 Caesium is retained at 1 600 °C in the fuel kernel, by the SiC and by the A3 matrix of the fuel 
element with SiC providing for the strongest retention. This retention, however, can only be 
guaranteed by modern high-quality TRISO coatings. At 1 800 °C there is no delay in caesium 
release by the kernel and the matrix, and SiC also becomes permeable to most fission 
products. 
 Krypton is always released later than caesium due to the additional retention provided by 
the dense, intact pyrocarbon layers. However, if the PyC layers are not intact krypton is 
released as readily as caesium. 
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 Strontium is retained much better in oxide kernels and the sphere matrix than caesium. 
Therefore, strontium release generally occurs later than caesium. 
More recently, accident simulation testing with irradiated LEU UO2 TRISO spherical fuel elements 
have been performed in Karlsruhe, Germany (Freis, 2010) (Seeger, 2012) in a recently installed KÜFA 
facility. These tests are still under evaluation, but results show clearly that there was not a single 
particle failure in all these additional heating tests. 
If the maximum burnup in the fuel element is kept strictly below 11 % FIMA, as is typical for current 
pebble-bed concept HTGR designs, the allowable fuel temperature limit may be higher than 1 600 °C. 
However, this remains to be established with new experiments. If the burnup of UO2 TRISO-coated 
particle fuel is pushed to ~ 15 % FIMA, fuel temperature must be rigorously limited to ≤ 1 600 °C 
(Figure 21). High burnup (14 % FIMA) LEU UO2 TRISO fuels show particle failure during the first 
300 hours at 1 600 °C. No particle failure was observed in lower burnup compact (11 % FIMA) at 
1 600 °C. 
 
 
Figure 21: Krypton-85 release at 1 600 °C from compacts with 11 % to 14 % FIMA burnup in comparison to 
spherical fuel elements (FE) with 4 % to 9 % FIMA 
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4.3. Accident simulation testing under oxidising conditions 
To assess fuel behaviour and fission-product release in accidents under oxidising conditions, the 
KORA furnace facility was designed and installed in the Jülich hot cells. This facility enables the 
simulation of (i) steam ingress, typically at 800 °C, and (ii) air ingress effects on TRISO-coated 
particles in the range from 1 300 °C to 1 500 °C. 
Steam ingress can lead to the additional release of fission gases and iodine from defective 
(manufacture-induced) and failed (irradiation-induced) fuel particles. Data are available from in-
reactor and out-of-reactor testing programmes. 
During unimpeded air ingress, early assumptions predicted complete particle failure at 1 100 °C. 
However, the available experimental evidence shows that it takes several days at 1 100 °C to oxidise 
the graphite in a spherical fuel element still leaving the TRISO particles intact. Only prolonged air 
ingress at 1 300 °C or at higher temperatures initiates failure of the TRISO-coated particles. 
 
4.3.1. Simulation of water ingress accident 
In the accident simulation tests for a water ingress accident with heated irradiated fuel spheres, 
water vapour is intermittently added to the helium purge gas. An enhanced release of fission gas was 
found to occur in the presence of exposed UO2 from failed fuel particles in the irradiated sphere. 
Figure 22 illustrates this enhanced release of 85Kr from the irradiated fuel element AVR 89/30 that 
contained two fabrication-related defective particles; 57 % of the stored krypton inventory was 
released during the steam injection. This release behaviour is similar to that observed after an 
increase in temperature. Intact TRISO-coated particles are not affected by water vapour over a wide 
range of temperatures. 
Irradiated UO2 fuel kernels obtained by cracking particles deconsolidated from spherical fuel 
elements, simulating irradiation-induced failures, exhibited a strong burnup dependence of the 
enhanced fission gas release (85Kr) after repeated water vapour injections at 800 °C. Only ~ 2 % of the 
85Kr inventory was released from kernels with a burnup of 5 % FIMA due to water vapour. In contrast, 
more than 17 % was released from kernels with a burnup of 9 % FIMA. 
 
 
 
Page 48 
 
 
Figure 22: Enhanced 
85
Kr release from irradiated spherical fuel element AVR 89/30 under intermittent 
steam injections 
 
4.3.2. Simulation of air ingress accident 
The prerequisite for air ingress in an HTGR is a very large leak, such as a rupture of the connecting 
vessel between the reactor core and the steam generator. Only then can excessively high graphite 
corrosion occur because of sufficient oxygen supply. Under extreme circumstances (open cell, open 
reactor building) it will still take 1 to 2 days for corrosion of the spherical fuel element fuel-free zone 
to progress to the point where the first fuel particles are exposed. At this point it is important how 
long the SiC coatings of the particles remain intact. 
Samples of 10 irradiated particles, each deconsolidated from an irradiated AVR spherical element, 
along with individual AVR fuel spheres were heated in an air stream of 30 litres per hour to 
investigate the air oxidation of the ceramic particle coatings and fuel element materials. The results 
of these investigations in terms of 85Kr release and particle failure in KORA (Korrosionsapparatur, i.e. 
corrosion device) furnace simulation tests are shown in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Heating tests in KORA with irradiated unbonded particles and irradiated fuel spheres in air 
(Schenk, 1995) 
 Test conditions 85Kr release 
Fuel 
sample 
No of 
particles 
Burnup 
(% 
FIMA) 
Heat-
up 
(h) 
Max. 
temperature 
(°C) 
Time 
(h) 
First 
failed 
particle 
after/at 
No of 
failed 
particles 
Fraction 
of failed 
particles 
AVR 
92/29.12 
10 9.2 14 1 400 400 397 h 1 0.1 
AVR 73/8, 
11 
10 4.7 15 1 500 25 8 h 10 1.0 
AVR 
92/29.13 
10 9.2 15 1 500 25 3 h 10 1.0 
AVR 
92/29.11 
10 9.2 28 1 620 1 1613 °C 10 1.0 
AVR 89/12 16 400 9.4 13 1 300 410 258 h 4 2.4 × 10–
4 
AVR 92/22 16 400 8.8 14 1 400 140 1 h 20 1.2 × 10–
3 
AVR 89/14 16 400 9.0 14 1 400 70 2 h 12 7.3 × 10–
4 
 
In air ingress simulation tests conducted at 1 100 °C, complete oxidation of the graphite matrix in 
spherical elements takes 70 to 100 hours. However, the TRISO-coated UO2 fuel particle remained 
intact over this period. During subsequent testing at elevated temperatures, the first SiC layers of 
particles were damaged at 1 300 °C, although only after more than 10 days of air ingress exposure. 
As the temperature increases during air ingress the time to SiC failure and fission-product release 
decreases. The first particle failures were observed after 1 or 2 hours at 1 400 °C and these may have 
been as-manufactured defective particles. In the 10 TRISO particle samples the first particle failure 
was observed after ~ 400 hours of exposure to air ingress at 1 400 °C. After 3 to 8 hours of exposure 
to air ingress at 1 500 °C the first particle failures were observed. In exposure to air ingress conditions 
at ~ 1 600 °C the first particle failures occurred at the end of the heat-up phase of the test when 
1 600 °C was reached. 
 
4.4. Fuel performance limits 
With modern HTGR fuels, the German LEU UO2 TRISO fuel performance is characterised by: 
 near complete retention of fission products in intact particles during normal operating 
conditions at temperatures < 1 250 °C and in accident conditions at temperatures ≤ 1 600 °C; 
 very low levels of contamination present in the outer coating layer of the TRISO particle and 
in the graphitic matrix of the fuel element. 
In this manner, the source term is dominated by defects during manufacture and by failures during 
irradiation and in accidents. Many tests conducted between 1981 and 2010 demonstrated excellent 
behaviour and the final performance assessment is limited only by sampling statistics. Therefore, in a 
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conservative way, the performance data collected during manufacture, irradiation testing and 
accident testing of reference 60 mm-diameter spherical fuel elements are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10: Final statistical evaluation of the performance data collected during manufacture, irradiation 
testing and accident testing of reference 
HTGR fuel spheres and fuel 
bodies with UO2 TRISO 
particles 
No of fuel 
bodies  
(60 mm-
diameter 
spheres) 
No of 
coated 
particles 
N 
No of 
defective/failed 
coated particles 
n 
Expected 
failure 
fraction 
= n/N 
One-sided 
upper 95 % 
confidence 
limit 
Manufacture 
pre-1985 125 1 673 800 80   
post-1985 50 528 400 6   
total 175 2 202 200 86 3.9 × 10–5 4.7 × 10–5 
Irradiation 
testing 
MTRs 19 276 680 0   
AVR 24 393 600 0   
total 43 670 280 0 0 4.5 × 10–6 
Accident 
testing 
1 600 °C 
iso. FZJ 
8 131 200 0   
1620 °C 
acc. FZJ 
5 82 000 5   
1 600 °C 
iso. ITU 
6 74 280 0   
total 19 287 480 5 1.7 × 10–5 3.7 × 10–5 
iso. = isothermal constant temperature heating test. 
acc. = temperature transient heating tests following predicted accident scenario. 
 
The manufacturing data in Table 10 represent two production-scale operation periods where 
reference 60 mm-diameter spherical elements with LEU UO2 TRISO fuel were produced by NUKEM in 
Germany: 
 pre-1985: 55 200 elements manufactured with 125 elements destructively examined; 
 post-1985: 14 200 elements manufactured with 50 elements destructively examined. 
The irradiation tests in Table 10 include: 
 HFR-K3, -K5, -K6, FRJ2-K13, -K15, with a total of 19 reference 60 mm-diameter spherical fuel 
elements with no detectable particle failures at EOL — special tests with other geometries 
have been used for research studies, but are not included in this statistical evaluation; 
 evaluation of the EOL irradiation performance for 24 GLE-3 spheres from the AVR, which has 
shown zero in-reactor failures (Figure 13 and Figure 14). 
The accident simulation heating tests in Table 10 comprise the following: 
 eight isothermal 1 600 °C tests with LEU UO2 TRISO fuel elements conducted at the 
Forschungszentrum Jülich with the spheres AVR 71/22, 82/9, 82/20, 88/15, 88/33, HFR-K3/1, 
FRJ2-K13/2 and 4, as reported previously by Schenk (Schenk, et al., 1988) (Nabielek, et al., 
2008); 
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 five accident tests simulating HTR Module core heat-up to 1 620 °C with AVR GLE-3 fuel 
elements AVR 85/18, 89/13, 90/2 (two failures), 90/5 and 90/20 (three failures) (Schenk, et 
al., 1991); 
 six isothermal 1 600 °C tests with LEU UO2 TRISO fuel elements conducted at the Institute of 
Transuranium, Karlsruhe with the spheres AVR 74/18, HFR-K6/2,3 and HFR-EU1bis/1,3,4 
(Freis 2010), all without any particle failure. 
Collectively, the statistical evaluation for manufacture, irradiation and accident simulation testing is 
shown in Figure 23. These results, based on the results obtained during manufacture, irradiation in 
MTRs and in AVR and in accident simulation testing, demonstrate the essential components for a 
passively safe system insofar as the additional source term due to operation does not exceed the 
already low level of defects from manufacture. Furthermore, the maximum temperature (1 600 °C) 
that can be reached in an accident does not lead to a significant additional source term. 
 
4.5. Summary 
Inherent safety features of modern small modular HTGRs are, in part, provided by the high level of 
fuel quality of UO2 TRISO-coated fuel particles. The work conducted with the German fuel 
development programme over two decades from 1980 to 1995 constitutes a convincing 
demonstration of fuel excellence in manufacture, and continuing through irradiation and accident 
simulation testing. The low levels of particle defects produced during manufacture were significantly 
altered neither by extensive accelerated and real-time irradiation testing, nor through accident 
simulation testing in dry and wet environments. 
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Figure 23: Statistical evaluation of defective and failed LEU UO2 TRISO particle fractions in reference 
60 mm-diameter spherical fuel elements 
 
5. Components 
The technology of the HTR Module and its components is based on the experiences of AVR, THTR and 
the general development of HTR in different countries around the world. The technical details of the 
concept are explained in the following sections. 
5.1. Primary system 
The primary system (Figure 24) of each module consists of the following components: 
 the reactor pressure vessel together with the inner metallic and graphite structures, the 
shutdown systems, the fuel-handling system and measurement installations; 
 the steam generator vessel, which contains the steam generator bundle and the helium 
circulator, including the drive; 
 the connecting vessel, which contains the hot gas duct; 
 the inner concrete cell, which contains the surface cooler. 
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Figure 24: Primary system of an HTR Module (200 MWth) 
 
One very important topic regarding water ingress accidents is the side-by-side arrangement of the 
reactor and the steam generator, which is positioned geodetically below the core. The two vessels 
are connected by a third vessel, which contains a hot gas duct. 
Furthermore, after total failure of active decay heat removal no natural circulation from the hot core 
to the steam generator can occur. This component is therefore protected against excessive 
temperatures. It is practically insulated during this condition of accident. The evaporation in the 
steam generator is upwards directed and therefore the stability of the process is very good. 
Access to the tubes of the steam generator is also possible without opening the primary circuit. 
Clogging up defect tubes from the outside is possible. 
Due to the chosen arrangement of the helium circulator on top of the steam generator vessel, 
maintenance work on this component is relatively easy and possible without opening of the primary 
circuit. 
The arrangement of the reactor pressure vessel in a concrete cell allows the surface cooler to be put 
in place surrounding this component. This surface cooler is operated with water and is carried out 
redundantly. 
Decay heat removal via the surface cooler after a ‘total loss of active core cooling’ accident is an 
effective measure to limit the normal fuel temperature during the accident (1 600 °C in case of the 
HTR Module). The concrete, furthermore, can store the decay heat if even the surface cooler fails. 
1: Core 
2: Core internals 
3: Reactor pressure vessel 
4: Steam generator 
5: Blower 
6: Coaxial duct 
7: Surface cooling system 
8: Shutdown gear 
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The concrete wall between the reactor pressure vessel and the steam generator acts as effective 
shielding for the steam generator and limits the activation of this component. 
The outer reactor building for a plant with two modules, which is designed to withstand the usual 
loads (earthquake, gas-cloud explosion, aeroplane crash), has a ratio of height to width which is 
favourable for stability against earthquakes. 
After accidents involving small leaks in the primary enclosure the helium is given off via the inner 
concrete cell and a high-efficiency filter. If larger leaks occur (diameter of 65 mm) the release 
happens via the containment building, with a relatively lower filter efficiency. If larger leaks will be 
assumed in the future, improved solutions for the retention of radioactivity can be applied. 
Some important data on the primary system are given in Table 11. Data on the main primary 
components are explained in later specific sections. 
Table 11: Some data on the primary system of the HTR Module (1 unit) 
Parameter Dimension Value Remark 
Thermal power MW 200 For electricity and process-
steam production 
Average helium outlet 
temperature 
Celsius 700 Hot streaks 
Helium inlet temperature Celsius 250  
Flow direction in the core  Downwards  
Flow of fuel elements  Downwards MEDUL 
Loading  Continuously  
Number of loops  1  
Steam temperature Celsius 530  
Steam pressure bar 180  
Mass flow of steam kg/s 77  
Arrangement of steam 
generator 
 Side by side  
Connection of reactor 
and steam generator 
 Coaxial duct  
Concept of primary 
enclosure 
 Basic safe  
Earthquake load G ~ 0.3  
Lifetime of components Full-power years 40  
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5.2. Core structures 
The internal core in high-temperature reactors consists of ceramic and metallic components. 
The graphite reflector consists of top, side and bottom reflectors. These graphite build-in 
components serve as containers for fuel elements. The metallic core barrel is installed to support the 
ceramic structures. This core barrel again consists of a cylindrical part and top and bottom structures. 
The metallic core barrel is supported in a position above the core connection located in a position at 
the height of the ceramic core bottom. 
Special conditions exist for these graphite components, resulting from the high temperatures of the 
cooling gas, in case of the THTR of 780 °C, through mechanical forces resulting from the weight and 
movement of the pebbles and from high radiation doses with fast neutrons. The most important data 
on the core structures for the THTR are summarised in Table 12. Details are shown in Figure 25 and 
Figure 26. 
 
Table 12: Data on the ceramic core structures of the THTR 
Parameter Value 
Diameter of the core 5.6 m 
Height of the core 5.1 m 
Filling factor 0.61 
Thickness of the radial reflector 1 m 
Thickness of the graphite bricks (radial) 0.5 m 
Thickness of the top reflector 2 m 
Thickness of the bottom reflector ~ 2 m 
Weight of the graphite ~ 540 t 
Weight of the graphite bricks ~ 35 t 
 
 
Figure 25: Bottom reflector of the THTR 
1: Bottom reflector bricks 
2: Column of the hot gas chamber 
3: Insulation of the bottom 
4: Side reflector 
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Figure 26: Side reflector of the THTR (left: vertical cross section; right: horizontal cross section) 
 
The top reflector consists of graphite bricks which are connected to the top liner. The cooling gas 
enters the pebble bed with a temperature of about 250 °C through borings in the top reflector, 
absorbing the heat in the reflector produced by gamma radiation. 
The cylindrical side reflector is also built from graphite bricks, which are connected to each other by 
anchor bolts and also connected to the surrounding thermal shield. In these bricks there are borings 
for the absorber rods. 
The hot helium gas at approximately 750 °C leaves the core through borings in the bottom reflector. 
The reflector itself has a conical form with a gradient of 30° to support the draining of the pebbles 
out of the core. Figure 27 shows the bottom reflector of the HTR-10 pebble-bed reactor. 
 
1: Thermal shield 
2: Supporting bolts 
3: Anti-twist protection 
4: Outer side reflector 
5: Anchor bolt in the outer side reflector 
6: Inner side reflector 
7: Wedge in the inner side reflector 
8: Anchor bolts in the inner side reflector 
9: Guide tube for the reflector rods 
10: Shock absorber 
11: Deflector plate 
12: Hot gas passage in the inner side reflector 
13: Hot gas passage in the outer side reflector 
1: Bolting 
2: Thermal shield 
3: Reflector sealing 
4: Inner side reflector 
5: Anchor bolt 
6: Fitting key 
7: Outer side reflector 
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Figure 27: Bottom reflector of the Chinese HTR-10 
 
Concerning the HTR Module, the drives for the control rods and for the second shutdown system 
(the KLAK system (Kleine Absorber Kugel Systeme)) are mounted at the surface of the thermal top 
shield. The upper part of the core structure follows the principle, which was realised in the AVR, in 
which 24 segments are added, consisting of carbon stones because of thermal insulation and 
shielding.  
There are penetrations for seven loading tubes for fuel elements, and for six shutdown rods (first 
system) and 18 KLAK positions (second system). The side reflector consists of 24 graphite blocks in 
each layer and carbon stone blocks which are arranged between the graphite and the core barrel. 
The connection of the ceramic blocks to the core barrel is based on technologies which are well 
established in the field of HTR technology (Figure 28). 
In the lower part of the reactor there is a new component: the core connection for the hot gas duct 
(Figure 29). This component is insulated at the position of the penetration through the reactor 
pressure vessel. 
Pipes for fuel loading and further pipes, of the second shutdown system, for the transport of the 
KLAK elements (B4C balls with a diameter of 1 cm) from the core bottom back to the storage vessels 
above the top thermal shield are positioned in the space between the ceramic structure and the core 
barrel. 
The bottom of the core is built of ceramic segmented blocks, which contain borings for the hot gas. 
The bottom has a declination of 30° to allow the safe removal of fuel elements from the core. The 
fuel elements are removed from the core through the central discharge tube (800 mm in diameter) 
using a discharge system. 
The different layers of the ceramic core structures are designed and optimised to protect the reactor 
vessel against excessive neutron doses and embrittlement. Therefore, the fast neutron dose over the 
whole lifetime of the reactor pressure vessel is below 1018 n/cm2. 
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Table 13 contains some data on the core structures of the HTR Module and, for comparison, the 
corresponding information for the AVR and THTR. The core structures of both reactors have been 
licensed, constructed and operated successfully. 
The core structure of the AVR has been inspected after more than 15 years of operation in the upper 
hot part. No changes in graphite structures have been observed. After the unloading of the whole 
core some damage to the bottom structure has been detected. This indicates that an improved 
design solution for this part of the graphite should be chosen. 
The application of robotic technologies will enable many inspection, maintenance and repair 
procedures in the future. 
Furthermore, a broad experience of graphite structures is available from AGR plants. Design choices 
for bolting and removal can be taken from this field. 
 
 
Figure 28: Some details of core structures: connection between ceramic structures and core barrel 
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Figure 29: Concept of connection of the hot gas duct to the core internals in HTR 
 
Table 13: Data on the core structure of the HTR Module (AVR and THTR data for comparison) 
Parameter Dimension HTR Module AVR THTR 
Core diameter m 3 3 5.2 
Core height m 9.43 3 5.2 
Thickness of the 
side reflector 
m ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 
Number of 
discharge tubes 
 1 1 1 
Fast neutron dose 
in 20 years 
n/cm2 < 1022 < 1022 < 1022 
Max. 
temperature 
during operation 
Celsius 800 110 850 
 
The ducting of the primary helium in the reactor structures is as follows (Figure 30): the cold gas, 
leaving the outer annulus of the coaxial duct, enters the reactor pressure vessel, cools the metallic 
structures at the bottom of the vessel and enters 72 borings in the side reflector. 
After arriving at a position above the whole ceramic structure the cold gas is led to an upper cold gas 
chamber between the top reflector and the top part of the thermal shield. The top reflector contains 
borings through which the cold gas flows into the upper space above the core. After passing the 
pebble bed and heating up to the hot gas temperature the gas flows through borings in the bottom 
1: Graphite structure 
2: Core barrel 
3: Compensator 
4: Connecting vessel 
5: Bearing tube 
6: Graphite tube 
7: Intermediate flange 
8: Fibre insulation 
9, 10, 11: Insulation material 
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reflector into the hot gas chamber and from there into the hot gas channel. The core bottom 
structure is designed to mix the gas and to avoid hot streaks. 
 
 
Figure 30: Ducting of the helium in the reactor internals 
 
5.3. Shutdown systems 
The shutdown of the HTR Module is carried out by two diverse systems. The first system has to be 
able to shut down the reactor in the hot stage and in case of accidents, for example due to water 
ingress. It consists of six rods arranged in the side reflector. The second system must be able to hold 
the reactor in the cold under-critical state, including the long-term decay of xenon and other relevant 
isotopes. The system consists of 18 columns of KLAK (small absorber balls) in the side reflector. If the 
system has to be used the small absorber pebbles (10 mm diameter, graphite with 10 % B4C) fall 
under gravity into the borings in the side reflector. 
The neutron losses of the core are in the order of 13 %, therefore the arrangement of both systems 
in the side reflector are possible, with values of around 1.4 % for the first system and of around 10 % 
for the second system. 
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Figure 31 shows the arrangement of the borings in the side reflector and summarises the values of 
demand of reactivity and the worth of the systems. 
 
 
Figure 31: Positions of the borings in the side reflector (six reflector rods, 18 KLAK positions) 
The first system uses technologies which are well known from THTR and AGR plants. The rods consist 
of connected single parts which contain Boron carbide as an absorber. 
The drives of the reflector rods are mounted above the upper thermal shield plate. Because the room 
above the plate is separated from the primary helium, this room is accessible for inspection and 
repair. The rods fall freely into the borings if the electrical energy supply is lost or if they are initiated 
by the reactor protection system. In this case the electrical supply is also stopped. 
The second shutdown system (KLAK) (Figure 32) represents a new concept which still requires 
qualification. The small balls are contained in storage vessels arranged above the top thermal shield. 
If necessary they fall into the borings in the side reflector. At the bottom there are closures for each 
position which can be opened to be able to remove the balls pneumatically back to the storage 
vessel. The components for transporting the balls are arranged outside the reactor pressure vessel 
under this component. The transport pipes are inside the reactor pressure vessel between the core 
barrel and the ceramic structure. 
The KLAK system also uses the fail-safe principle: in case of loss of electrical power the storage 
containers are opened and the balls fall into the borings. 
Position of the shutdown elements: 
reflector rod (first system) 
small absorber (second system). 
 
Demand and worth of the systems: 
first system: 1.4 % 
second system: 10 %. 
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Figure 32: Principle of the second shutdown system (KLAK) of the HTR Module 
 
  
1: Gear 
2: Storage tank 
3: Detector for filling level 
4: Inspection device 
5: Shielding 
6: Connection brig 
7: Side reflector 
8: Channel inside the reflector 
9: Graphite 
10: Guide tube (360 mm in diameter) 
11: Connection brig 
12: Ball transport pipe 
13: Lower collection tank 
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5.4. The fuel-handling system 
The fuel elements of a pebble-bed reactor are loaded and discharged continuously during normal 
and full-power operation (Figure 33). They are inserted at the top of the reactor by a special device 
containing a valve and distribution system. After passing the core the fuel elements are discharged 
through a sufficiently large discharge tube and a rotating disk with a hole with a diameter of 65 mm. 
After that they pass a singuliser and a scrap separator, and they are either put into a scrap can or are 
reused in case of the MEDUL cycle. 
 
 
Figure 33: Concept of fuel handling in pebble-bed HTR (MEDUL cycle for a two-module plant) 
The intact fuel elements then pass a burnup measurement installation and are either recycled into 
the core (pneumatically) or they are moved into a vessel for spent fuel elements, from which they 
are transported into an intermediate storage facility. 
All transport processes occur pneumatically and the fuel-handling system allows for very flexible 
operation of the plant, as demonstrated in the case of the AVR. 
Furthermore, there is the possibility, in case of extraordinary repair procedures or other events, to 
discharge the core totally and to store the fuel elements for a limited time. After that the fuel 
elements could be transported back to the core again to continue operation. After the water ingress 
accident in the AVR this possibility has been demonstrated. 
In total the core of one module consists of 360 000 fuel elements. If, for example, the MEDUL cycle 
contains 15 runs through the core, around 120 000 fresh fuel elements have to be added per year 
and 120 000 spent fuel elements have to be discharged and removed. Around 5.4 million fuel 
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elements have to be handled per year. Following the experience of the AVR, around 300 damaged 
fuel elements have to be removed to the scrap canisters. 
5.5. Primary enclosure 
The primary enclosure of the HTR Module contains three vessels: 
 reactor pressure vessel, 
 steam generator vessel, 
 connecting vessel. 
 
Figure 34 shows the arrangement of the vessels and indicates the special side-by-side positioning of 
the steam-generator vessel. 
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Figure 34: Arrangement of the primary enclosure 
Basic data on the three components are contained in Table 14. 
Table 14: Data on the vessels of the primary enclosure 
Parameter  Dimension Reactor pressure 
vessel 
Steam generator 
vessel 
Connection vessel 
Design pressure bar 70 70 70 
Design 
temperature 
Celsius 350 350 350 
Fast neutron dose n/cm2 < 1018 < 1017 < 1017 
1: reactor pressure vessel  
2: steam generator vessel 
3: connecting vessel 
1 
2 
3 
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Material  20MnMoNi55 20MnMoNi55 20MnMoNi55 
Height m 25 20  
Inner diameter m 6 4 1.2 
Wall thickness m 0.1 0.08 0.07 
Length m   6 
 
For all components the material 20MnMoNi55, which is well known from light-water reactor (LWR) 
technology, was chosen. This material shows good welding properties, high toughness and low 
embrittlement under irradiation with fast neutrons. The material is applied as forged steel, and 
mainly rings are welded together. The principle design criterion is that the cold helium temperature 
is 250 °C and therefore all walls are cooled by the full mass flow of this cold helium. 
An extensive programme of quality assurance from the production of the material until the operation 
of the component, summarised overall as the ‘basic safety concept’, is applied for the whole primary 
system. Therefore, it is assumed that the ‘leak-before-break criterion’ is valid and that the vessel 
system cannot suffer from bursting. 
The reactor pressure vessel has a large nozzle in the centre of the bottom head for the discharge of 
the fuel elements. The diameter is around 1 m to house the discharge tube. 
Another four small nozzles are in the bottom head for the supply of fuel elements (pebbles) and the 
conveyor gas supply for transportation of the small B4C pellets to the shutdown units. 
The thermal cover for the purposes of inspection and maintenance of the reactor pressure vessel is 
connected to the inner reactor vessel with prestressed bolts, screwed together and sealed with two 
metallic sealing rings. The removal of the closure of the vessel is not necessary for changing of fuel or 
for maintenance work. 
The reactor pressure vessel has three supports to place it on the structure of the reactor building. 
The supports are at the elevation of the connecting pressure vessel. 
The connecting pressure vessel serves together with the hot (700 °C) helium gas duct as the primary 
connection between the reactor pressure vessel and the steam generator pressure vessel. The hot 
gas duct contains insulations and a liner, and is supported by special bearing systems in the 
connecting vessel. 
By counterflow of the cold helium (250 °C) in the outer annulus of the duct, the walls of the 
connecting vessel are protected in any case against interaction with hot helium. The pressure 
difference across the inner gas duct wall is in the order of 1 bar. 
The penetration through the cylindrical wall of the reactor pressure vessel forms a specific aspect of 
both components. Designs to reduce stresses have been chosen for this connection. 
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5.6. Surface cooler 
The surface cooler surrounds the reactor pressure vessel at a short distance from the wall (around 
1.5 m) and is set tightly against the concrete wall of the inner reactor cell. 
The cooling system designed as a plate heat exchanger consists of a lot of tubes which are arranged 
vertically. The cold water enters at the bottom with a temperature of 35 °C and flows to the top and 
is sampled there. The system removes around 400 KW during normal operation as heat loss, and in 
case of a ‘total loss of active core cooling’ accident removes around 800 KW. In this case the steam 
generator/helium loop would be out of operation. The cooling system is redundant and normally 
sends the heat to a cooling tower. In extreme situations the system can be connected to a fire 
protection installation. Figure 35 shows the arrangement (left) and the flow sheet of the concept 
(right), while Table 15 contains some data on the cooling system, whereby a value of the mass flow is 
not specified. 
 
 
Figure 35: Concept of the surface cooler of the HTR Module 
Table 15: Data on the surface cooling system 
Parameter Dimension Value 
Surface m2 300 
Cooling inlet temperature Celsius 40 
Mass flow kg/s  
Max. cooling temperature outlet Celsius 50 
Power (normal operation) KW 400 
Power (accident) KW 800 
Grace time h 20 
 
5.7. Hot gas duct 
The hot gas is transported from the hot gas chamber situated in the reactor pressure vessel to the 
steam generator via a central channel arranged inside the connecting vessel between the two 
abovementioned components (Figure 34). 
The hot gas duct (Figure 36) consists of the bearing tube, insulation and an inner liner, which ducts 
the hot gas. The duct is supported inside the connecting vessel with the help of special supporting 
systems. 
Changes of length caused by temperature changes are governed by compensators. The hot gas duct 
is connected to the graphitic core structure by a special core connection, which allows only small leak 
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rates for the helium. This new component has been tested under extreme conditions of temperature 
change and for an extreme number of cycles. The connecting vessel has the same quality of material 
and design as the reactor pressure vessel, including following the concept of ‘basic safety’ and 
therefore of the ‘leak-before-break’ criterion. This includes that bursting of the component is not 
assumed in the licensing process. 
 
 
Figure 36: Hot gas duct 
Insofar as mechanical loads are concerned the pressure differences between the hot and cold 
primary helium in the system are small (in the order of 1 bar during normal operation). Only in case 
of depressurisation accidents could larger pressure differences occur for a very short time. 
Vibrations caused by excessive velocities must be prevented by suitable component design. 
Furthermore, loads from the action of earthquakes must be tolerated by the concept. 
Some data on the hot gas duct are contained in Table 16. For comparison, some data are added on 
the EVO (EnergieVersorgung Oberhausen AG) plant, in which the hot gas ducting system operated 
very well over many thousands of hours. 
Table 16: Data on the hot gas duct of the HTR Module (some data on the EVO plant are added for 
comparison) 
Parameter Dimension HTR Module EVO plant 
Power MW 200 150 
Max. helium temperature Celsius 750 750 
Average hot gas temperature Celsius 700 750 
Cold gas temperature Celsius 250 200 
Helium pressure bar 60 28 
Helium mass flow kg/s 85.5 86 
Diameter of the hot gas channel m 0.75 0.9 
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Helium velocity (hot gas) m/s 65 40 
Liner  Incoloy 800H  
Insulation  Fibre Fibre 
Length of the duct m ~ 8 ~ 20 
 
Several bendings were included in this design and showed excellent behaviour during operation. 
From the experiences of HTR plants and AGR plants which have been in operation until now, and 
additionally from the results of different large test facilities, it can be stated that the hot gas duct of 
the HTR Module can be designed for the whole life of the plant. 
 
5.8. Steam generator 
The steam generator of the HTR Module is connected to the reactor by a coaxial duct and is arranged 
geodetically below the core, side by side. 
The component uses the principle of Benson-type steam generators and contains a helical-type tube 
bundle. There are 220 tubes arranged around the central tube (Figure 37). Each tube is coupled to 
the feed water and the life-steam samplers. Table 17 shows some data. 
The hot helium enters the component at the top with an average temperature of 700 °C and is 
cooled during the flow downwards to 250 °C. The cold helium is deflected at the bottom of the 
pressure vessel and flows upwards between the wall of the pressure vessel and the casing of the 
bundle. This choice of gas flow cools the wall of the pressure vessel and limits the temperature to a 
value of 250 °C. In some positions on the casing insulation is provided to limit the heat exchange. The 
cold helium arriving at the top of the component is sampled and ducted to the circulator. 
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Figure 37: Steam generator of the HTR Module — overview of the component 
Table 17: Steam generator data 
Parameter Dimension Value 
Power MW 200 
Helium temperature °C 700 …> 250 
Helium pressure bar 60 
Feed-water condition °C/bar 170/220 
Steam conditions °C/bar 580/180 
Helium mass flow kg/s 85.5 
Steam mass flow kg/s  
Reheat  No 
Average heat flux KW/m2 80 
Heat exchanger surface m2 1 200 
Number of tubes  200 
Length of the tubes m ~ 100 
Dimension of the tubes mm 22 × 2.5 
1: Helium circulator 
2: Cold gas ducting 
3: Sampler for life steam 
4: Bundle for compensation 
5: Pressure vessel 
6: Central tube 
7: Helical bundle heat exchanger 
8: Gas shroud 
9: Pier for feed water 
10: Casing for steam generator 
11: Gap (pressure) 
12: Flow distribution 
13: Hot gas duct 
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Material of the tubes  Incoloy 800H 
Average power density of the 
bundle 
MW/m3 5 
 
After compression in the circulator (around 1.3 bar) the helium is pressed into the outer part of the 
hot gas duct and transported back to the reactor. The cold gas allows the effective cooling of the 
connecting vessel and of the bearing tube of the hot gas duct. 
The heat exchanger bundle is designed with a relatively high heat-transfer number of around 
1 200 W/m2k and a high average heat flux of around 80 W/m2k. This results in a total surface for heat 
exchange of 1 200 m2 and an average power density of the heat exchanger bundle of around 5 W/m3. 
The feed water enters the component via the sampler with a temperature of 170 °C and a pressure 
of 220 bar. Inside the component the feed water is preheated, evaporated and superheated to 
530 °C/180 bar. The hot life steam leaves the component via a compensation bundle and the sampler 
for life steam. 
The life-steam pipes transport the steam from the reactor through the walls of the inner cell and the 
containment building to the turbine. The penetrations require special solutions to compensate for 
the elongation of the hot steam pipes. The concept of helical heat exchangers is fully developed and 
successful applied in THTR, Fort St. Vrain and in various Magnox and AGR plants. 
Additionally, a steam generator depressurisation system is installed. In case of a severe water ingress 
accident this system allows removal of most of the water from the primary circuit in a short period of 
time. The steam/water mixture will be condensed in a mixed cooler and will later be released from 
the plant. Figure 38 shows the flow sheet for this system and indicates that there are two parallel 
lines provided for. 
 
 
Figure 38: Depressurisation system for the steam generator 
 
1: Steam generator 
2 Shut off valve 
3: Depressurisation valve 
4: Vessel for pressure reduction 
5: Vessel for depressurised medium 
6: Sound absorber 
7: Pump 
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5.9. The intermediate heat exchanger 
Any combination of a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor with chemical processes will most 
probably need a decoupling between the primary circuit and the heat utilisation system for the 
following reasons: 
 separation on the nuclear part for safety reasons; 
 limitation/exclusion of radioactive contamination of the product (e.g. tritium); 
 exclusion of ingress of corrosive process media into the primary circuit; 
 near-conventional design of the heat utilisation system; 
 ease of maintenance and repair of the heat utilisation system; 
 exclusion of contamination of high industrial investment around the nuclear plant. 
The intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) is designed as a component to fulfil these requirements and 
provide a clear separation between the nuclear plant and the heat application. Under normal 
operating conditions the IHX prevents the primary coolant from accessing the process plant and 
prevents process gases from being routed through the reactor containment. This physical separation 
allows the heat application facility to be conventional designed and repair work to be conducted 
under non-nuclear conditions. The flow diagram of the combination of primary and secondary circuit 
together with the corresponding T-Q diagram is shown in Figure 39. 
 
 
Figure 39: Primary circuit of a modular HTR with IHX (left: principal flow diagram; right: T-Q diagram for 
use of nuclear heat 
 
The concept of a combination of the HTR Module with an IHX is shown in Figure 40 (Nuclear Energy 
for Hydrogen Production). The example provided represents the German reference design of a 
process-heat HTR Module in a side-by-side arrangement of nuclear reactor and IHX vessel for each 
modular unit. The thermal power of the nuclear reactor and of the IHX is 170 MW; the limitation of 
power is given by the requirement of self-acting decay heat removal in accidents with a total loss of 
active cooling. If larger thermal powers were needed an annular core would be required. The 
limitation in this case is caused by the dimensions and type of reactor pressure vessel. Details of the 
IHX with a helical tube bundle are shown in Figure 41. Characteristic design data are listed in Table 
18. 
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Table 18: Comparison of IHX data tested in a KVK facility with data on IHX for nuclear application 
IHX KVK 170 MWth HTR Module 
(IA 1983) 
500 MWth PNP 
(PNP 1981) 
Helical U tube Helical U tube Helical U tube 
Material: 
Tube 
 
Nicrofer 
5520 
 
Nicrofer 
5520 
 
Inonel 
617 
 
Inonel 
617 
  
Size: 
Bundle outer diameter(m) 
 
Tube outer diameter (mm) 
Tube wall thickness (mm) 
Tube length (m) 
Number of tubes 
 
1.5 
 
22 
2 
 
117 
 
2.0 
 
20 
2 
 
180 
 
2.78 
 
22 
2 
38.2 
1 612 
 
1.512 
 
20 
2 
30.0 
2 470 
 
2.52 
 
22 
2.2 
40.7 
1 444 
 
2.098 (hot) 
2.815 (cold) 
20 
2 
32.7 
1 900 
Primary helium 
Inlet temperature (°C) 
Outlet temperature (°C) 
Inlet pressure (MPa) 
Outlet pressure (MPa) 
Flow rate (kg/s) 
 
950 
293 
3.99 
3.935 
2.95 
 
950 
300 
3.99 
3.94 
3.0 
 
950 
292 
3.99 
3.97 
50.3 
 
950 
292 
4.05 
3.99 
50.3 
 
950 
293 
4.0 
 
36.9 
 
950 
293 
3.99 
 
36.9 
Secondary helium 
Inlet temperature (°C) 
Outlet temperature (°C) 
Inlet pressure (MPa) 
Outlet pressure (MPa) 
Flow rate (t/h) 
 
220 
900 
4.19 
4.025 
2.85 
 
220 
900 
4.35 
4.25 
2.9 
 
200 
900 
4.38 
4.19 
47.3 
 
200 
900 
4.35 
4.19 
47.3 
 
220 
900 
4.2 
 
35.6 
 
220 
900 
4.35 
 
35.6 
Heat-transfer area (m
2
)  3 500 4 254 4 700 4 000 3 900 
Life time (h)   140 000 140 000 140 000 140 000 
 
The employment of an IHX was also suggested within the PNP project with regard to the steam 
gasification of hard coal, for which the main characteristic data are also given in the table for 
comparison. 
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Figure 40: Arrangement of HTR Module (a) with helix IHX (b) or U tube IHX (c) (Nuclear Energy for 
Hydrogen Production) 
The helical IHX (see Figure 41) consists of a bundle of helical tubes arranged around a central return 
gas duct for the hot secondary helium. The support system for the tubes consists of support cylinders 
with star-shaped welded-on support plates serving to take the weight of the bundle. A segmental 
design of the support structure limits the axial relative expansion caused by the operation 
temperature. In the upper cold area, the mechanical loads are carried by the vessel cover. This 
ensures access to the secondary system for in-service inspection and repairs without the necessity to 
open the primary circuit. 
 
Reactor 
1: Pebble bed 
2: Reactor pressure vessel 
3: Fuel discharge 
4: KLAK spheres shutdown system 
5: Reflector rods 
6: Fuel loading 
7: Surface cooler 
8: Insulation 
9: Hot gas duct 
IHX 
10: Secondary pipe connections 
11: Central secondary hot gas return pipe 
12: Tube bundle (helical or U tube) 
13: Secondary hot gas header 
14: Primary cold gas duct 
15: Primary hot gas duct 
16: Blower 
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Figure 41: Intermediate heat exchanger for nuclear applications (Technical and Safety Aspects of 
Processes of Hydrogen Production using Nuclear Energy, 2005) (left: helical tube bundle; right: details of 
hot gas collector tube and support structures) 
 
A facility for large component testing (Komponenten-Versuchskreislauf — KVK) was constructed and 
successfully operated by Interatom within the PNP project (Harth, et al., 1990). In a heating system 
consisting of a heater with steam, a natural gas burner and an electrical heater with a total thermal 
power of 10 MW, helium was heated up to 950 °C at 4.0 MPa (Figure 42 and Figure 43). This plant 
also allowed the testing of hot gas ducts with a large diameter, of a steam generator, of valves for 
hot helium and of other components such as hot headers or auxiliary plants like gas purification. 
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Figure 42: Flow sheet of 10 MW KVK facility for testing nuclear process-heat components 
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Figure 43: 10MW KVK facility for testing nuclear process-heat components 
 
 
 
Figure 44: Two IHX components tested in KVK (left: Helical tube bundle by SteinmOIIer; right: U tube 
bundle by Balcke-Durr) 
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Two IHX components were constructed and tested in the KVK loop, one with a helical tube bundle 
and another one with U tubes. Figure 44 shows schematics of both components. 
In the helical IHX, primary hot helium (950 °C) entering the heat exchanger flows via a mixing and 
deflecting device at the bottom of the component upwards through the bundle and is cooled to 
300 °C. The cooled primary helium flows back into the gap between the wall of the reactor pressure 
vessel and the gas shroud of the heat exchanger to the blower at the bottom of the component. 
The secondary helium is entering the component at the top. After entering into a ring conduit, the 
helium with a temperature of 200 °C is uniformly distributed over the tube bundle and heated up to 
900 °C in counterflow. The cycle is closed by the hot header which is insulated on the inside. The hot 
helium leaves the IHX at the top of the component. 
The maximum wall temperature in the tubes under normal operation is 920 °C; the maximum 
pressure difference between the primary and secondary sides is 0.2 MPa under operational 
conditions. During depressurisation accidents they have to withstand the full pressure difference in a 
limited time period. 
The relevant data on the IHX test components are contained in Table 18 in comparison to the data on 
an IHX component to be connected to the two German concepts of a process-heat nuclear reactor. 
Each component had a thermal power of 10 MW. The most critical part in the design of a helical tube 
concept, the hot header for the secondary helium, was tested in the 10 MW component at 1:1 scale 
related to the large component. Both components were operated over several thousands of hours 
without any difficulty. 
The table shows that the specific data on the test components were very similar to those which are 
planned for the nuclear application. The gas temperatures, pressures and material temperatures in 
the KVK facility were identical to those of the nuclear design. 
In particular, hot gas samplers, as the main sensitive large components of such an heat exchanger, 
have been tested at 1:1 scale. The tube systems had the same dimensions in test and for nuclear 
application. The materials for the tubes, the headers, the supporting structures and the gas ducting 
on the primary side are the same as those planned for the nuclear application. 
On the basis of a broad experimental programme in the KVK plant and other related test facilities 
(HHV plant, EVO plant, insulation test facilities, specific facilities to test, for example, friction, 
fretting, wear, materials, depressurisation), the following statements can be made with respect to 
the feasibility of the IHX. 
 Two helium-heated IHXs have been successfully tested at the 10 MW power level and at 
maximum helium heating temperatures of 950 °C (primary) and 900 °C (secondary), 
respectively. So far, the process parameters have been tested under the real conditions of 
the nuclear application. The operation time of the helical tube bundle was more than 
5000 hours and that of the U tube bundle was more than 4000 hours. 
 Parallel to the integral tests of the components, additional testing in KVK was carried out for 
a hot gas header of the helical tube bundle, for hot gas ducts (including bends and expansion 
bellows), hot gas valves and a steam generator. 
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 The thermodynamic data on the heat exchanger designs have been confirmed by the 
experiments. Average heat fluxes of approximately 40 kW/m2 can be realised at reasonable 
pressure drops. 
 The components were tested in steady-state operation and under transient conditions. 
Transients of ± 7 K/min were tolerated by the components without failure. 
 Tests have shown leak tightness between the primary and secondary sides of the IHX. The 
measured vibrations did not result in serious loads on the heat exchanger tubes. 
 The bearing forces for the load transfer system of the cold header and the bundle were 
within the range of calculated values. 
 Ultrasonic inspection of IHX tubes after 4700 hours of operation did not reveal any 
deviations. 
 Creep buckling tests on the hot gas header were carried out. 
 As many as 656 cycles from 950 °C to 710 °C and the reverse, with a transient of ± 40 K/min, 
did not cause any damage to the header. 
 Tests with a pressure difference of 4.3 MPa between the primary and secondary sides of the 
hot gas header at 970 °C were carried out over a time period of 455 hours to simulate a 
depressurisation accident. No damaging influences were identified. 
 Insulation and gas-ducting structures inside the tube bundles showed no damage. Overall it 
was stated that an IHX following one of the two designs investigated (helical tubes and U 
tubes) can be designed for a power of 170 MW and can be operated for 100 000 hours on 
the basis of the available experience. In particular, the extensive wall-material testing for 
high-temperature alloys at a temperature of 950 °C showed that this component can be 
applied in connection with process-heat HTGRs. 
 
5.10. Helium circulator 
The helium circulator has to compensate for total pressure drops in the helium cycle of around 
1.5 bar. The helium pressure is 60 bar. 
The mechanical power to compensate for the pressure drop in the whole primary circuit can be 
calculated as follows: 
𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ =
?̇?𝐻𝑒∗∆𝑝
𝜌1∗𝜂𝑖
         (20) 
with typical values for THTR: 
?̇?𝐻𝑒 = 298 𝐾𝐺/𝑠 
∆𝑝 = 1.12 𝑏𝑎𝑟 
𝜌1 = 4.03
𝑘𝑔
𝑚3 
⁄ (at 40 bar and 250 °C) 
𝜂𝑖 ≈ 0.75 
A total amount of mechanical power in the system of 𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ = 10.8𝑀𝑊 is needed. For the THTR 
with six blowers this results in a single blower power of 1.8 MW. 
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The total power of the motor is: 
𝑁𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟 =
𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ
𝜂𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ∗𝜂𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟
          (21) 
with 𝜂 being the degree of efficiency mechanical and of the motor. 
To calculate the specific rotor diameter, the following equations can be used. 
For the helium throughput: 
?̇? = ?̇? 𝜌(𝑝, 𝑇)⁄            (22) 
The specific work of the helium flow: 
𝑦 =
∆𝑝
𝑝
= 𝜂𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑝 ∗ 𝑇1 ((
𝑝2
𝑝1
)
𝑅
𝜂𝑖∗𝑐𝑝 − 1)        (23) 
The specific rotation speed: 
𝜎𝛾𝑀 = 2.108 ∗ 𝑛 (
?̇?0.5
𝑦0.75⁄ )
         (24) 
The equation for specific rotor diameter is: 
𝛿𝛾𝑀 = 1.054 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ (
𝑦0.25
?̇?0.5
⁄ )        (25) 
The Cordier diagram (Figure 45) shows that the blowers used in the AVR, the THTR and the HTR 
Module are optimally designed. 
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Figure 45: Correlation between specific diameter and specific rotation speed for HTR blower 
For the HTR Module a-one stage radial compressor with a vertical shaft (Figure 46) is used. The 
component is arranged at the top of the steam generator and is fully integrated into the primary 
circuit. The drive is an asynchronous electrical motor with speed regulation. The bearings of the 
drive-circulator unit use oil lubrication and helium gas sealing; the cooling is done by water. 
The-one stage compressor uses one bearing for the wheel in overhang arrangement. It has a flap on 
the suction side. 
The primary circuit and the housing of the motor are connected via an intermediate flange. The 
motor can therefore be removed without opening the primary circuit. 
The drive for the flap and several pipes for the supply of auxiliary systems are arranged in the 
housing of the motor . The motor housing has the same helium pressure than the helium cycle. 
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Figure 46: Helium circulator of the HTR Module 
 
Some data on the component are contained in Table 19. For comparison, the data on a THTR helium 
circulator are included in this table. 
The development of the HTR technology delivered broad experience on helium circulators and is a 
good basis for future applications. The many years of successful operation of CO2-cooled reactors 
form another large pool of experience for this component. 
 
Table 19: Data on the helium circulator of the HTR Module (THTR circulator data for comparison) 
Parameter Dimension HTR Module circulator 
data 
THTR circulator data 
Number of loops  1 6 
Power MW 2.5 2.3 
Mass flow of helium kg/s 85.5 46.25 
Pressure drop bar 1.5 1.1 
Helium pressure bar 40 60 
Helium inlet 
temperature 
°C 250 250 
Type of circulator  Radial, 1 stage Radial, 1 stage 
Drive  Electric motor Electric motor 
Bearing  Oil oil 
Speed Rotations/min 3 000 5 600 
Arrangement  Vertical Horizontal 
Support of wheel  Overhang Overhang 
 
 
1: Suction 
2: Flap 
3: Inner diffuser 
4: Outer diffuser 
5: Wheel 
6: Intermediate flange 
7: Shaft 
8: Oil bearing 
9: Motor 
10: Auxiliary wheel 
11: Gas cooler 
12: Drive of flap 
13: Gas penetration 
14: Flange 
15: closure 
Page 83 
 
5.11. Helium purification plant 
The helium purification plant, together with helium auxiliary systems, has to fulfil different 
requirements. The helium of the primary circuit must be cleaned to limit the values of H2, CO, CO2, 
N2, O2, H2O and CH4 to permitted specified values. This is necessary to limit the corrosion of fuel 
elements and graphite structures to permitted values. Furthermore, tritium has to be removed from 
the primary circuit. All components and circuits which contain helium have to be supplied with this 
gas in normal operation, thereby the pressure of the system is controlled too. During extended 
inspections and repair work the helium has to be removed from the system and storage. 
The helium purification of a two-module plant contains three tracks. The third system is mainly used 
as a reserve unit during inspection and repair and for the purpose of regeneration of one of the other 
tracks. 
Figure 47 shows the concept of the system containing several stages. In the first stage a filter 
removes dust; in the second stage H2 and CO are converted to H2O and CO2 with help of copper 
oxide; in the third stage a molecular sieve removes H2O and CO2. 
 
Figure 47: Concept of gas purification of the HTR Module consisting of three tracks 
 
In a further stage the helium is cooled to very low temperatures (~ 180 °C), and this allows CH4 and 
N2 to be removed. 
Additionally, fission gases like argon, krypton and xenon are removed. The very small amounts of 
them in the cooling gas are also reduced. 
The purified gas is recycled to the primary system with help of an additional helium circulator. The 
throughput of the gas purification plant was chosen in the HTR Module to be 5 % per hour related to 
the primary circuit inventory. This corresponds to a mass flow of helium of nearly 3 kg/s. 
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The third track in the gas purification of the HTR Module has a special function in case of a ‘water 
ingress into the primary circuit’ accident. Water which has entered the primary system can be 
removed using a water separator especially installed for such an accident. This procedure is helpful in 
reducing corrosion effects in fuel elements and graphite structures and limiting the formation of 
water gas. 
Furthermore, it allows the rise in pressure of the primary circuit to be limited. The blowing off of 
helium/steam mixtures into the reactor building is avoided in this case. 
 
The purification plant of the THTR -plant is a good example of the technology explained above (Figure 
48) 
 
 
Figure 48: Flow sheets of THTR gas purification plant 
 
5.12. Depressurisation systems 
The primary system has a depressurisation system. It protects the primary enclosure in case of 
excessive pressure (around 69 bar). A higher pressure could be caused, for example, by the loss of 
the main heat sink and the pressure regulation at the same time or in case of severe water ingress 
accidents. 
The system consists of two parallel tracks which contain valves, safety valves, pressure holding valves 
and burst discs. 
One track is designed for a flow section of 1 cm2 for small leaks and one of 30 cm2 corresponding to a 
break with diameter of 65 mm. In the first case very effective filtering of the effluent gas takes place; 
in the second case the gas is ducted directly into the channel for depressurisation and released via 
the stack. Corresponding to the permitted release of radioactivity at the time of planning, the 
radiological consequences were assumed to be tolerable. For future concepts in this case, filtering 
could even be envisaged, and could be required in the licensing process. Figure 49 shows the 
arrangement of the components of the depressurisation system. 
1: Dust filter 
2: Recuperator 
3: Cooler 
4: Separator 
5: Active coal filter 
6: Copper oxide catalyst 
7: Recuperator 
8: Cooler 
9: Separator 
10: Molecular sieve 
11: Recuperator 
12: Cooler 
13: Active coal filter 
14: Helium compressor 
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Figure 49: System for the depressurisation of the primary system 
 
Furthermore, a system is available to depressurise the steam generator if large amounts of water 
have penetrated into the primary circuit. The system will limit the amount of water which will stay in 
the steam generator pressure vessel, and it is designed in such a way that the pressure becomes 
smaller than the primary pressure, thereby a release via a leak in the steam generator is avoided. Gas 
purification allows the total removal of the water after the accident has happened. Steam will be 
condensed and the helium will be pumped into the gas storage. 
Two tracks allow a redundant design of the systems consisting of valves and vessels which are 
provided for steam condensation. 
Finally the concrete cell inside the reactor building is equipped with a depressurisation system to 
protect this room against excessive pressure in case of ‘loss of coolant’ accidents. 
All rooms with pressurised pipes are connected via a central pressure exoneration channel to the 
stack and the environment, and during accidents this measure avoids excessive pressures in these 
rooms. All rooms have openings into this channel. These openings are normally closed by flaps which 
allow the rooms to operate in under-pressure conditions 
 
 
1: Pebble bed core 
2: Graphite reflector 
3: Core container 
4: Pressure vessel 
5: Steam generator 
6: Reactor cell 
7: Reactor building 
8: Pressure-relief system 
    of reactor cell 
9: Steam generator dump line 
10: Exhaust air system 
11: Pressure-relief system 
12: Surface cooler 
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5.13. Decay heat removal installations 
The normal situation of decay heat removal from the reactor is the operation of the production loop, 
consisting of the gas duct, the steam generator and the helium circulator. This system has several 
possibilities of feed-water supply and steam condensation or blow-off. Figure 50 shows this concept. 
 
Figure 50: Decay heat removal in a modular HTR 
There are several possibilities feeding in water into the steam generator. Furthermore there are 
several diverse possibilities to condensate the steam or release it to the environment. 
Despite of all these efforts the non-availability of this chain of decay heat removal is relatively large, 
and is estimated at around 10–1 per year. Therefore, in some concepts of modular HTRs separate 
additional decay heat removal systems are provided for. As an example, in the GAC-600 design a 
small auxiliary loop (layout for full pressure of the primary system) is planned to be situated at the 
bottom of the reactor pressure vessel. Naturally, a similar solution of a small loop located side-by-
side with the reactor could also be used in the case of the HTR Module. The electricity supply of this 
loop should have high availability. If the active decay heat removal has failed, the surface cooler, 
situated around the reactor pressure vessel, acts as heat sink. This cooler is built from three tracks 
and has simple supply systems for water and cooling towers outside the reactor building. Figure 51 
shows a principal flow sheet for this installation. 
 
 
Tmax 
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Figure 51: Concept of surface cooler 
1: Reactor pressure vessel 
2: Wall of reactor building 
3: Surface cooler 
4: Pump 
5: Intermediate heat exchanger 
6: Pump 
7: Cooling tower 
8: Auxiliary water supply 
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If the surface cooling system were also to fail the decay heat would penetrate into the concrete of 
the inner cell (
 
 
 
Figure 52). It would be stored there and finally released into the environment. In all cases the 
maximum temperature of 1 600 °C during these accidents would not be reached. 
Further intervention methods to cool the reactor are possible, for example feeding water into the 
surface cooler after long grace time, cooling the concrete cell or cooling the reactor pressure vessel 
using nitrogen. 
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Without any measure of active cooling, however, the principle of self-acting decay heat (see chapter 
7.2) would be suited to limit the maximum fuel temperature to values of 1 600 °C. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52: Results for a ‘total loss of active cooling’ accident; failure of the surface cooler; storage and 
transport of heat in the concrete cell (HTR Module, 200 MWth) 
 
5.14. Reactor protection system 
As usual in nuclear technology each modular unit possesses a reactor protection system. The systems 
for single modules are not coupled and work without interactions. 
In case of accident the afflicted unit will be shut down and protection system actions will be initiated 
in this reactor.  
Figure 53: Connections in the reactor protection system of the HTR Module 
Figure 53 shows an overview of the connections between measured data, assumed accidents and 
actions initiated by the reactor protection system. 
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The measurement of the following process parameters allows the detection of accidents due to both 
internal reasons and outer impacts: 
 neutron flux (reactor power), 
 helium inlet temperature to core, 
 helium outlet temperature from core, 
 humidity in primary helium, 
 pressure in primary helium circuit, 
 pressure in secondary circuit, 
 mass flow of primary helium, 
 mass flow of feed water. 
The concept of measurement of data and the logical connection of these data will be taken over from 
the established technologies for light-water reactors. 
The actions of safety systems, which are initiated by the reactor protection system, are (see Figure 
53): 
 insertion (free fall) of the six reflector rods of the first shutdown system; 
 shutdown of the primary helium circulator; 
 closure of the secondary circuit (feed-water valves, life-steam valves); 
 depressurisation of the steam generator until it reaches the same pressure as the primary 
system; 
 locking of primary circuit closures. 
 
The following accidents are governed by this concept of the reactor protection system in the case of 
the HTR Module: 
 uncontrolled removal of reflector rods during the start-up procedure; 
 uncontrolled insertion of reflector rods during normal power operation; 
 loss of pressure in the primary system; 
 break in steam generator tubes; 
 failure of the helium circulator; 
 malfunction of the helium circulator flap; 
 break in the feed-water line; 
 break in the life-steam line; 
 loss of electrical power. 
Normally, several process variables are used to detect the accident and they initiate different actions. 
For example, in case of a break in a steam generator tube the humidity in the primary system and the 
primary pressure initiate actions (1), (2), (3) and (4) via the reactor protection system. 
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Figure 53: Connections in the reactor protection system of the HTR Module 
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The number of the safety actions in Figure 53 can be described as follows: 
① levelling of the six control rods through gravity (scram); 
② switch off the blower in the primary circuit; 
③ blocking of the secondary circuit (feed-water and life-steam instruments); 
④ unloading the steam generator until pressure equilibrium with the primary system is 
reached; 
⑤ blocking of the primary system closure. 
 
5.15. Steam turbine plant 
 
For a power plant for cogeneration consisting of two modular reactors two turbines were envisaged 
(Figure 54). Alternatively, the application of one turbine is possible. This is a question of optimisation 
between investment costs and plant availability. 
The process steam will be produced using steam leaving the high-pressure part of the steam turbine 
system. The water consumed is substituted with deionised water from storage. Steam which is not 
required for the production of process steam is used in the medium- and low-pressure turbines for 
electricity production. The condensate leaving the low-pressure turbines is condensed and pumped 
back into both feed-water storage vessels. 
From these vessels the feed-water pumps carry the water back to the steam generators. Some 
important data on the steam cycle are included in Table 20. This process corresponds to well-known 
technologies, often applied in conventional energy technology. 
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Figure 54: Steam turbine system for process-steam delivery from a power plant with two modular HTRs 
and two turbines 
 
The detailed layout of the turbine process is possible on the basis of the operation of prototype 
plants, for example THTR and Fort St. Vrain. Table 21 shows pre-calculated and measured values for 
the THTR and demonstrates the excellent agreement of the data. 
A special question for this process of steam production by cogeneration is the tritium content of the 
product. Based on the experience of HTR plants which were in operation and on many 
measurements in special test facilities for tritium permeation, it can be stated that the tritium 
content of the products is very low, and is smaller than licensed levels. The introduction of a steam 
transformer is a major precondition for the limitation of tritium. 
 
Table 20: Some data on the steam turbine plant for the production of process heat by cogeneration 
Parameter Dimension Value Remark 
Thermal power MW 2 × 200  
Electric power MW 95 Flexible 
Power of process-
steam delivery 
MW 130 Flexible 
Life-steam conditions °C/bar 530/190  
Process steam-
conditions 
°C/bar 240/42, 200/11  
Mass flow of process 
steam 
t/h   
Concept of the turbine  Extraction  
Separation of process 
heat 
 Steam transformer  
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Cooling method  Wet cooling tower  
 
 
Table 21: Pre-calculated and measured values of THTR 
Parameter Dimension Measured value Calculated value 
Thermal power of the 
core and internals 
MW 756 755 
Circulator speed min–1 5 407 5 380 
Helium flow rate kg/s 48.26 49.12 
Feed-water flow rate t/h 151.6 151.7 
Mass flow through the 
reheater 
t/h 144.7 144.1 
Hot gas temperature 
at the SG inlet 
°C 750.3 750 
Hot gas temperature 
at the SG outlet 
 246.8 246.3 
Main steam 
temperature 
°C 534.2 535 
Main steam pressure MPa(abs) 18.69 18.67 
Reheat steam 
temperature 
°C 530.6 527 
Reheat steam pressure MPa(abs) 4.85 4.84 
Generator active 
power 
MW 303.3 301.3 
Cooling water 
temperature 
°C 27.6 26.5 
 
5.16. Cooling system 
The cooling system of the plant contains the following parts. 
 A main cooling system for the steam turbine plant. A condenser and a wet cooling tower 
release the waste heat into the environment. Some additional water is necessary to operate 
this cooling system. 
 Start-up and shutdown systems for each module are necessary for the operation; each 
system has its own cooling system. 
 Separate intermediate cooling systems; all heat losses occurring in different components of 
the plant are released via this system containing separate cooling towers. 
 A separate cooling system for the surface cooler, which is built in three tracks. Some effort is 
required to make this system as reliable as possible. Also, after a long grace time water can 
be injected into this system from different sources (e.g. by the fire brigade). 
Some more details on these cooling systems can be seen in Figure 55. 
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Figure 55: Overview of cooling systems of the HTR Module 
 
5.17. Handling of radioactivity 
There are several streams of material containing radioactive substances during operation of the HTR 
Module. 
 Spent fuel elements are highly radioactive waste — around 300 spherical fuel elements have 
to be brought into the intermediate storage per day during full-power operation of one 
modular HTR. 
 Air containing radioactive, polluted helium is released from the plant via filtering and the 
stack. 
 Releases of waste water occur and the water has to be cleaned up. Finally the cleaned water 
has to be released into the environment. 
 There are various paths to treat solid-waste mainly containing low radioactive substances. 
They have to be conditioned and stored in special intermediate storage containers. 
An overview of the different paths to handle waste and the conditioning of these materials is given in 
Figure 56. 
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Figure 56: Flow of activity which is envisaged for the HTR Module 
 
The concept of storing spent fuel is a very well-established concept in AVR and THTR, and rules for 
future licensing processes can be adopted from LWR technology too. The intermediate storage 
technology is extremely safe, even for cases of very strong impacts from the outside. 
Gaseous waste is produced in the gas purification plant. The gases removed in this plant are pumped 
into special storage vessels, and later they are released in a controlled manner via the stack. The 
regeneration of the stages of the gas purification causes the release of very small amounts of noble 
gases (85Kr, 133Xe), tritium and carbon (14C). 
A very small contribution to the radioactivity formed during operation comes from neutron-activated 
isotopes like argon (41Ar), mainly inside the reactor building. These impurities are released via the air 
ventilation system. 
Leakages of helium from the primary system can contain very small amounts of gaseous activity too. 
Following the experience of HTR plants and large facilities in which helium was handled, around 50 % 
to 100 % of the helium inventory leaks per year. Again this release of radioactivity is very low. 
Releases during inspection, maintenance and repair require special attention. 
Overall the expectations for the HTR Module are as given in Table 22. 
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Table 22: Estimate of yearly releases of radioactive isotopes from an HTR Module plant 
Released activity Bq/yr Ci/ye 
Noble gases 7.4 × 1013 2 000 
- Main gas argon (41Ar) 1.2 × 1013 320 
Iodine (131I) 2.2 × 107 0.0006 
Aerosol (long half-life) 3.7 × 107 0.001 
Tritium (3H) 3.7 × 1012 100 
- Main release in turbine 
building 
8.9 × 1011 24 
Carbon (14C) 8.9 × 1011 24 
 
 
Contaminated water is collected and treated. Treatment processes mainly consist of evaporation. 
Water can originate from washing processes, laboratories or decontamination processes. 
The processed waste water is routed to three waste-water vessels, each having a storage capacity of 
20 m3.The water content of a waste-water vessel is only allowed to be released into the environment 
according to applicable guidelines. The limit for this is 1.85 × 107 Bq/m3 (5 × 10–4 Ci/m3). If the 
radioactivity is higher than the limit the water must undergo an additional water-treatment cycle. 
The average concentration in the sewage will, in general, be substantially below the permitted 
release limits. 
In general, the following annual values should be applied in a future plant specific location for an HTR 
Module power station: 
 radioactivity in treated water 9.2x109 Bq/yr (0.25 Ci/yr) 
 Tritium H3,   3.7x10
12 Bq/yr (100 Ci/yr) 
Condensate that contains tritium which is separated in the helium cleaning system, and in case of 
accidents when it is stored in separate storage vessels, is accumulated in the reactor building or in 
the reactor auxiliary systems building and is not released to the surroundings. 
Solid waste, beside spent fuel elements, which is produced during operation is treated and stored in 
the power plant or in special intermediate storage buildings before later being taken for final 
storage. 
The values estimated above correspond to experiences from the operation of AVRs and THTRs. Table 
23 for example contains some values gained over 20 years of AVR operation. 
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Table 23: Values of release of radioactivity during AVR operation: (a) release of radioactive substances 
into the atmosphere; (b) transfer of radioactive water from the AVR In the KFA 
Year From the secondary circuit to the 
storage basin 
From waste-water storage 
to the vaporiser unit to storage basin 
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 m3 Bq Bq Bq m3 Bq Bq BQ m3 Bq Bq Bq 
1968 13 282  1.19E09 2.223e11     296.3  3.80E07 1.90E10 
1975 18 022  1.03E10 3.40e12 5.6  2.68EE09 2.6E08 568.9  2.38E08 4.13E10 
1986 9 426  4.50E08 1.35E11 244.2 1.44E08 9.73E10 4.26E10 268.2 1.57E04 3.73E06 3.07E08 
1987 8 624  2.15E08 2.04E11 363.5 3.12E07 4.88E10 4.30E11 363.6 1.28E05 1.04E07 1.62E09 
1988 10 030  7.58E07 1.23E11 261.6 1.34E06 1.34E10 1.61E10 284.6 7.93E03 3.5E06 8.65E08 
 
Year Noble gas Aerosol 90Sr 89Sr 3H 14C 131I 82Br Outlet air 
 Bq Bq Bq Bq Bq Bq Bq Bq m3 
1968 5.81E11 < DT NM NM NM NM NM NM 1.75E08 
1986 4.77E11 1.61E04 1.6E05 3.09E05 1.71E12 3.38E10 1.62e04 4.65E05 3.22E08 
1987 2.20E11 8.33E03 4.75E04 8.55E03 1.66E12 3.83E10 2.03E03 7.60E05 2.97E08 
1988 2.78E11 < DT 1.17E05 1.05E04 1.70E12 4.42E10 DT 8.79E05 2.89E08 
 
5.18. Status of development of components and the concept of the HTR 
Module for cogeneration 
In practice, the components and concepts described in the previous chapters have already been used 
in LWR or HTR plants. As Table 25 indicates, broad experience is available for all components. 
The most important component, the spherical fuel element, has been tested extensively in the AVR, 
the THTR and many irradiation and heating experiments. The operational temperature, fast neutron 
dose and burnup values required in the HTR Module concept are significantly lower than those which 
have been used in development up to now. 
The core design of the reactor uses the experience of all HTR plants, especially that of the AVR, which 
has the same core diameter. The long-term experience from the graphitic core structures of AGR 
plants furthermore supports the use of the core structures of the HTR Module. 
The first shutdown system is well known from the THTR. For the second shutdown system (KLAK), 
experiences from Fort St. Vrain can be adopted, however this system still requires additional 
qualification work. 
The loading and unloading system is fully developed and can be derived from the AVR and the THTR. 
Some further improvements are possible. 
The reactor pressure vessel and the steam generator vessel can be adopted from LWR technology. 
Because of the use of helium as coolant, no inner protection layers against corrosion, as in the PWR, 
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are necessary. The steam generator vessel follows similar principles of design to the reactor pressure 
vessel. The concept of designing and evaluating the connecting system with the hot gas duct and the 
cold annulus as a connecting vessel is new in nuclear technology. 
For the whole primary enclosure the principle of ‘basic safe design’ and following the requirement to 
use the ‘leak-before-break’ concept must be fulfilled. This is well-established technology for LWRs 
today. The arrangement of the components of the primary system chosen for the HTR Module has a 
good example in the development of the AGR. The Windscale AGR (WAGR), as the prototype of AGR 
development, used the same concept of arrangement of the primary circuit and has worked for more 
than 10 years with good success. However, the arrangement is turned by 180° compared to the HTR 
Module. 
The steam generator bundle, compensation and support systems inside this component can be 
derived from technologies applied in the THTR, Fort St. Vrain, Dragon and several CO2-cooled 
reactors. Furthermore, heat exchangers with helical farmed surfaces are well known from fast 
breeders and from many fields of conventional technology too. 
The helium circulator corresponds to technical solutions used in all HTR plants and in CO2-cooled 
reactors. The component applied in the HTR Module can be directly derived from that of the THTR. 
The hot gas duct has been tested at 1:1-scale (with a displacement body) in the Interatom 
component test facility KVK (KomponentenVersuchsKreislauf) and in the large ADI facility with good 
success. Elements of these components (insulation, liner, support) can be taken from other HTR 
projects. An important component joined to the hot gas duct is the core connection. This component 
has also been tested extensively at 1:1-scale in the KVK facility, and it was shown that a connection 
with very small leak rate can be used. 
Auxiliary systems such as gas purification, helium circuits, helium technology in general and helium 
measurement methods can be carried over fully developed from HTR plants and many test facilities. 
The control systems, the reactor protection system and electrical systems are fully developed and 
can be transferred from nuclear technologies developed up to now. 
The concept of the inner concrete cell, which houses the primary system, is also well established in 
nuclear technology. For example, the WAGR uses a similar arrangement of an inner cell and an outer 
reactor building. In the case of the HTR Module the inner concrete cell is dense and connected to a 
filter system. The outer reactor building is not dense but protects against impacts from outside. The 
filter systems are well known and introduced in nuclear technology. 
Containment structures, especially those designed against strong impacts from the outside, are now 
a well-established technology. Conventional systems for the plant, such as cooling systems, 
steam/water circuits, turbine generator units, secondary electrical systems and further concepts, are 
well known worldwide and can be carried over to the HTR Module. 
The intermediate storage of spent fuel elements will be the waste management solution for several 
decades in many countries (e.g. Germany). The technologies developed for the AVR, the THTR and in 
the field of LWR can be carried over to the HTR Module. Dry storage vessels with self-acting decay 
heat removal offer an extremely high standard of safety. 
Page 100 
 
A very important topic for the components operating at high temperature, such as the hot gas duct, 
the core connection and the steam generator, is the materials used. The alloy relevant for this 
application up to an average helium temperature of 700 °C is Incoloy 800H. For this material a broad 
qualification programme has been carried out and showed that these components can be designed 
for the whole lifetime with high safety factors. 
Table 24 contains some comparisons and valuations of safety aspects and safety relevant features of 
AVR and HTR Module. Further improvements in case of modular HTR are possible, especially 
regarding air ingress accidents and very strong impacts from the outside. 
 
Table 24: Safety concept of HTR Module compared to that of AVR 
Main design data 
 HTR Module AVR 
Power, power density 200 MWth, 3 MWth/m3 46 MWth/m3 
Pressure, temperature 60 bar, 250/700 °C 10.8 bar, 275/950 °C 
Core radius/height 1.5/9.4 m 1.5/2.4m 
Heavy metal 7 g/fuel element 6 g/fuel element 
Safety concept 
Reactivity control inherent inherent 
Temperature coefficient –5 × 10–5/°C –9 × 10–5/°C 
Excess activity 1.0 nile 1.2 nile 
Shutdown systems 6 reflector rods (hot) 
18 reflector KLAK systems (cold) 
4 reflector rods (hot, cold) 
Decay heat removal passive, operating system only 
(cavity cooler for component 
protection) 
passive, operating system only 
(seal gap cooler for component 
protection) 
Safety enclosure fuel elements (Tmax < 1 600 °C) 
pressure vessel unit 
vented confinement 
fuel elements 
inner and outer pressure vessel 
gastight containment 
Water ingress control volume limitation (leak 
insulation) 
vessel configuration: 
slight under-moderation 
volume limitation (leak 
insulation) 
Air ingress control volume limitation (vessel 
excluding failure, small reactor 
building) 
volume limitation (multiple 
vessel excluding failure) 
Reactor protection system   
Criteria Pressure, temperature, flow 
rate, flux (moisture) 
Pressure, flow rate, flux, 
moisture 
Actions Plant shutdown — hot standby 
(steam generator relief) 
reactor shutdown — cold run 
(steam generator insulation, 
relief) 
 
The questions of licensing, application of existing rules of nuclear technology, development of new 
rules and design prescriptions always require new considerations corresponding to the development 
of the state of science and technology. Furthermore, changing conditions regarding politics and 
acceptance have brought large amounts of uncertainty and delays in many nuclear projects, 
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especially in Germany. The licensing process of the AVR and the THTR was carried out completely and 
successfully; the licensing process of the HTR Module was nearly finished, but was stopped for 
political reasons. There was no doubt, however, that on the basis of the work of the companies, the 
advisers, the TÜV and the German Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) this reactor concept was 
licensable. 
Table 25 contains some important components of modular HTRs. It is clear that there is a broad basis 
available to use these components and systems. 
Table 25: Evaluation of components of the HTR Module 
Fuel element HTR reactor and test facilities 
Fuel-handling system AVR,THTR 
Ceramic core internals AVR,THTR, other HTR plants, AGR 
Metallic core internals AVR,THTR, other HTR plants, AGR 
First shutdown system THTR, AGR 
Second shutdown system Fort St. Vrain 
Concept of primary enclosure LWR (PWR, BWR), AVR, Dragon, Peach Bottom 
Arrangement of the primary system WAGR 
Support of the vessels of the primary system LWR (PWR, BWR) 
Core connection KVK tests 
Hot gas duct KVK tests, EVO,HHV,ADI, several plants 
Steam generator bundle THTR, Fort St. Vrain, several AGRs 
Helium circulator THTR, all other HTR plants, AGRs 
Helium purification AVR, THTR, all other HTR plants, large test facilities 
Helium circuits, Helium technology AVR, THTR, all other HTR plants, large test facilities 
Inner concrete cell WAGR, LWR (PWR, BWR) 
Filter systems LWR (PWR, BWR) 
Surface cooler in inner concrete cell Conventional technology (boilers) 
Outer reactor containment building All reactors 
Instrumentation of the primary circuit AVR, THTR, KVK,PWR 
Reactor protection system LWR (PWR, BWR), THTR 
Secondary cycle (stem/water cycle, turbine) THTR, Fort St. Vrain, AGR, all conventional plants 
Intermediate storage for spent fuel elements AVR, THTR, LWR (PWR, BWR) 
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6. Materials 
The need for reliable material property data is an important requirement for the HTR and (V)HTR. 
The development of advanced HTR concepts requires an understanding of material behaviour plus 
data information under representative reactor operating conditions for the main HTR components 
important to safety and feasibility. The following sections provide the position on materials 
development issues for the HTR, making use of information from previous projects (such as those in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States) and more recently developed information from 
R & D projects managed within the European Commission’s fifth (Martin-Bermejo, et al., 2001), sixth 
(Raphael) and seventh (Archer) framework programmes. For consistency the materials issues and 
available information are discussed under similar headings to those listed in the previous section on 
components. 
6.1. Primary system and primary enclosure 
The primary system components are largely metallic (e.g. reactor pressure vessel — RPV), except for 
those of the reactor core, which are constructed using graphite and composite materials (used for 
straps etc.). The components covered here are as follows: 
 the reactor pressure vessel together with the inner metallic and graphite structures, the 
shutdown systems, the fuel-handling system and measurement installations; 
 the steam generator vessel, which contains the steam generator bundle and the helium 
circulator, including the drive; 
 the connecting vessel, which contains the hot gas duct; 
 the inner concrete cell, which contains the surface cooler. 
The non-metallic materials for the core are discussed in the next section. 
Materials issues for the reactor pressure vessel, the steam generator vessel and the connecting 
vessel which use a similar material for the pressure boundary (depending on the temperature) are 
discussed here. For the HTR the LWR materials technology provides a firm basis. For the VHTR a 
stronger material capable of operating at higher temperatures is needed. Such a material (Mod 9Cr 
1Mo steel) has been investigated in the HTR-M & M1 (Buckthorpe, 2004) and Raphael projects 
(Buckthorpe, et al., 2008). 
For the HTR RPV the design pressures and internal diameters fall within a relatively narrow range. 
This is because of the constraints imposed by requirements for passive heat removal under ‘loss of 
circulation’ or ‘loss of coolant’ scenarios and the requirement to meet the allowable stress levels in 
various design codes. As a result two types of material are used, depending on whether the 
temperature of the pressure boundary under normal operation or design conditions exceeds the 
limit for LWR/PWR pressure vessel operation. Different ferritic materials have been used for the RPV 
in both current and past test reactor systems. Comparisons between material types and between 
grades of the same material suggest the following materials are possible: 
 various grades of 2-1/4 Cr-1Mo steel (ASME Grade 22 Class 1, the normalised or quenched 
and tempered grades of RCC-MR); 
• Mn-Ni-Mo steel (PWR grades); 
• ASME Grade 91 and RCC-MR mod 9Cr-1MoVNb. 
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Comparisons of tensile and creep data for matching grades indicate that there are differences in the 
minimum stress to rupture (Sr) and the primary stress intensity (St) design values for these materials, 
particularly for modified 9Cr1Mo steel, which exhibits great strength at elevated temperatures (see 
Figure 57). There is also a need for long-term creep data at moderate creep temperatures (425-
500 °C) to confirm long-term values of Sr and St for both the 2-1/4 Cr-1Mo and modified 9Cr-1Mo 
types of steel, particularly if these are to be used for the pressure boundary. 
In China, silicon killed C-Mn steel to ASME SA 516-70 has been specified for both the HTR-10 test 
reactor and future power reactors. This material is similar to the C-Mn steels used in the United 
Kingdom for the construction of both steel and concrete pressure vessels in CO2-cooled reactors of 
the Magnox and AGR types. Long-term operating and/or design temperatures are limited to 370 °C. 
Similar limits apply to the SA 508 forgings used widely in LWR pressure vessels and proposed for the 
pebble-bed modular reactor (PBMR) in South Africa. It should be noted that the SA 508 specification 
covers a number of grades, some of which are not suitable for pressure vessels. In terms of the 
current designations in ASME specifications, ‘SA 508 type’ material is taken to mean SA 508 Grade 3 
Class 1 or the equivalent material in plate form, SA 533 Type B Class 1. Equivalent European 
designations are 20MnMoNi 5 5 (Germany) and 15MND 5 or 18MND 5 (France). Except for HTR-10 
the above systems have core inlet gas temperatures close to 550 °C, so the integrity of the RPV also 
depends on the performance of the insulation, which might be in the form of fibre blanket and/or 
stagnant/flowing layers of helium. 
For the HTTR test reactor and larger power reactors of 450-600 MWth the RPV temperature is close 
to the core inlet temperature due to the passage of inlet (or intermediate) temperature helium to 
cool the inside surface of the vessel. Vessel temperatures are in the range 395-460 °C under normal 
operating conditions. The HTTR inlet temperature of 400 °C allows the use of 2-1/4 Cr-1Mo steel with 
a margin of about 25 % on allowable stress and about 40 °C on temperature. Modified 9Cr1Mo steel 
has also been specified for both large and small reactors with the beltline region of the vessel 
running at the core inlet temperature. This material has not yet been qualified for pressure vessel 
use according to most design codes. Work has however been carried out within the European 
framework programme Raphael (Buckthorpe, et al., 2008) to investigate the issues connected with 
material qualification for RPV application, including the effects of irradiation and environment with a 
specific thick section (150 mm) welded plate manufactured for testing. 
Page 104 
 
 
Figure 57: Vessel steels — comparison of allowable strengths 
 
For an RPV application the fabrication and qualification of the vessel steel material has to be 
extremely thorough. Investigations have to be carried out in a very measured way. Issues that should 
be addressed include areas such as weld strength, manufacturing and adherence to design codes and 
procedures. These three areas are addressed briefly below. 
Weld strength 
 
The main concerns for the VHTR RPV are in the vicinity of the welds. The welds carry an additional 
requirement to satisfy the safety analysis methodology and safety studies (defect location and defect 
size), and have to be assessed from the point of view of non-destructive examination and potential 
for failure or leakage. 
The main damage mechanisms to be addressed are fracture, fatigue and creep-fatigue. These have to 
be evaluated from an initiation aspect and for crack growth of defects under fluctuating thermal and 
mechanical loads. The potential effects of the environment (temperature, irradiation, ageing) all 
have to be taken into account. The important issues to address are toughness and creep behaviour 
under as-fabricated and simulated end-of-life conditions. This is to provide an understanding of the 
welding processes, weld metals and post-weld heat treatment required for thick welds and weld 
factors to be applied on the base material properties. The strength issues for HTR and VHTR vessels 
are summarised in Table 26 below: 
 
Table 26: Qualification issues for HTR/VHTR reactor pressure vessel 
LWR vessel steel (HTR temperatures) Mod 9Cr 1Mo steel (VHTR temperatures) 
LWR experience provides filler materials. 
Toughness properties well matched. 
Irradiation embrittlement less than 1dpa 
as for LWR- low P and Cu. 
Thermal ageing embrittlement — most 
No previous experience on thick section 
RPV welds. 
Short term strength — HAZ; long term 
strength by Type IV cracking. 
Irradiation embrittlement — increases with 
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likely in the HAZ — only for transients at 
higher temperatures (10s to 100s of 
hours). 
Carburisation/corrosion — HTR gas 
chemistry. 
lower temperature — no data on welds. 
Thermal aging embrittlement — operation 
above 450 °C — no data on welds. 
Carburisation/corrosion — HTR gas 
chemistry. 
 
Other sensitive zones that are important are areas that feature thicker sections (potential for 
reduced properties and strength), hotspots and regions important from a functionality point of view. 
This includes the flange area and belt line, which have to satisfy primary and secondary stress-limit 
requirements and progressive deformation mechanisms. 
The HTR and VHTR helium gas chemistry is dominated by the impurities H2, H2O, CO, CO2 and CH4 
that exist within the gas. Low concentrations of H2O and H2 are produced by leakage and/or 
desorption from both metal surfaces and graphite. CO, CO2 and CH4 may be produced by 
coolant/graphite reactions at high temperatures. 
Design codes usually instruct the designer to take into consideration the effects of corrosion without 
specifying in detail how this should be done. In practice two measures are usually adopted. 
 An allowance for metal losses over its lifetime is added to the minimum design thickness of a 
pressure vessel. 
 Fatigue and creep-fatigue damage calculations made with design data include allowances for 
data scatter, ‘mild’ (oxidising) environments and the characteristics of typical pressure vessel 
surfaces. Additional margins are necessary only where the environment has different and/or 
more severe effects on fatigue and creep by carburising the exposed surfaces or by 
producing intergranular oxidation to a significant depth. 
The chemical attack from the impurities within the helium is temperature dependent, and its effects 
have to be checked at all operating temperatures where the material is expected to experience a 
significant period of operating time. Depending on the partial pressure of the impurities the resulting 
atmosphere can either be oxidising, carburising or decarburising, with damage either at the surface 
or diffusing to significant depths in the metallic matrices (internal oxidation or carburisation or 
decarburisation) which may result in a loss of mechanical properties. Phase diagrams (Figure 58) can 
be used to determine the neutrality of the chemical activity and to determine whether compatibility 
issues are likely to have a strong impact on material behaviour and performance. 
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Figure 58: Phase diagram for Fe at 350 °C 
The RPV in the HTR will be irradiated with neutrons, which cause damage within the material and will 
result in a change in mechanical behaviour of the material and in the welds. Depending on the 
operating conditions of the HTR and (V)HTR, this irradiation can take place at temperatures between 
120 °C and 450 °C, where 120 °C is considered representative of the lower temperature of the LWR 
material option and 375 °C the lower temperature of the Mod 9Cr 1Mo steel material option, with 
450 °C the upper end of the Mod 9Cr 1Mo steel material temperature operating window. 
The effects of irradiation on the toughness of LWR steels have been studied extensively and reviews 
have been undertaken as part of the work programme of the CEC-supported AMES network (Ageing, 
Materials Evaluation and Studies), where CEC is the abbreviation of “Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation”. Reports from this group, along with publications in the open literature, are highly 
relevant to the materials and operating conditions of LWR steel HTR vessels given that LWR vessels 
operate at 250-300 °C with similar end-of-life fluences to HTR vessels. 
The major effect in these materials is an increase in the ductile brittle transition temperature (DBTT) 
and ΔDBTT due to the combined effects of matrix hardening and grain-boundary weakening 
associated mainly with the residual elements P and Cu. Various empirical relationships between 
composition, fluence and ΔDBTT have been proposed on the basis of results from test reactors and 
LWR surveillance programmes (Western PWRs and Russian LWRs). Common features of the formulae 
are the importance of the Cu and P contents as well as synergistic effects of the Ni content. The 
range of behaviour predicted for Mn-Ni-Mo, 2-3/4 Cr-Mo-V and 2-1/4 Cr-Ni-Mo-V pressure vessel 
steels is shown in Figure 59. The upper bounds correspond to steels used in the 1960s and 1970s 
which had relatively high levels of either Cu (PWR steels) or P (WWER steels). Specifications for 
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modern pressure vessel steels and weld metal contain special limits on Cu and P for material to be 
used in the most highly irradiated (beltline) region of LWRs: 
 0.008 %P and 0.08 % Cu in RCC-M; 
 0.012 %P and 0.12 % Cu in the ASME Code; 
 0.010 % P and 0.08 % Cu in WWER rules. 
 
The above limits can be met comfortably using modern steelmaking techniques. They ensure that the 
predicted end of life ΔDBTT for a LWR vessel operating at 250-300 °C is small in relation to the data 
scatter. 
 
Figure 59: PWR and WWER regulatory guides — shift in DBTT with dpa dose 
 
Material ageing describes a continuous time or operational degradation of the material due to 
operating condition, (excluding ‘design’ and ‘beyond design basis’ accidents). As a result of ageing 
degradation the plant or component state could vary through the operating life. 
Material ageing or thermal ageing embrittlement (TAE), sometimes called temper embrittlement 
(TE), may involve hardening due to precipitation of carbides and intermetallic compounds, along with 
grain-boundary segregation of trace elements (P, Sn, As, Sb). The term ‘temper embrittlement’ came 
into use because slow cooling after tempering was sufficient to embrittle steels with relatively high 
levels of the trace elements. More severe effects could be induced by step cooling from the 
tempering temperature followed by holding at approximately 450 °C and/or slow (furnace) cooling to 
room temperature. TE is not usually a problem in modern steels with very low levels of P and the 
other trace elements. TAE can however occur after long-term service at temperatures in the 350-
550 °C range. The severity of the effect depends on a number of factors including: 
 the prior austenite grain size of the material; 
 the concentration and distribution of the trace elements (P, Sn, As, Sb); 
 the cooling cycle after tempering; 
 time at temperature(s) within the critical range; 
 the property considered. 
The base materials and weld metals for both the LWR steel and Mod 9Cr 1Mo steel vessel options 
normally have very fine grain sizes. The most likely embrittlement location is therefore the coarse-
grained heat-affected zone. Because the LWR-cooled vessels operate at temperatures below the 
embrittlement range of the material, it usually can only occur for this material during transients 
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involving exposure to higher temperatures for tens or hundreds of hours. Warm (non-cooled) vessels 
(Mod 9Cr 1Mo steel) can operate at higher temperature and in the ageing temperature range 
throughout their lifetime, and so for the Mod. 9Cr 1Mo steel vessel ageing can be more important to 
integrity. The approximate duration after which ageing effects can be significant can be in the order 
of 20-30 years, and its predictability depends upon technical understanding of the conditions and the 
quality of the operational experience data. It predictability is also dependent on the ability to 
monitor the condition of the component and to model it. For Mod 9 Cr 1 Mo steel investigations 
have been carried out in the HTR-M & M1 projects (Buckthorpe, 2006) and Raphael (Buckthorpe, et 
al., 2010) on both irradiation and ageing effects with specific experiments performed. 
Manufacturing 
 
The technology developed for building LWR vessels from heavy section ring forgings provides a 
sound basis for manufacture covering: 
 procurement specifications for forgings; 
 welding procedures and filler metal selection; 
 manufacturing sequences including weld examinations and post-weld heat treatment. 
 
HTR vessel wall thicknesses are within the PWR range but the diameters of HTR vessels (6-8.5 m) are 
much greater than for PWR (up to 4.5 m). There is therefore a need to establish a capability to 
produce forged parts of the required dimensions with the required mechanical properties. If this 
cannot be done it will be necessary to manufacture the vessel from formed plates. In this case there 
are implications for both design and manufacturing. The most important design consideration is the 
introduction of axial welds with higher cross-weld stresses. Manufacturing requirements include 
provision of procurement specifications, forming facilities and forming procedures for heavy plates. 
On-site welding and post-weld heat treatment (PWHT) of the reactor vessel–cross vessel–PCS vessel 
assembly can introduce a requirement that does not arise in LWR manufacture: 
 a validated local heat treatment procedures for Mn-Ni-Mo steel; 
 a site heat treatment facility that can accommodate the whole reactor vessel–cross vessel–
PCS vessel assembly. 
The above considerations also apply to vessels using 2-1/4 Cr-1Mo steel. There is manufacturing 
experience in France for one grade and it can be extended to other grades of 2-1/4 Cr-1Mo steel. 
Appropriate filler metals exist but the properties of welded joints require evaluation. Russian 
experience of WWER-1000 vessel manufacture in 2-1/4 Cr-Ni-Mo-V steel is also relevant. The PWHT 
temperature for 2-1/4 Cr-1Mo steel is 630-660 °C compared with 620 °C for Mn-Ni-Mo steel. This 
difference may have a significant effect on cost, particularly in the case of a site PWHT facility. 
In the case of modified 9Cr-1Mo steel the above-noted manufacturing problems introduce greater 
difficulties, as detailed below. 
 A lower limit on the mass of single cast or ingot for high-Cr steel compared with 2¼Cr-1Mo 
steel. 
 Difficulties in selecting filler metals to achieve the required levels of resistance to hot 
cracking, high toughness at 0 °C and creep strength. 
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 A much higher PWHT temperature (> 750 °C) compared with 2¼Cr-1Mo steel (630-660 °C). 
Local heat treatment at > 750 °C of welds in the RPV/cross vessel assembly would be 
particularly difficult to validate. 
 The design temperature of the PCS vessel for GT-MHR is 150 °C compared with 440 °C for the 
RPV and cross vessel. It is possible therefore to specify C-Mn, Mn-Ni-Mo or 2¼Cr-1Mo steel 
for the PCS vessel. A transition joint between modified 9Cr-1Mo steel and any one of the 
other candidate material types would involve a mismatch of 100-150 °C in their PWHT 
temperatures. It might be necessary in this case to validate the use of a filler metal such as 
Alloy 82 and a ‘buttering’ technique to permit separate PWHT at temperatures appropriate 
to each base material prior to completion of the closure weld. 
 
Manufacturing issues for HTR and VHTR vessels are summarised below in Table 27: 
 
Table 27: Qualification issues for HTR/VHTR reactor pressure vessel 
LWR vessel steel (HTR temperatures) Mod 9Cr 1Mo steel (VHTR temperatures) 
Technology for LWR provides a sound 
basis: 
 procurement specifications, 
 welding procedures, 
 manufacturing sequences and 
examinations. 
Larger-diameter forgings than LWR. 
On-site welding produces additional 
requirements — on-site heat treatments. 
No previous similar experience in 
manufacture with this material. 
Selection of filler material. 
Higher PWHT temperatures (> 750 °C). 
Possibility of needing transition welds if 
cross vessel is of a different material. 
Potential for PWHT mismatch of 100-
150 °C. 
 
Codes and standards 
 
Pressure vessel design and construction codes provide mandatory rules for calculation of material 
thickness, allowable materials for construction, welding, NDE, testing and regulatory documentation. 
The pressure vessel code(s) applicable to the location of installation must be followed for mechanical 
design and construction. There are several commonly accepted design codes that can and have been 
used for the metallic materials of the primary circuit: 
 ASME BPVC — American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; 
 (KTA3221, 2015) ‘Metallische HTR Komponenten’ Parts 1 to 3 (Draft); 
 (KTA3201, 2015) Light-Water Reactors; 
 (EN13445, 2012) EN 13445 — the European standard, harmonised with the pressure 
equipment directive (PED); 
 (AFCEN, 2012) RCC-MRx — design and construction rules for mechanical components of 
nuclear installations. 
Within such codes key damage mechanisms are addressed: 
 DM 1. Instantaneous excessive deformation; 
 DM 2. Delayed excessive deformation; 
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 DM 3. Ratcheting; 
 DM 4. Fatigue; 
 DM 5. Creep-fatigue. 
DMs 1 and 2 are of major significance to the design of pressure vessels because they lead directly to 
the primary stress limits Sm (instantaneous limit based on tensile properties) and St (delayed limit 
based on creep properties). The crossover temperature θco above which St applies is an important 
parameter for RPV materials selection since it is necessary to show that time-dependent effects are 
negligible. For the pressure vessel structures this means that normal operating temperatures must 
be below the negligible creep limit of the material. The areas relevant to DMs 3-5 are identified 
below. 
 Parts of the vessel where wall temperatures are highest may be subject to creep damage. 
 Nozzles and openings including the cross-vessel connection and penetrations in the 
hemispherical bottom and lid may be subject to fatigue. 
 The internal support attachments may be subject to fatigue and ratcheting. 
 The RPV and PCU support to foundation may be subject to fatigue with mean stress effects. 
The designs of the two supports need to be compatible. 
 Welds. Results from thick section welds at such temperatures are very scarce and such data 
are very important not only for understanding weld behaviour but also for confirming a 
maximum normal operating temperature (and hence, for non-cooled designs, the gas inlet 
temperature) for vessel operation. 
 
Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB of the ASME Code is fully applicable to the design of LWR-type 
HTR pressure vessels operating at up to 371 °C and the RCC-M Code provides a European set of rules 
for these vessels. Both ASME III NB and RCC-M incorporate extensive LWR experience and are easily 
available. They can be regarded as having equivalent status from the standpoint of an HTR vessel 
design and validation approach. The ASME III Division 1, Subsection NH and the RCC-MR rules 
provide limited coverage for HTR vessels made from 2 ¼ Cr-1Mo steel and Mod 9Cr 1Mo steel. 
Codes and standards issues for HTR and VHTR vessels are summarised below in Table 28. 
 
Table 28: Codes and standards issues for HTR/VHTR reactor pressure vessel 
LWR vessel steel (HTR temperatures) Mod 9Cr 1Mo steel (VHTR temperatures) 
Data and experience of LWR provides 
sound basis. 
Property data plus fracture and fatigue 
crack growth information. 
ASME/RCC-M Code — exclude effect of 
environment — but procedures 
substantiated by years of successful 
operation in service. 
No previous service experience. 
Property data available — RCC-MR 
design rules — some gaps 
Long term data required at 425-500 °C. 
Experimental programmes required for 
irradiation and thermal ageing. 
P91 approved code material for ASME 
subsection NH. 
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6.2. Reactor core 
The graphite core is a key component that affects the safety and operability of the reactor. It 
provides structural support, coolant channels, moderation and shielding while operating in a high-
temperature helium environment. Its performance is critically dependent on the graphite properties, 
which are irradiation dependent. The final choice of graphite for the core should be based on a 
number of factors, although the most important will be the effects of fast neutron irradiation on its 
properties up to the peak doses envisaged. Given the best graphite available, it is the task of the core 
designer to produce a design that will operate safely over the design life of the reactor. The most 
important considerations are component integrity and changes in core geometry, both of which are 
affected by the dimensional change (see Figure 60). 
 
Figure 60: Effect of irradiation on dimensional change 
 
Many of the graphites used in previous core designs are no longer available and there has been a 
serious decline in the ability to manufacture nuclear-grade graphite in large quantities since the 
1980s. The main questions concern the long-term availability of the coke and manufacturing 
procedure. Current HTGR projects — HTTR (Japan) and HTR-10 (China) — use a Japanese graphite 
called IG110, which, with its high strength, is suitable for exchangeable core components where low 
fast neutron fluences are applicable. 
Much of the available irradiated materials data are obtained from various materials test reactors, 
and often it is not possible to complete an irradiated materials property database for a particular 
graphite in advance of a reactor’s design and construction phases. In such cases design databases can 
be used to arrive at the required information, developed from previously irradiated graphites of 
similar microstructure and an understanding of irradiation damage in the polycrystalline graphites. 
R & D activities have been undertaken in a number of countries to investigate graphite properties. 
Two of the most significant experimental programmes in the past were for the European Dragon HTR 
programme and the German HTR programme. Unfortunately most of the data obtained by other 
countries are confidential and so far have not been published in open literature. Work performed on 
the review and collection of graphite properties considers the accessible information on the IAEA 
database, internal information and published information at seminars and conferences. The IAEA 
database was established to help the development of International programmes on graphite-
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moderated reactors, assist safety authorities in assessment of safety aspects and serve as a source of 
scientific information for nuclear and non-nuclear technology. 
The data relevant to the irradiation temperature and neutron fluence domains for new HTRs will 
largely come from the new tests and be built up for each graphite grade and sample orientation, and 
contain the appropriate details of the graphite, i.e. grade, manufacturer, coke source, grain size and 
manufacturing method. These data are being collated into a set format for use and development 
representing the experimental data on the new graphites in the form of recommended ‘design 
curves’ for each required material property. 
For nuclear applications, the graphite has to be as free as possible from impurities. Most of the 
impurities present will become activated during the operating life of the reactor, which will give rise 
to operational problems, as well as decommissioning and final disposal problems. Most impurities, 
however, are volatile and so disappear during graphitisation. To remove as much of the remainder as 
possible, halogens are added generally during graphitisation to aid the conversion of metal 
impurities, and boron particularly, to their more volatile halides. (Extremely low boron levels are 
important from a reactor physics point of view, as it is a very strong neutron absorber.) 
Table 29: Typical range of graphite grades in an irradiation experiment 
 
 
The choice of graphite for the reactor core is limited to those that are currently recommended and 
available from manufacturers (see Table 29). Discussions with graphite manufactures will establish 
suitable graphites produced using a range of methods (extruded, iso-moulded and viro-moulded 
graphites), which can be investigated using a graphite irradiation programme. Such a programme has 
been carried out in Europe (over the 2000-2015 period) within EU framework programmes (Martin-
Bermejo, et al., 2001) (Raphael) (Archer) to provide results over a low, medium and high dose levels 
suitable for both the prismatic and pebble-bed HTR designs. The experiments examine material 
behaviour at two nominal temperatures (750 °C and 950 °C) relevant to the HTR and VHTR cores (see  
Figure 61). A further irradiation programme can be performed (under load) including the effects of 
creep (Ratton, 2005), but these types of experiment are significantly more expensive and should be 
considered to be a second step after general selection. Such irradiation programmes performed on 
selected graphites can be used to determine the variations in their physical and mechanical 
properties over low/medium/high irradiation doses and used for design. 
Manufacturer Grade Coke 
Grain size 
Process Classification 
GrafTech 
PCEA Petroleum Medium Extrusion Major 
PPEA Pitch Medium Extrusion Major 
PCIB-SFG Petroleum Super-fine Iso-moulding Minor 
LPEB/BAN Petroleum Medium Extrusion Minor 
SGL 
NBG-10 Pitch Medium Extrusion Major 
NBG-25 Petroleum Fine Iso-moulding Minor 
NBG-18 Pitch Medium Vibro-moulding Major 
NBG-17 Pitch Medium Vibro-moulding Minor 
Toyo Tanso 
IG-110 Petroleum Fine Iso-moulding Minor 
IG-430 Pitch Fine Iso-moulding Minor 
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Figure 61: Schematic overview of the graphite irradiation experiments 
For the experiments above the focus has been on the determination of engineering design curves 
which can be used for the core design process: 
 dimensional change (DC) 
 dynamic Young’s modulus (DYM) 
 coefficient of thermal expansion (CTE) 
 thermal conductivity/diffusivity (TC/TD) 
The effects of irradiation can change all these properties and it is important to have representative 
curves for design. There can also be significant differences in the with-grain (WG) and against-grain 
(AG) directions, because of the non-isotropic nature of the graphite material. A typical curve for 
dynamic modulus variation with irradiation dose is shown in Figure 62 below. The DYM data show 
the expected increase at lower dose to a plateau, followed by a further increase at medium dose and 
finally a decrease at high dose. The CTE decreases with irradiation dose to a stable plateau at 
medium dose and a slight increase at high dose. The TD and TC values typically fall rapidly at low 
dose and reach a plateau at medium dose. 
Since investigations into the effects of neutron irradiation rely heavily on testing (such as that 
described above), and given that suitable facilities for such testing are both scarce and expensive to 
use and that manufacturers are continually developing and offering new graphites for such 
applications, in the longer term it is also important to develop an alternative modelling approach (in 
parallel with the tests) that will both facilitate the longer-term development of graphites and 
minimise and reduce the extent and requirement for future irradiation testing. One such technique 
uses X-ray tomography in conjunction with model simulations to predict behaviour which can be 
applied to both non-irradiated and irradiated samples from experiments (Halli, 2004). Such 
investigations can indicate that irradiation-induced microstructural (pore) changes can be detected 
and can give confidence that they can be used to gain further insight into the microstructural 
changes within the graphite and their predictive models. 
 
Innograph-1A 750 °C, low/medium dose (FP5) 
Innograph-1B 750 °C, high dose (Raphael) 
Innograph-2A 950 °C, low/medium dose (Raphael) 
Innograph-2B 950 °C, high dose (Raphael) 
Innograph-1C 750 °C, low dose (Archer) 
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Figure 62: Change in E/Eo with irradiation dose for graphite 
 
Oxidation of the graphite also takes place during normal operation of the HTR core due to impurities 
in the cooling gases. In such cases however the oxidation rate of the graphite is extremely low. Tests 
in oxygen and air at temperatures up to 1 500 °C (accident and normal operation) to establish 
graphite property requirements and specifications can provide useful information on graphite 
behaviour, with the rapid oxidation data derived (Kuhn, et al., 2003) providing information on 
reactivity for the graphites investigated. Such tests can identify differences between grades and 
between the inner and outer parts of a block which can be explained by density and impurity 
differences between centre and edge specimens in the block. 
Work has been carried out in Germany to develop SiC coatings for graphite materials to protect the 
graphite against oxidation from air or steam ingress under severe accidents. Investigations were 
done using the matrix German graphite A3-3 to measure the corrosion rate for temperatures up to 
1 200 °C, and on coated pebbles using different graphites. Such tests involve corrosion tests, 
irradiation tests and PIE tests to assess coating integrity and different coating methods (chemical 
vapour deposition (CVD), paste siliconisation (PS)). Although the original objective, to develop a 
coating for A3-3 graphite, was not achieved, these results gave a very positive indicator and provide a 
useful basis for further investigation. 
Other issues that need to be addressed are the tribological performance, like on like for the core; 
graphite on metal like on like (Core/Core); and graphite on metal for the core against internals. Such 
investigations need to be carried out at pressure and under load for accident and normal operating 
conditions. Results from these investigations are summarised in Buckthorpe (Buckthorpe, et al., 
2008). 
In summary, graphite material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR core can be 
summarised as follows. 
 
Table 30: Graphite core material issues and requirements 
Graphite core (HTR and VHTR temperatures) 
Graphite impurity levels and disposal. 
Changes in physical and mechanical properties with 
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irradiation dose. 
Investigations under load to determine properties with 
irradiation creep. 
Increase and saturate the data range required for design. 
Oxidation under normal operation and accident conditions 
to establish corrosion resistance and protection. 
Tribology tests and simulations. 
Link between testing behaviour and design, establishing 
design curves representative of the physical property 
variation with irradiation dose and temperature. 
Graphite microstructural modelling and simulation. 
 
6.3. Shutdown system 
For the control rod, which compensates for fuel burnup and power variation reactivity effects, used 
to control the reactor operation under fast normal operating modes and to shut down the reactor 
system, available metallic materials (such as Alloy 800H) are prime candidates. Material property 
data at elevated temperature are available in codes such as ASME to enable a metallic arrangement 
to be designed and operated. Such a material can be employed in the HTR but is considered to be at 
its operational limit for the VHTR. For the VHTR, new carbon fibre reinforced materials can be 
considered as alternatives. Such materials are expected to give potential for improved reactivity 
control during shutdown and to allow the normal operating temperatures of future reactors to be 
increased. 
The characteristics of composites are usually governed by their individual base constituents. This is 
the main advantage of employing composites over conventional materials, having that ‘unique’ mix 
of different properties delivered by its fibres and matrix components. This provides the potential for 
composites to deal with severe nuclear environments. Most composites for industrial use are based 
on polymeric matrices, i.e. thermosets and thermoplastics. These are usually reinforced with aligned 
ceramic fibres, such as carbon. Aligned reinforced composites or 1D reinforced composites have two 
distinct orientations: parallel to the fibre reinforcements (z-axis) and transverse to the fibre 
reinforcements (x- and y-axes). The orientations parallel to the fibres possess superior properties. 
The use of carbon-carbon composite and carbon fibre material composites for control rods (Figure 
63) is not, however, a proven technology. Consultation with manufacturers on possible candidate 
materials is important and necessary. The material sits permanently in a neutron field accumulating 
fast fluences that change its structure and properties. The selection of the material is very important. 
Manufacture involves specialised (and expensive) processing. Certain fabrication parameters (e.g. 
fibre and yarn properties, matrix bonding of fibres, porosity, architecture, graphitisation) have a 
strong influence on mechanical properties. The mechanical properties of the composites are 
however remarkably stable up to temperatures of 2 000 °C. As with other carbon-based materials 
(and graphite), significant changes in the physical and mechanical properties occur due to the effect 
of irradiation and temperature, and material investigations as discussed for the graphite core are 
considered important for the validation of such materials for this application. 
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Figure 63: An arrangement for a carbon-fibre composite control rod 
 
In summary, control rod material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR can be summarised 
as follows. 
 
Table 31: Control rod material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR 
Control rod (HTR and VHTR temperatures) 
Alloy 800H a candidate metallic material for HTR 
application. Material property data at elevated temperature 
are available in codes such as ASME. 
The use of carbon-carbon (C/C) composite and carbon fibre 
material composites is possible for VHTR conditions, but 
this is not a proven technology. 
Consultation with manufacturers on possible candidate C/C 
materials is needed. Fast fluences change its structure and 
properties as with graphite. 
Issues associated with graphite core will need to be 
investigated if a C/C or fibre-reinforced composite is to be 
used (e.g. impurity levels, oxidation and corrosion, property 
changes with irradiation, modelling).  
 
6.4. Hot gas duct 
The hot gas duct is used to transfer the hot helium from the reactor core to the power conversion 
circuit components such as heat exchangers and turbines (in the case of the direct cycle). The duct is 
usually insulated to increase efficiency and limit thermal loads. 
The lifetime of the hot gas ducts is the same as that of the reactor with no repairs or maintenance 
required with the option to repair or replace the component reserved for unforeseen circumstances. 
Materials that could be considered include high-strength alloys such as Alloy 800H, ODS materials 
and composites. Some investigations have been carried out in the past using such materials and 
these need to be extended, taking full advantage of new and potential material developments. 
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The hot gas duct can be of horizontal or vertical design, usually of coaxial flow (hot on inside, cold on 
the outside). Temperatures are in the 465-480 °C range on the outside and the 680-850 °C range on 
the inside. A design was recommended for the hot gas duct and the thermal insulation which could 
be used at the turbine inlet (straight duct configuration). Thermomechanical analysis of such a 
concept has been performed as part of the past German experience and within the fifth framework 
programme project HTR-E (Buckthorpe, et al., 2008). For the design, fibre packed insulation is used 
between the inner liner and the outer support pipe in the region of the thermo-sleeves. Wrapped 
fibre insulation is used between the outer liner and the depressurisation gap liner. 
The metallic materials used are classed as materials for elevated temperatures with sufficient tensile 
strength and creep resistance in the < 550 °C temperature range. For the insulation, fibrous materials 
consisting of at least Al2O3 can be used at temperatures above 600 °C, with mixed-oxide fibres at 
lower temperatures and mineral insulation below 400 °C. 
The design rules used are those important to safety, with initial sizing based on international rules 
and regulations (e.g. in Germany AD specifications, technical rules for steam boilers). Stress, 
deformation and fatigue analyses can be performed in accordance with the ASME Code and KTA 
Safety Standards using approaches consistent with the ASME Code. 
In summary, hot gas duct material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR can be summarised 
as follows. 
Table 32: Hot gas duct material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR 
Hot gas duct (HTR and VHTR temperatures) 
Alloy 800H a candidate metallic material for HTR 
application. Material property data at elevated temperature 
are available in codes such as ASME. 
Helium: impurities, potential for 
carburisation/decarburisation possible above 700 °C. 
Radiation issues (negligible); ageing issues (possible). 
The use of carbon-carbon (C/C) composite and carbon fibre 
material composites and ceramics is possible for VHTR 
conditions, but this is not a proven technology. 
Consultation with manufacturers on possible candidate C/C 
and insulation materials is needed. 
 
6.5. Circulator 
Gas circulation in HTR and VHTR is required for a number of different purposes (e.g. turbo-
compressors/turbo-generators for direct cycle helium gas turbine plants, start-up blower system for 
the turbo compressor, operational coolant gas circulation for heat transfer to the heat exchangers, 
coolant gas blowers in intermediate helium circuits, etc.). Turbo compressors and turbo generators 
generally attract most attention within R & D programmes, however other applications for blowers 
and compressors are equally important for the functionality and availability of the complete reactor 
system. 
 
For the HTR with indirect cycles, the design of the gas circulator, the impeller, the electric motor and 
the bearings (e.g. electromagnetic bearings + catcher bearings and/or permanent magnetic bearings) 
is important under normal operation and also under external loads from the process transients. For 
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the power rotor, benefit can be taken from the materials investigations on the turbine (see below). 
For the 600 MWth VHTR a blower power of 10 to 15 MW is required, which is much higher than in 
former HTRs (maximum 4 MW). 
A study of former designs (Buckthorpe, et al., 2008), including bearings, lubrication, control and 
drive, showed in many cases that the technology is based on the broad experience with CO2 
circulators from the Magnox and AGR plants in the United Kingdom and in France. In most cases, 
one-stage radial circulators with an overhung wheel have been applied, and the overall experience is 
very good with high availability. 
With regard to the selection of materials, those used for the IHX (such as Alloy 800H for HTR) should 
provide necessary creep strength for the casing. The material IN 607 has been established for steam 
turbine rotors, and this should represent a suitable impeller material. Other possible materials are 
Hastalloy, IN 6I7, IN 625 or Haynes 230 for the casing and IN 638 or IN 608 for the centrifugal 
impeller. There are more materials options for smaller discs. Temperatures in the vicinity of the 
circulator are expected to be < 700 °C, hence corrosion may not be a problem. The final materials are 
most likely to be influenced by the manufacturer’s choice. 
The design approach and information on materials behaviour is likely to be commercial and held by 
the gas turbine manufacturers. The ASME Code case for Ni-based alloys is in progress and should 
provide an elevated temperature procedure for relevant materials. For a gas temperature of 465 °C, 
non-cooled options should be acceptable. Coatings are also possible for protection against activation 
(cobalt). For the disc, there may be a limit on the diameter because of forging capacity. For the large 
centrifugal impeller there may be a need to use casting or a more advanced sintering/hipping 
process. The use of casting/hipping processes for the impeller as an alternative to casting may 
require the development of specific standards. 
In summary, circulator material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR can be summarised as 
follows in Table 33. 
Table 33: Circulator material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR 
Circulator (HTR and VHTR temperatures) 
Materials used for IHX should provide necessary creep 
strength for the casing. Alloy 800H a candidate metallic 
material for HTR application. Also Hastalloy, IN 6I7, IN 625 
or Haynes 230. 
 
Materials property data at elevated temperature for Alloy 
800H are available in codes such as ASME. KTA has 
extensive property data for Alloy 617. 
IN 607 established for steam turbine rotors and impellers. 
Greater number of materials options for smaller discs. 
Temperatures < 700 °C hence corrosion may not be 
problem. 
High-velocity impingement of dust and particles (possible). 
Radiation issues (negligible). Ageing issues (possible). 
For the disc there may be limit on the diameter because of 
forging capacity. For large the centrifugal impeller there 
may be a need to use casting. The alternative is more 
advanced sintering/hipping processes. 
Materials most likely influenced by manufacturer’s choice. 
Page 119 
 
 
 
6.6. Steam generator 
Steam generator concepts are currently in use in several HTR demonstrators overseas. All seven 
constructed HTRs, including prototypes and the grid-connected THTR-300, deliver their heat to steam 
generators operating at temperatures significantly lower than the reactor’s capabilities. Steam 
generators are also in use in the UK AGRs, which operate with gas outlet temperatures ~ 640C. 
Possible options for the SGU include the straight-tube and helical-tube designs. The helical-coil-tube-
type steam generator was used in the THTR-300 (see Figure 64), which consisted of a shell and three 
tube bundles. The small bundle on the bottom of the steam generator (SG) provides the reheat 
section and, for manufacturing reasons, there are two high-pressure bundles above it that contain 
the superheater, evaporator and economiser. The thermal-expansion helical tubes are located on top 
of the steam generator. On the secondary side, water enters the helical tubes on top of the HP 
bundle. The water flow is downwards. First the water is preheated in the economiser, then 
evaporated and at last superheated before leaving the steam generator. 
 
 
Figure 64: HTR cooler THTR 300 
The use of appropriate materials and their data is an important issue, and the materials used in the 
superheater sections, which must withstand the highest temperatures and the target lifetimes of 
500 000 hours, are of primary importance. The need to avoid stress-corrosion cracking has influenced 
material selection at lower temperatures, and the shell material is similarly required to withstand 
prolonged durations, while maintaining the pressure boundary due to its connection to the reactor 
vessel. For the THTR, Alloy 800H was selected for the helical coil material. 
Within the Archer project (Archer) the helical design was selected for the HTR since this can 
accommodate thermal expansion more readily, and Alloy 800H was chosen as the tubing material. At 
VHTR temperatures an improved high-temperature-strength material would be needed, and Alloy 
617 and Haynes 230 are considered good candidates for long operating periods (< 850 °C) and 
potential transients. Alloy 617 already has a very large database with numerous mechanical 
properties, and creep data measured in air and a helium atmosphere. 
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For the design the ASME Code is applicable and contains many of the material design information 
needs. The section ASME III-NH provides the material specification together with all requirements 
necessary for the material to be properly specified. This includes both ferrous (common steels) and 
non-ferrous materials, for example Alloy 800H tubes. Most of the temperature-dependent material 
properties (allowable stress, yield strength, modulus of elasticity, etc.) are listed. Of primary interest 
too are the location and stressing of any dissimilar metal welds (DWMs) which may arise when 
connecting the higher-strength Alloy 800H with a lower-cost carbon material such as SA-335 Grade 
P11 used at lower temperatures. 
Over the past 40 years or so there has been much research on DMWs, examining such effects as 
 carbon migration across the weld interface; 
 diffusion of other metallic alloying elements; 
 effect of post-weld heat treatments; 
 effect of exposure at temperature; 
 effect of oxidation/corrosion; 
 consequent changes in mechanical properties at the microscopic scale and how this effects 
large-scale properties; 
 selection of filler metals with a view to reducing thermal expansion mismatch. 
 
Many problems have been overcome, but as temperatures have increased the associated mismatch 
in expansion possess an increased risk. In addition the manufacture will require many thousands of 
tube-to-tube welds and necessitate high-quality advanced manufacturing methods to produce and 
inspect welds on a routine basis by non-destructive testing. 
At present the materials data requirements for the steam generator seem no more complex than for 
other HTR components. Since there is current experience in using similar technology elsewhere there 
seem to be no fundamental barriers with respect to materials for the successful development of 
steam generators for HTR applications 
In summary, steam generator materials issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR can be 
summarised as follows in Table 34. 
Table 34: Steam Generator material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR 
SGU (HTR and VHTR temperatures) 
For the tube and plate designs the thick section requires 
development. Consistency of properties (midsection) is important. 
Issues of tribology in an inert helium environment. Requirement for 
coatings for resistance to fretting, etc. (vibration). 
Materials candidates: Alloy 800H and Alloy 617 identified by vendors 
as primary candidates for HTR application. 
Materials selection: creep rupture — use of tertiary creep for 
development of allowable; creep-fatigue could be more developed. 
Weldability: Alloy 800H has good capabilities, as does Alloy 617. 
Automated processes are available for manufacture. Alloy 230 
welding possible but difficult, especially in thicker section. All 
candidates need precautions to avoid hot cracking. 
Corrosion depends on exact He coolant composition and temperature: 
possible degradation due to carburisation, decarburisation and 
oxidation. 
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Cold work can affect the creep properties of materials such as Alloy 
617 and Haynes 230 leading to a reduction in strength. A suitable limit 
for manufacture should be defined. 
 
 
6.7. Intermediate heat exchanger 
The heat exchanger component is vital in any nuclear power plant, and particularly in process-heat or 
cogeneration applications (Groot, et al., 2013). Its compactness and efficiency has been highlighted 
to be of particular importance in the VHTR. 
The intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) is perhaps the most critical part of the VHTR and HTR. Its 
development relies on selecting specific materials that can deal with high operating temperatures 
and pressure drops. The thermal, environmental and service life of the reactor makes selecting high-
temperature materials a significant challenge, especially for the VHTR conditions (> 950 °C). Alloy 
800H and Alloy 617 already have a very large database with numerous mechanical properties and 
creep data measured in air and a helium atmosphere and are regarded as a possible material for HTR 
conditions. For VHTR conditions established industrial materials (such as Alloy 617, Haynes 230, 
Hastalloy X, Hastalloy XR and Alloy 800H) are at or near their limit and new range of materials (oxide 
dispersion strength (ODS) alloys, ceramics) may have to be considered for development, however 
these require significant manufacturing advances before they are suitable for this application. The 
need for materials capable of tolerating very high temperatures is especially true when used with the 
iodine-sulphur hydrogen generation process. 
The thermomechanical conditions of the IHX that affect material selection are as follows 
 the normal operating temperatures range from 350 °C to 1 000 °C (maximum); 
 the expected mechanical load is from the pressure, i.e. 1 to 10 MPa; 
 impurities in the helium are a major concern for metals, since they can lead to 
environmentally induced degradation; 
 ageing effects and embrittlement are important since they can affect performance, 
especially during thermal transients; 
 welding and fabrication issues in relation to design. 
 
Materials selection and optimisation for the once-through AGR boilers, for example, were uniquely 
influenced by corrosion considerations from both the primary and secondary water/steam 
environments, where a 250 000-hour design lifetime was required. There are four boilers in each 
reactor and each boiler comprises three once-through HP units and three reheater units, and in 
normal operation generates steam to drive the main turbine. These units have demonstrated proven 
control and reliability in service. 
Tube-and-shell arrangement 
The conventional form of IHX component is the tube-and-shell design, which is housed within a 
pressure vessel connected to the reactor vessel by a coaxial cross-duct. Its components are: the tube 
bundle; secondary-side headers; the primary gas circulator with its electric motor and cooler; and the 
primary-side gas baffles. The concept of a heat exchanger with an integrated circulator offers the 
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greatest protection to the primary circuit components and provides for the whole pressure boundary 
to be cooled by the primary coolant. 
An important design principle of the IHX is that the tube bundle had to be free to expand within the 
shell to minimise stresses within the tubes and the tube plates. A further design principle is that 
neither hot primary nor hot secondary gas should come into contact with the primary pressure 
boundary. To comply with the first principle, the tube bundle and its headers can be designed to be 
fully floating with respect to the IHX shell. The second principle can be fulfilled by using a system of 
internal baffles and engineered leak paths to ensure that the entire internal surface of the shell is 
cooled by primary coolant at the reactor inlet temperature. 
Compact arrangement 
The effective transfer of heat is an important requirement for the HTR. For higher temperature 
exchanges, the gas-to-gas IHX is likely to offer a cheaper, more robust and compact solution. 
Temperatures are close to the core outlet temperature for most of its lifetime, which requires 
considerable design development to achieve a solution capable of resisting to such temperatures for 
long periods of time. 
The plate stamped heat exchanger (PSHE) design offers the most promising solution. This design of a 
compact IHX is being investigated in the EU projects Raphael and Archer. Such a design uses a series 
of flat, thin plates assembled together in such a way that a counterflow of hot and cool gas can be 
achieved to transfer heat. Plate-type heat exchangers (PHEs) were formerly used for milk 
pasteurisation and gradually became the standard choice for heat treatment in the liquid food 
industry. The facility to dismantle plate heat exchangers is one the main reasons for their wide use in 
the food industry. Furthermore, as the heat-transfer coefficients are high, the fluid path length is 
shorter and relatively well defined. With the developments of larger plates, their use began to grow 
quickly in the chemical, petrochemical, district heating and power industries, but essentially for 
single-phase duties. 
Adaption of this type of technology for the IHX was first applied to the recuperator and was 
investigated in Raphael (Buckthorpe, et al., 2008). Table 35 below provides some characteristics in 
terms of hydraulic and thermal considerations for the direct and indirect cycle HTR options. 
Table 35: Main characteristics for direct and indirect from hydraulic and thermal consideration 
 Direct cycles Indirect cycles 
Fluid He/He He/mixture: combined cycles 
He/He: Heat production 
Nominal working P (bar) P HP ~ 72 
P BP ~ 26  
P primary side ~ 55 
P secondary side ~ 50 
Differential of pressure 
between circuits (bar) 
~ 50  ~ 5  
Maximum nominal 
temperature (°C) 
510 850 or 750 
Thermal duty (MW) 635 600 
Thermal efficiency (%) 95 90 
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The PSHE comprises a stack of corrugated plates generating mechanical contact points between the 
plates (see Figure 65). However, it is necessary to apply external pressure to ensure the rigidity of the 
system. Depending on the application, the plates are mechanically maintained by tied bars or by an 
external pressure higher than that of the fluids. 
 
Figure 65: Plate heat exchanger (flow direction and mock-up) 
 
Iterative sizing and CFD/FEM calculation were performed to minimise the thermomechanical stresses 
under steady and transient conditions so that the length and the height were chosen to give smooth 
thermal gradients. The technology task also involved exploring different types of welding processes 
(laser, plasma, diffusion bonding, etc. — see Figure 66) and an important challenge was to set the 
welding parameters and complete welding tests on single and stacked plates to validate their 
application. 
 
Figure 66: Examples of welding involved in joining the plates 
Within Archer (Buckthorpe, 2014) a mock-up was made with Alloy 800H material of the same size as 
a real IHX module with fewer plates — 20 instead of 300. Welding and machining processes were 
optimised to ensure the quality of the component. The compact heat exchanger was tested under 
transient high-temperature conditions to evaluate its integrity and potential. 
With regard to materials, Alloy 800H was chosen as this has a strong background in heat exchanger 
development at temperatures up to 750 °C and has an extensive range of design material properties 
available for the development of such a technology. The ASME Code recently produced design 
property data that extends to temperatures above this and includes information on higher-
temperature alternatives such as Alloy 617. 
In summary, IHX material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR can be summarised as 
shown in Table 36 below. 
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Table 36: IHX material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR 
IHX (HTR and VHTR temperatures) 
For the tube and plate designs the thick section requires development. 
Consistency of properties (midsection) is important. 
Issues of tribology in an inert helium environment. Requirement for 
coatings for resistance to fretting etc. (vibration). 
Materials candidates: Alloy 800H and Alloy 617 identified by vendors as 
the primary candidate, with Alloy 230 or Alloy X, XR as alternatives. 
Materials selection: creep rupture — use of tertiary creep for 
development of allowable; creep-fatigue could be more developed. 
Weldability: Alloy 230 possible but difficult, especially in thicker section 
— other candidates are easier to weld but need precautions to avoid 
hot cracking. 
Corrosion depends on exact He coolant composition and temperature: 
possible degradation due to carburisation, decarburisation and 
oxidation. 
Cold work can affect the creep properties of materials such as Alloy 
617 and Haynes 230 leading to a reduction in strength. A suitable limit 
for manufacture should be defined.  
 
6.8. Turbine for direct cycle and turbine plant 
The HTR or VHTR can be developed as a direct-cycle or an indirect-cycle system. The direct-cycle 
system based on the Brayton cycle utilises a gas turbine placed directly into the hot gas leaving the 
reactor and converts it into rotational energy and electricity via a generator. The indirect-cycle 
system uses a steam generator or intermediate heat exchanger introduced into the heat transport 
circuit to transfer the heat energy into steam or hot gas for electricity via a process-heat application. 
The following sections consider the materials issues for the turbine for these two types of system. 
Turbine plant 
Turbine components are subjected to: 
 rotation velocities of ~ 3 000 rpm (50 Hz), which lead to centrifugal forces in disks and 
blades; 
 aerodynamic forces; 
 thermal gradients; 
 contact forces between blades and their corresponding disk; 
 axial retention of blades in their disk socket. 
 
Materials issues concern the selection of materials for the turbine blades and lead turbine disc. 
For the turbine blades failure modes such as creep, high cycle fatigue and low cycle fatigue have to 
be taken into account. The gas radial temperature variation often peaks typically in the middle third 
of the blade, with steep temperature gradients across the blade section that vary according to the 
transient and steady-state conditions. All regions of the blade profile therefore undergo complex 
stress-strain cycling with reversed plasticity in some areas. 
For turbine discs there is a requirement to limit the permanent growth and distortion to within 
typical design life targets. Critical regions for the disc are the hottest and highly stressed parts (high 
stress and moderate temperature at the hub, low stress and high temperature at the rim). For large 
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diameter disks, IN706 can operate successfully at temperatures of 550-600 °C (steam turbines) and 
IN718 is a further possible material for higher temperature. 
Turbine for direct cycle 
High temperatures and environmental degradation are again main concerns for the direct-cycle 
system utilising a turbine in the hot outlet gas leaving the reactor. 
For the turbine materials, resistance to high temperatures (above 750 °C) and long-term endurance 
(60 000 hours) are key issues. The main concerns in areas such as the turbine blades and discs are 
creep plus the influence of the environment. 
Manufacturing considerations are also especially important for the rotor and blades. Candidate alloys 
for the disc must have good forging properties and proven thermal stability. For the blades cast 
material is not sufficient, and so directionally solidified or single crystal alloys have to be considered. 
The need for cooling is also an important issue for both disc and blades. For current disc materials 
the temperature limits are in the region of 750 °C, suggesting that a cooled disc could be required for 
the VHTR design. 
The environment in an HTR is composed of helium with impurities as CH4, CO, H2O and H2 at bar 
levels. The impurities can interact with the core graphite and metallic components and cause some 
degradation of their properties. Low concentrations of H2O and H2 are produced by leakage and/or 
desorption from both metal surfaces and graphite. CO, CO2 and CH4 may be produced by 
coolant/graphite reactions at high temperatures. Depending on the partial pressure of the impurities, 
the atmosphere can be either oxidising (high PO2, low ac) or carburising (low PO2, high ac) for the alloys 
selected. 
The carburisation can be limited by a protective Cr oxide layer, provided that the oxygen partial 
pressure is sufficiently high for a stable Cr oxide scale to be formed (see Ellingham diagram). The 
experience gained in the past German projects has shown that the oxygen partial pressure may not 
in all cases be high enough for the formation of a stable Cr oxide scale. For this case, Al oxide formers 
should be considered in the selection of blade alloys because Al oxide forms even at extremely low 
oxygen partial pressures. 
Damage can either be at the surface or can diffuse to significant depths in the metallic matrices 
(internal oxidation or carburisation or decarburisation), resulting in a loss of mechanical properties 
over a significant thickness of the material. As with the RPV, phase diagrams are used to determine 
the neutrality of the chemical activity and to determine whether compatibility issues are likely to 
have a strong impact on materials selection. For Ni-based alloys phase diagrams were constructed 
based on Cr levels. Typical zones for carburisation and decarburisation and the formation of 
protective oxidation were identified at different temperatures and used to aid materials selection. 
Impurities in helium atmospheres, arising from decomposition of methane under extremely low 
oxygen partial pressures, are heavily carburising and can cause a significant shortening of the 
material creep life and accelerated creep crack growth rates. The presence of alloying elements such 
as cobalt (which is in most of the currently available turbine disc and blade materials) is also difficult 
to avoid. The main issues are the potential for plate-out and lift-off of particles and their activation 
and prevention of transport through the core. 
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Table 37: Chemical composition of IN 792 DS and CM 247 LC DS blade materials (weight %) 
 C Si Mn Cr Mo Ni Ta Ti W Co Fe Al Hf V Zr 
CM 
247 
0.074 < 0.03 < 0.03 8.16 0.43 Bal. 3.21 0.68 9.55 9.364 0.03 5.63 1.42 < 0.03 0.015 
 Cu B P S Pb Ag Bi Te Tl Sb Sn Zn Cd 
 
 < 0.03 0.0155 < 0.005 6 ppm 
< 2 
ppm 
< 2 
ppm 
< 0.3 
ppm 
< 1 
ppm 
< 1 
ppm 
< 3 
ppm 
< 3 
ppm 
< 2 
ppm 
< 0.5 
ppm 
 
 C Si Mn Cr Mo Ni Nb Ti Ta Al Fe Co Cu Hf W 
IN 792 0.079 < 0.05 < 0.05 12.63 1.82 Bal. < 0.1 3.91 4.18 3.52 0.02 9.08 0.03 1.34 4.25 
 B Zr P S Ag As Bi Mg N O Pb Se Te Tl  
 0.017 0.02 < 0.002 
< 20 
ppm 
< 0.1 
ppm 
< 5 
ppm 
< 0.1 
ppm 
< 6 ppm 
< 11 
ppm 
< 12 
ppm 
< 0.3 
ppm 
< 2 
ppm 
< 1 ppm 
< 0.2 
ppm 
 
 
Suitable materials investigated in the EU HTR-M-M1 projects (Martin-Bermejo, et al., 2001) include 
Udimet 720 for the disc material and CM 247 LC DS and IN 792 DS blade materials (see Table 37). 
Investigations have been carried out to verify their strength properties (tensile, impact, fatigue and 
creep) to evaluate their performance under carburising and decarburising atmospheres. Such 
investigations are required to confirm the effects of the corrosion on material properties. Alternative 
approaches include the use of large test loops which can investigate material degradation under 
representative reactor environments. 
With regard to codes and standards most information is commercial (gas turbine manufacturers). No 
nuclear coded design data are available for these materials. An ASME Code case for Ni-based alloys is 
being developed. Cooled discs could be used for a gas temperature of 850 °C, and non-cooled blades 
and coatings are possible for protection against corrosion/activation (cobalt). 
For the fabrication of the disc there is a limit on diameter with materials such as IN 706 because of 
their forging capacity. For the blades cast versions are considered insufficient for HTR — direction-
solidified and single-crystal versions are possible. 
In summary, turbine material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR can be summarised as 
follows in Table 38. 
 
Table 38: Turbine material issues and requirements for the HTR and VHTR 
Turbine disc (HTR and VHTR) Turbine blades (HTR and VHTR) 
Life assessment methodology (standards, 
design rules, 1D, 2D or 3D simulations?). 
List of possible critical defects (bore, hole, 
metallurgical defect). 
Critical mechanical criteria for design (creep or 
fatigue); cumulative damage laws. 
Minimum required ductility of alloys (non-aged 
Life assessment methodology 
(standards, design rules). 
Identification of critical defects 
(metallurgical defect, machining). 
Creep design rules and damage 
assessment. 
Minimum required ductility of alloys (non-
Page 127 
 
and aged conditions). 
Vibration analysis (critical speeds, possible 
failure location due to vibration). 
Stress relaxation properties/Fatigue and creep 
design rules (1 % plastic deformation in 
creep?). 
High-velocity impingement of dust and 
particles (possible). Radiation issues 
(negligible). Thermal ageing (impurity level (for 
carburising or oxidising environment). 
Possible plate-out by fission products. 
Specific design criteria related to environment. 
Recommendations on alloy composition (Co) 
due to plate-out. 
aged and aged conditions). 
Vibration analysis. 
Impurity level (for carburising or oxidising 
environment). 
Possible plate-out by fission products 
(Cs, Ag, Te). 
Specific design criteria related to 
environment. 
Recommendations on alloy composition 
(Co) due to plate-out. 
High velocity impingement of dust and 
particles (possible). Radiation issues 
(negligible). Ageing issues (possible). 
 
7. Safety 
7.1. Relevant accident scenarios 
In case of an accident, the behaviour of the reactor during severe accidents that are beyond an 
emergency shutdown is of considerable interest. Many possibilities of disturbance of the heat 
balance of the reactor have to be considered, especially during the licensing process and beyond, in 
discussions about the acceptance of nuclear technology. 
Concerning possible accident scenarios, accidents due to inner or outer reasons must be 
distinguished. Furthermore, many events are foreseeable, while others are beyond expectations, for 
example terrorist attacks (Figure 67). 
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Figure 67: Overview of possible impacts and events in nuclear power plants: proposal for classification 
From this list the accidents can be grouped as shown in Table 39. 
Table 39: Regarded severe accidents and their probability (P) 
Design-basis accident DBA P ≈ 10–2 …10–3/1 year 
Beyond design-basis accident BDBA P ≈ 10–3 …10–6/1 year 
Extreme assumed accident EAA P << 10–6/ year 
 
For the future it would be helpful to have a classification of accidents with regard to their severity. 
 DBA events (design-basis accidents). These are analysed in the licensing process und the 
plants have to withstand these loads. In particular, the decay heat removal, the shutdown 
and the barriers to retain the radioactive substances must stay intact. 
 BDBA events (beyond design-basis accidents). Assuming these loads it should be possible to 
show that no catastrophic release of radioactivity from the plant can occur. 
 EAA events (extreme assumed accidents). There are very extreme assumptions behind this 
type of accident. They should be discussed to analyse the robustness of a nuclear system 
against extreme impacts from outside. There can be special solutions to ensure safety even 
against these very extreme accidents, for example underground siting and cores that can 
never melt, and EAA events are explained in Figure 68 and Figure 69. They are related to the 
severity of earthquakes. For many years the layout against a horizontal acceleration of 
approximately 0.2-0.3 g seemed to be sufficient for most sites. This would correspond to a 
magnitude of 7 to 8 (the Richter scale). The probability for this event was estimated as 10–6 
per year. One could interpret this scenario as a DBA accident. Earthquakes with an 
acceleration of 0.3-0.4 g can be classified as a BDBA event with a smaller probability of 10–7 
to 10–8 per year (German conditions). Stronger earthquakes cannot be excluded. However, 
their occurrence is very unlikely so that they can be regarded as EAA events. 
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Figure 68: Aspects of earthquakes: (a) estimated annular probability that an earthquakes (as large as the 
value on the X-axis) could occur (e.g. THTR 300, Germany (20)); (b) probability of damaging components 
depending on the acceleration 
 
Figure 69: Probability of damaging components depending on the acceleration 
 
The question of an aeroplane crash has totally changed. At the beginning of the development of 
nuclear technology (~ 1960) this topic was not important and was not considered. During the 
following decades the requirement rose to the assumption that a military aeroplane (e.g. McDonnel 
Douglas F-4 Phantom) could damage the containment. The last three German convoy plants 
(1 300 MWel, PWR) were built fulfilling this requirement. The crash of a Phantom could correspond 
to a DBA event, but today very few nuclear installations have similar protection (2 m-thick wall of 
concrete for the containment) (Dräger, 2001) (VDI, 2001). 
Since the terroristic attacks on buildings in the United States in 2001 (World Trade Center, Pentagon) 
the crash of large commercial aeroplanes into nuclear power plants has been discussed. This event 
could be classified as a BDBA event. The very new situation is, additionally, that no probabilistic 
numbers can be identified for these events. Sometimes even stronger impacts on nuclear plants are 
discussed, for example very large aeroplanes, which can carry a large load, flying into the nuclear 
power plant. A characteristic example could be a turbine shaft with a weight of many tons. Such 
events have to be classified as EAA events. Figure 70 shows the forces depending on time (DBA event 
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for a Phantom aeroplane crashing into the containment) and Table 40 the aeroplane characterisation 
for DBA, BDBA and EAA events. 
 
Figure 70: Forces of an aeroplane crashing into the containment (different DBA, BDBA and EAA events) 
 
Table 40: Comparison of some data on aeroplanes for DBA, BDBA and EAA events 
 
 
 
 
 
The limits of possible considerations on accidents at nuclear installation become clear looking at two 
examples: special weapons (including atomic bombs) or meteorites (of sufficient large size) could 
possibly damage plants. 
Accidents relevant for self-acting decay heat removal in HTRs are summarised in Table 41 and are 
discussed briefly below using the HTR Module as a representative modular HTGR design. 
 
Table 41: Accidents relevant for self-acting decay heat removal 
Event 
Conditions of 
primary system 
Assumption 
Accident 
case 
Characterisation 
Failure of 
the active 
decay heat 
removal 
Normal helium of 
primary system 
available 
Helium circulation fails 
A DBA 
Steam generator fails 
Outer surface cooler 
works 
Depressurisation of 
the primary system 
Helium cycle fails 
B DBA Outer surface cooler 
works 
Helium cycle fails, outer 
surface cooler does not 
work; heat is stored in 
concrete inner cell 
C BDBA 
0
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 t
) 
Time of thrust (ms) 
Parameter DBA BDBA EAA 
Aeroplane Phantom B 747 Antonov 
Total mass (t) 20 400 500 
Mass of turbine (t) 1 1 > 10* 
Mass of kerosene 
(t) 
5 200 50 
Necessary wall 
thickness (m) 
1.5-2 > 2 > 3 
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Inner concrete cell is 
destroyed by extreme 
event; heat transport 
through rubble 
D EAA 
 
7.1.1. Accident case A: reactor under full pressure, loss of forced cooling 
If the reactor is under full pressure, but the helium circulator fails, the forced helium flow through 
the core stops and the helium flow is driven by natural convection. By this mechanism the heat is 
distributed inside the reactor system. Part of the heat is already removed via the surface of the 
reactor pressure vessel (approximately 1 M W for the HTR Module — Figure 71). 
The maximum fuel temperatures will stay below 1 250 °C in this accident. A value of 1 250 °C 
corresponds to the specification of the coated particles under normal operation (TRISO particles with 
LEU fuel). Therefore, the fission-product release from the fuel elements will stay well below the 
desirable limits. The amount of heat removed is nearly the same as that during normal operation 
(Melese, et al., 1984). 
 
Figure 71: Temperatures (right) in the core in case of loss of forced convection in a modular HTR core, 
here HTR Module, 200 MWth (illustrated at left), at full helium pressure 
The natural convection of the helium leads to heat distribution within the reactor structures. The 
temperatures of the upper part of the reactor internals will be higher than they are during normal 
operation. Figure 71 shows the temperatures at the top reflector and at the control rod drives as 
they would rise from approximately 250 °C to approximately 400 °C. Due to the rising temperatures it 
must be ensured that, after a ‘loss of coolant flow’ accident, the pressure of the system does not stay 
too high over a long period of time. 
In this accident case the supplying of electric energy is totally unnecessary. The operation of the 
surface cooling system can be interrupted for a long period of time. Even after a very long ‘grace 
period’ (several hundred hours), it would be possible to feed the surface cooling system with water. 
The special behaviour of HTR — this long ‘grace period’ before feeding the surface cooling system — 
has already been accepted in the licensing process in Germany. In the THTR 300, for example, it was 
 
      
  
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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acknowledged by the regulator that the reactor will be able to remain without active cooling for 
5 hours (Figure 72) (Verfondern, et al., 1979) (Verfondern, 1983). 
 
 
Figure 72: Results of calculations for the THTR 300 (750 MWth) in case of ‘loss of active cooling’ accident 
 
The top left figure shows the positions (1 to 5) of important temperatures; top right the time 
dependence of some characteristic temperatures in the THTR core (assumption: failure of circulators, 
reactor at pressure of 40 bar, hot water operation of steam generators); bottom left the time 
dependence of some characteristic temperatures in the THTR core (assumption: failure of helium 
circulators and of steam generators, reactor at 40 bar pressure); and bottom right the histogram of 
fuel temperatures in normal operation. 
Even in this reactor, with a much larger power density than the HTR Module, the fuel temperatures 
would have stayed below 1 250 °C and the temperatures of the top reflector structures would have 
stayed below 500 °C within the first 5 hours. 
This was the first time that the principle of self-acting decay heat removal played an important role in 
a licensing process and was accepted by the official licensing body. It would have permitted repair 
works to be carried out to re-establish cooling systems after failures. Furthermore, it offered time 
spans for carrying out efficient interventions for specific cooling measures. 
  
  
  
Relatively cold gas (helium) 250 °C   
Hot gas (helium) 750 °C   
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Page 133 
 
7.1.2. Accident case B: reactor at normal pressure, surface cooler working 
In this case the heat is transported from the core through the internal structures of the reactor to the 
surface of the reactor pressure vessel. From the surface the heat is conducted to the surface cooler, 
which surrounds the reactor pressure vessel. This transport uses only heat conduction, heat radiation 
and free convection of air. The surface cooling system can either work with small pumps that are 
applied to circulate the water or by natural convection. 
The temperature distribution within in the core of the modular HTR can be calculated using 3D 
program systems (Rehm, et al., 1985) (Holzkamp, 1987). 
 
 
 
Figure 73: Results for the total loss of coolant and active cooling; failure of the surface cooler; storage 
and transport of heat in the concrete cell accident (HTR Module 200 Mth) 
The top figure shows the radial dependence of temperatures at different times (t = 0, t = 100 hours) 
and the bottom figures the time dependency of the temperatures, the maximum fuel temperature 
(left) and the temperature of the reactor pressure vessel (right). 
After 30 hours the maximum fuel temperature reaches 1 500 °C. After reaching the maximum the 
temperature decreases. During the accident case the temperature of the reactor pressure vessel 
stays below 400 °C. Therefore, this component stays intact. 
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The time schedules for these heating and cooling processes are very long (approximately 800 hours 
as shown in Figure 73). Therefore, it is very likely that there would be enough time to cool the system 
using simple or tentative methods to cool the core (e.g. nitrogen injection). If cooling the reactor the 
possibility of subcriticality occurring has to be considered (see Figure 74). 
Due to xenon decay and a strong negative temperature coefficient in the core, neutron-absorbing 
material has to be added to the core, otherwise a small amount of additional heat production due to 
fission will occur. 
The analysis showed that only a few per cent of the fuel elements — less than 5 % — stay at 
temperatures between 1 500 °C and an upper limit of ~ 1550 °C. The time span for which these fuel 
elements stay under these conditions is relatively short — approximately 30 hours. The other fuel 
elements reach lower, partly much lower, temperatures during this accident case. 
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Figure 74: Neutron multiplication in the core of a modular HTR without active shutdown (examples: HTR 
Module, 200 MWth) 
 
Page 136 
 
The top figure shows the average fuel temperature, the figure in the middle neutron absorption in 
xenon I35 and the lower figure the time dependence of criticality without active shutdown. 
7.1.3. Accident case C: reactor under normal pressure, surface cooler fails 
The probability of this accident case is very low as a failure of the surface cooler can nearly be 
avoided using a redundant design of the surface cooling system. Moreover, the possibility of 
effective countermeasures is provided due to the long ‘grace period’ of the reactor. However, as 
detailed calculations show, even under these assumptions the maximum fuel temperature is quite 
similar to an accident case with a working surface cooler as the heat is given to the concrete 
structure of the inner concrete cell. Figure 75 shows that the maximum temperature of the reactor 
pressure vessel would rise to approximately 600 °C and the concrete temperature would reach nearly 
500 °C (Siemens/Interatom, 1988). The histogram of the fuel temperatures changes insofar as the 
percentage of fuel elements with temperatures higher than 1 250 °C will be larger and the time these 
fuel elements have to withstand the heat will be longer. The important property of the fuel elements 
— to nearly retain all fission products — will not be changed drastically. 
 
 
 
Figure 75: Results for the accident: total loss of active cooling; failure of the surface cooler; storage and 
transport of heat in the concrete cell (HTR Module, 200 MWth) 
In the scheme of the reactor (top left) the characteristic points (1, 2, 3) are denoted where 
temperature distributions are shown. The top right figure shows the radial dependence of 
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temperatures after 0 h and after 100 h. The figures below show the time dependence of the reactor 
pressure vessel and surface cooler after a short time (left) and after a long time (right). 
7.1.4. Water ingress into the primary circuit 
Even though the steam generator or possible separate water-powered decay heat removal systems 
of an HTR system are manufactured, monitored and operated with great care, it is still possible that 
leaks may occur or pipes may burst during operation. As a result of such incidents quantities of water 
may enter the primary circuit. The amount of water entering depends on the design of the heat 
exchanger as well as the size and location of the leak. The ingress of water into the helium circuit of 
an HTR basically has the following consequences. The penetrated water evaporates or enters in the 
form of vapour, which consequently leads to a pressure increase in the primary helium circuit. Either 
the existing reactor volume has to be sufficiently large so that the penetrated water can be saved as 
a vapour within acceptable pressure limits in the primary circuit, or after exceeding an allowable 
overpressure redundant existing safety valves or rupture discs need to open so that the primary 
circuit can be depressurised. The steam is then collected in a ‘mixed condenser’, which effects 
condensation of the vapour in a water trap or a suitably dimensioned heat store so that the vapour 
can be transferred into a liquid phase again. Steam in the primary system may lead to corrosion of 
the hot graphite structures of the fuel or the core structures. As a result of this structural weaknesses 
may occur. The products of this water-gas reaction are hydrogen and carbon monoxide. These gases 
can mix with the helium in the primary circuit and the unreacted steam in the reactor building. The 
gas mixture may furthermore mix with the air present in the reactor building. This multicomponent 
system (air/helium/hydrogen/carbon monoxide) can be explosive in certain mixtures. 
In addition, water entering the primary circuit can result in increased reactivity of the core since the 
water acts as a moderator. 
Subsequent damage to components that are not directly related to reactor safety but may impact 
the availability of the overall system will be mentioned only briefly here. Considerable damage may 
be caused to the insulation, the blower and components of the shutdown and charging system. 
The pressure increase in the primary circuit due to water ingress may be estimated according to 
equation 1. 
 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝑡
~𝑓√2𝜕∆𝑝           (26) 
 
𝑓 describes the area of the leak in a steam generator and 𝜕 is the density of the water in the steam 
generator close to the leak. ∆𝑝 may be the pressure difference between the primary and secondary 
circuits. The pressure differences changes over time (equation  2). 
 
∆𝑝~∆𝑝0(1 − 𝛼𝑡)          (27) 
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Using changing pressure differences may lead to equation 3. 
 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝑡
~𝑓√2𝜕∆𝑝 ∙ (1 −
𝑎
2
𝑡) = ?̇?0(1 −
𝑎
2
𝑡)       (28) 
 
Equation 4 may be used to estimate the mass leaving the secondary circuit over time t. 
 
𝑀(𝑡) = ∫
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝑡′
𝑑𝑡′ =
𝑡
0
 ?̇?0(𝑡 −
𝑎
2
𝑡2)        (29) 
 
The volume of the water entering the primary circuit can then be estimated as follows. 
 
𝑉𝐷(𝑡) =
𝑀(𝑡)
𝜕𝐷
           (30) 
 
with 𝜕𝐷 accounting for the steam density. 
Assuming that safety valves or other measures used to decrease the pressure in the primary circuit 
do not react instantly the steam concentration in the primary circuit may be determined using 
equation 6. 
 
𝑘𝑑(𝑡) =
𝑉𝐷(𝑡)
𝑉𝐶(𝑡)+𝑉𝐻𝑒
≈
𝑉𝐷
𝑉𝐻𝑒
         (31) 
 
At the beginning 𝑉𝐷 <  <  𝑉𝐻𝑒 is assumed. Hence the pressure increase in the primary circuit can be 
expressed as follows. 
 
𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑝0
1
1−𝑘𝑑(𝑡)
≈ 𝑝0(1 + 𝑘𝑑(𝑡))        (32) 
 
𝑝(𝑡) ~ 𝑝0 (1 +
𝑉𝐷(𝑡)
𝑉𝐻𝑒
) = 𝑝0(1 +
𝑀(𝑡)
𝜕(𝑡)∙ 𝑉𝐻𝑒
)       (33)
  
 
Time dependent: 
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𝑝(𝑡) ≈ 𝑝0 (1 +
?̇?0
𝜕(𝑡)∙ 𝑉𝐻𝑒
∙ (𝑡 −
𝑎
4
𝑡2))        (34) 
 
A leak with f = 1 mm2, an initial pressure difference of 150 bar and a rupture resulting in 𝜕 = 𝜕𝑊 = 
1 000 kg/m3 water loss may be used as an example here. The amount of water at the beginning of 
the incident flowing into the primary circuit is given as ?̇?0 ≈ 0.2 𝑘𝑔/𝑠. In this example it is assumed 
that moisture detectors in the primary system notice the water ingress after 10 seconds, resulting in 
activation of the shutdown valves after 30 seconds. The amount of water that may penetrate the 
primary circuit this way can be estimated taking the capacity of the damaged steam generator 
sections into account. Ideally, the steam generator allows locking of different sections so that the 
amount of water entering the primary circuit can be reduced. For instance, 10 steam generator tubes 
result in a tube length of around 100 m with a total capacity of about 200 kg of water. Assuming a 
completely ruptured heat exchanger tube from the super heater, the amount of water entering the 
primary circuit may be as follows: 
f = 4 cm2, 𝜕𝐷 = 60 𝑘𝑔/m
3, ∆𝑝 ≈ 150 bar resulting in ?̇?0 zu ≈ 17 kg/s. It is evident that in addition to 
the content of the tube a significant contribution of water occurs, as the valves are not closed 
immediately but after 30 seconds. This process can be estimated using the following equation. 
 
𝑡 ~ (
𝑝
𝑝0
− 1)
𝜕(𝑡)∙ 𝑉𝐻𝑒
?̇?0
          (35) 
 
In reality condensation processes may occur prior to reaching the final pressure, therefore the total 
pressure may not be reached. Figure 76 displays the result of a more accurate quantitative analysis 
of the time-dependent pressure increase in the THTR primary circuit system in case of demolition of 
a steam generator tube. 
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Figure 76: Pressure as function of time in the THTR primary circuit due to water penetration from a 
defective steam generator tube (operating pressure 40 bar) 
 
For new HTR concepts this accident scenario may occur as follows. After detecting a tube rupture 
using moisture detectors, pressure increase, neutron flux changes or blower power changes the 
reactor is shut down. The water supply is stopped and the leak will be detected using moisture-
measurement techniques. In such an incident the pressure is usually around 20 % above the design 
pressure, therefore the abovementioned pressure-relief devices of the primary circuit may be 
opened. The steam/helium mixture is thereby injected into condensers. The steam condenses and 
the helium flows into the reactor protection building. Depending on the design of the overpressure 
protection system of the primary circuit this event may result in 1 bar operating pressure or normal 
operating pressure. The decay heat removal system is put into operation and cools the reactor to 
such an extent that corrosion processes occur only very slowly. This means that the surface 
temperature of the graphite in the core region is lowered to below 700 °C. In addition to the pressure 
increase, corrosion effects need to be investigated further. Based on the determined heterogeneous 
water-gas reaction: 
 
𝐶 + 𝐻2𝑂 → 𝐶𝑂 + 𝐻2, ∆𝐻=119 kJ/mol (endotherm)      (36) 
 
the following amount of material may react: 
 
1𝑘𝑔 𝐶 + 1.5 𝑘𝑔 𝐻2𝑂 → 1.87𝑚
3𝐶𝑂 + 1.87𝑚3𝐻2      (37) 
 
The reaction speed is dependent on the pressures and the temperature of the components involved. 
 
Page 141 
 
𝑟′ =
𝑘1∙𝑝𝐻2𝑂
1+𝑘2∙𝑝𝐻2𝑂+𝑘3∙𝑝𝐶𝑂
          (38)
      
 
With: 
 
𝑘𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖 ∙ 𝑒
−
𝐸𝑖
𝑘𝑇           (39)
    
 
Experiments with graphite suitable for reactor application determined the following relationship: 
 
𝑟 = 𝑟0√
𝑝𝐻2𝑂
𝑝
∙ 𝑒
𝐸
𝑅
(
1
𝑇0
−
1
𝑇
)
          (40) 
in which: 
𝑟 = reaction rate (mg/cm2h), 
𝑝𝐻2𝑂 = water pressure (bar), 
𝑝 = overall pressure (bar), 
𝐸 = activation energy (kJ/mol), 
𝑅 = gas constant (kJ/mol K), 
𝑇0 = nominal temperature (K), 
𝑇 = material temperature (K), 
𝑟0 = nominal reaction rate (mg/cm
2h). 
 
The nominal reaction rate 𝑟0 is usually for 𝑇0 = 950 °C, p = 1 bar and a specified volume fraction of 
3 % steam in helium. The value of 𝑟0 is for A3 graphite at 1.3 mg/cm
2h. The dependence of the 
reaction rate 𝑟 (mg/cm2h) to temperature, total pressure and water vapour partial pressure is shown 
in Figure 77 and Figure 78. Here a burnup of 2 % was used. The dependence of the reaction rate of 
the burnup has also being taken into account in accurate analyses. It is shown in Figure 79. The 
curves indicate that data higher than 1 000 °C was extrapolated. This high graphite temperature 
occurs only in extreme incidents. In all design-basis accidents the core is rapidly cooled below 
1 000 °C. Moreover, corrosion rates of over 2 % go beyond the scope of design-basis accidents. A 
modification of the corrosion rates by catalytic effects of alkali metals is known, but the magnitude of 
this effect is below these values. 
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Figure 77: Corrosion rate of A3 graphite in water vapour as a function of temperature 
 
 
Figure 78: Corrosion rate of A3 graphite in water vapour as a function of total pressure p 
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Figure 79: Corrosion rate of A3 graphite in water vapour as a function of burnup 
To illustrate the effect of water vapour corrosion of fuel, the following example is considered. A fuel 
assembly with surface A = 4πR2 = 113 cm2 will be exposed for 1 hour to water vapour attack (1 bar 
partial pressure in helium) at 1 000 C and 40 bar total pressure. The reaction rate under these 
conditions is about 10 mg/cm2h. Consequently, in this period, a graphite amount of about 1.1 g, 
corresponding to 0.6 wt % relative mass loss is plotted on the entire fuel assembly due to corrosion. 
The corresponding layer is 6 × 10–2 mm, therefore it is essentially not significant. Also, a substantial 
adverse effect on the stability of the fuel is not yet connected to such a low burnup, as shown in 
Figure 80. Only if a longer-lasting corrosion attack is relevant does this become important. 
 
 
Figure 80: Decrease in the strength of the fuel due to corrosion in steam (6:42) 
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The total area of the reflector hot graphite structures shall be subject to the flooding event. In steam-
generating systems the core area or the hot gas chamber is located in a temperature range from 700 
to 750 °C. These temperatures are similar to fuel element graphite at 950 °C. During process-heat 
applications, reflector graphite structures are affected by water vapour corrosion. Figure 81 shows 
measured corrosion rates for various reactor graphite materials with A3 graphite inclusions for fuel 
elements. In this case a reaction rate r (in %/h) related to the entire surface plotted against the 
increasing burnup is assumed. The rate is to be regarded as an integral rate. 
It can be noticed that in standard conditions, depending on the grade of graphite, around 0.1 % to 
0.4 % of the amount of graphite would be transferred by water vapour corrosion if no cooling of the 
graphite structures were carried out before. Reflector structures which are operated normally during 
operation below temperatures of 800 °C are therefore not endangered by multiple flooding incidents 
during the system life cycle, as relatively small reaction rates are to be set for such events. 
A method for dealing with the effects of a flooding incident on the integral corrosion behaviour of an 
HTR core’s space- and time-dependent temperature fields must be determined for all graphite 
surfaces, overlaid with the temperature, burnup, and partial pressure dependent corrosion rates. 
 
Figure 81: Integral corrosion rate in water vapour as a function of burnup for standard conditions. 
Reflector graphite ATR-2E and ASR 1RS and fuel element graphite A3-3 and A3-27 (6:37) 
In general, it can be assumed that the corrosion of the reactor internals of the core due to water 
vapour can be limited by timely cooling of the core by the decay heat removal system within 
tolerable limits. In addition, only a few fuel elements in the HTR core see temperatures that are 
relevant to water vapour corrosion (the surface temperature of the fuel element is about 700 C). As 
mentioned above, reactions with 1.5 kg of water vapour on 1 kg of graphite by the heterogeneous 
water-gas reaction results in a total of 3.74 m3 of hydrogen and carbon monoxide. Thus if, as 
mentioned above, for example in a tube damage accident, around 400 kg of water enters the primary 
circuit of an HTR, then about 1 500 m3 of water gas is formed when complete conversion of the 
water is assumed. These gases do not come there to relieve the pressure of the primary circuit, 
therefore they must be removed after shutting down the reactor through the gas cleaning system 
(see ‘Components’ section). If, additionally, the relieving of the pressure of the primary circuit is 
assumed, a gas mixture consisting of helium/air/water gas forms in the reactor protection building. A 
portion of the incoming air from the containment is displaced by the incoming helium-water mixture. 
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Under certain conditions the composition of such a mixture is explosive. The diagrams below show 
potential explosion areas, to assess the usefulness of the relationships (Figure 82). Thus, the area of 
ignitable mixtures with increasing temperature shifts. As a security boundary, values for the fuel gas 
contents of an inert gas fuel gas-air mixture can be defined where for any dilution with air no 
ignitable mixtures will emerge. For ambient temperatures, therefore, this stands at 17.85 %. With 
precise analysis the effect of pressure and water vapour is taken into account. A further limitation of 
the quantities of water during flooding can be achieved through changes to the steam generator 
concept. When using gas turbine systems the question becomes less relevant. 
In general it can be said that the formation of gas would extend after flooding over a period of 
several hours and that cooling of the graphite usually already occurs during this period, therefore the 
amount of water gas remains very limited regarding reactivity changes which are to be expected in 
connection with water ingress in an HTR core. 
 
 
Figure 82: Flammability of water-gas helium-air mixtures at different temperatures 
 
7.1.5. Air ingress into the primary circuit 
Quantities of air that enter into the helium circuit of an HTR can trigger reactions depending on the 
size and location of one or more leaks and can possibly lead to safety-related incidents in the hot 
core. Specifically, fuel and graphite internals may be damaged and their structural behaviour 
adversely affected by combustion of graphite. If too much erosion occurs fission products may be 
released from the graphite matrix or from defective particles, in addition to incomplete oxidation of 
the graphite carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide, which has to be considered in connection with 
Area of 
ignitable 
mixtures 
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the formation of explosive gas mixtures in the reactor building protection. Exothermic reactions that 
may lead to fires may cause further heating of the internal structures. The amount of air that can 
penetrate into the core is determined by the expiration of convection processes, by the contraction 
or compression of the primary cycle gas content, by cooling and fluctuations in air pressure and by 
diffusion processes. Whilst for the THTR chosen design principle of the inclusion of the entire primary 
circuit system in a prestressed and mon bursting concrete container leaking cross sections of 65 mm 
in diameter can be assumed, other leaking cross sections and incident possibilities for different HTR 
concepts are conceivable. As part of these considerations, other fragment sizes incidents possibilities 
are conceivable. As part of these considerations chimney effects may also be assumed considering 
two leaks. These incidents are classified in the range of hypothetical accidents. 
First the reactions may be explained using simple stoichiometric considerations. The basic reactions 
are as follows. 
 
𝐶 + 𝑂2 → 𝐶𝑂2, ∆𝐻 = −393.9
𝑘𝐽
𝑚𝑜𝑙
(𝑒𝑥𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚)       (41) 
𝐶 +
1
2
𝑂2 → 𝐶𝑂, ∆𝐻 = −111.2
𝑘𝐽
𝑚𝑜𝑙
(𝑒𝑥𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚)       (42) 
𝐶 + 𝑂2 → 2𝐶𝑂, ∆𝐻 = +170.5
𝑘𝐽
𝑚𝑜𝑙
(𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚)      (43) 
𝐶𝑂 +
1
2
𝑂2 → 𝐶𝑂2, ∆𝐻 = −281.7
𝑘𝐽
𝑚𝑜𝑙
(𝑒𝑥𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚)      (44) 
 
The first two reactions mentioned lead to the following quantities of air reaction. 
 
1 𝑘𝑔 𝐶 + 2.667 𝑘𝑔 𝑂2 → 3.667 𝐶𝑂2       (45) 
1 𝑘𝑔 𝐶 + 8.92𝑚3 𝑎𝑖𝑟 → 1.87𝑚3 𝐶𝑂2 + 6.87𝑚
3𝑁2     (46) 
 
or 
 
1 𝑘𝑔 𝐶 + 1.33 𝑘𝑔 𝑂2 → 2.33 𝑘𝑔 𝐶𝑂2       (47) 
1 𝑘𝑔 𝐶 + 4.96 𝑎𝑖𝑟 → 1.86𝑚3 𝐶𝑂 + 3.48𝑚3𝑁2      (48) 
The distribution of the reaction processes to the responses of CO2 or CO formation is based on 
present experience such that below a reaction temperature of about 1 000 °C significant amounts of 
CO2 and increasing amounts of CO are formed. The equilibrium and the CO–CO2 ratio are shown as a 
function of temperature in Figure 83. 
Page 147 
 
The reaction rate of graphite with oxygen or air is known from a variety of measurements. Essential 
parameters for the conversion rate are: the temperature T, the oxygen partial pressure 𝜓𝑂2, the flow 
rate of air 𝑣𝐿 and the pre-burnup of the graphite ∆𝑚. In the range below a temperature of about 
700 °C in the graphite, called the pore diffusion region, the corrosion rate increases exponentially 
with temperature, and the dependence on the oxygen partial pressure is linear. In this area the 
chemical reaction is dominant for the reaction rate and the flow rate of air has virtually no effect on 
the reaction rate R (mg/cm2h). 
 
𝑅~exp (−
𝐴
𝑇
) ∙ 𝑇−0.125 ∙ 𝜓𝑂2 ∙
𝑃
𝑃0
(1 −
∆𝑚
𝑚
)0.66       (49) 
 
The relationship above is in close agreement with past measurements. At reaction temperatures 
above 900 °C in the boundary layer region the flow speed determines all of the oxygen which is 
introduced to the graphite surface because of the high temperature. In this area, the reaction rate 
can be expressed by: 
 
𝑅~𝑇0.53 ∙ 𝑣𝐿
0.437 ∙ 𝜓𝑂2 ∙
𝑃
𝑃0
(1 −
∆𝑚
𝑚
)0.66        (50) 
 
In the transition region of 700 °C < 900 °C the following equation can be used: 
 
𝑅~𝜑(𝑇, 𝑣𝐿) ∙ 𝜓𝑂2 ∙
𝑃
𝑃0
(1 −
∆𝑚
𝑚
)0.66        (51) 
 
Function 𝜑 takes both effects, diffusion and reaction, into account. Experimental results for the 
reaction rates of graphite pebble beds are shown together with the aforementioned theoretical 
relationships in Figure 84, and show close agreement between theory and experiment. 
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Figure 83: equilibrium and ration of CO/CO2 
The effect of air entering the primary circuit of an HTR to the fuel is here illustrated by the following 
simple estimation: at a temperature of 1 000 °C and a flow rate of 2.35 cm/s, a reaction rate of about 
200 mg/cm2h in the corrosion of A3 graphite can be expected in air. When a fuel assembly remains 
for 1 hour in air it loses about 23 g of its graphite matrix by burning. The corrosion would occur 
evenly distributed over the surface, so a graphite shell would be ablated with a thickness of about 
13 mm. Consequently the fuel matrix is not affected. 
However, in case of direct exposure of the fuel elements to air the graphite is not attacked uniformly 
but a certain ‘shaping’ of the fuel elements is observed. The material removal is not evenly 
distributed over the spherical surface. This phenomenon leads to more detailed considerations 
beyond the scope of the assumptions employed here. In case of material removal the properties of 
the fuel or the graphitic core structures are unfavourably altered. For example, the strength of the 
fuel is decreased by graphite corrosion (Figure 85) over time. 
 
 
Figure 84: Measured reaction rates of corrosion of graphite pebble beds by air 
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Figure 85: Decrease of the maximum load before rupture of the fuel elements depending on the corrosion 
time at variable temperatures (corrosion in air) 
According to the stoichiometric considerations initially employed about 0.4 m3 of CO is produced per 
1 m3 of air. In air, carbon monoxide is formed in a volume range of 14 % to 73 % ignitable mixtures. 
By including helium, which would be available in certain quantities during air ingress accidents in the 
reactor protection building, the flammability limits are moved (Figure 86). If the total helium share is 
above 40 % ignitable mixtures are not possible. For more accurate analyses local gas compositions 
and the influence of water vapour and may be dust have to be taken into account. 
 
 
Figure 86: Flammability limits for the air/carbon monoxide/helium system 
 
A prerequisite for the occurrence of significant graphite burning in both fuel elements and graphite 
structures is that sufficient quantities of air can penetrate into the reactor core. In particular, the 
chimney effect through the reactor is worth mentioning in this context. A hypothetical accident 
situation is considered here (Figure 87). 
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Figure 87: Schematic diagram of the chimney effect during air ingress into the HTR core 
 
An opening is available at both the upper and lower ends of the reactor pressure vessel, therefore a 
chimney can form through the reactor. The air mass flow, which is established in the primary circuit, 
can then be determined from the conservation equations. The conservation of mass, which was first 
seen in the chimney approximated without chemical reaction, yields the stationary case: 
 
𝑑
𝑑𝑥
(𝜕 ∙ 𝑢 ∙ 𝐴) = 0, ?̇? =  𝜕 ∙ 𝑢 ∙ 𝐴 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡      (52) 
 
Application of the pulse conservation law leads to: 
 
𝜕 ∙ 𝑢 ∙
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑥
= −
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑥
− 𝑔 ∙ 𝜕 − 𝐾𝛼(𝑇) ∙ ?̇?
𝛼        (53) 
 
The energy law finally gives: 
 
𝜕 ∙ 𝑐𝑝 ∙ 𝑢 ∙
𝑑𝑇
𝑑𝑥
=
𝑞(𝑥)
𝐴
          (54) 
 
q(x) may represent the heat in the core of the air stream here, and the size A is the free cross section. 
The part 𝐾𝛼 ∙ ?̇?𝛼 accounts for the frictional pressure loss. Taking into account the temperature 
dependence of density and toughness this leads to: 
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𝜕 = 𝜕0 ∙
𝑇0
𝑇
, 𝜂~𝐶 ∙ 𝑇1 2⁄ , 𝑣 =
𝜂
𝜕
~𝐶∗ ∙ 𝑇3 2⁄        (55) 
 
After appropriate transformation of the equations the correlation between mass air flow, the height 
of the system H, the heat input q(x) into the system and the free cross section A is given as: 
 
𝜑(𝑥) =
1
𝑚∙𝑐𝑃∙𝑇0̇
∙ ∫ 𝑞(𝑥′)𝑑𝑥′
𝑥
0
         (56) 
 
where: 
 
?̇?2
𝜕0∙𝐴2
(
1
2
+ 𝜑(𝐻)) = 𝜕0 ∙ 𝑔 ∙ ∫ (1 −
1
𝜑(𝑥)
) 𝑑𝑥 − 𝐾𝛼 ∙ ?̇?
𝛼 ∙ ∫ (1 + 𝜑(𝑥))(2−𝛼 2)⁄ 𝑑𝑥
𝐻
0
𝐻
0
  (57) 
 
In the case of laminar flow (α = 1) is given as 𝐾𝛼 where: 
 
𝐾𝛼~𝐶1 ∙ 𝑇
3 2⁄            (58) 
 
while for turbulent flow (α = 2): 
 
𝐾𝛼~𝐶2 ∙ 𝑇           (59) 
is given. In Figure 88 the results of calculations that include the dependence of the invading air mass 
flow rates of the most important parameters are listed for a module reactor. With one ingress and 
the passage of 10 m3/h of air through a chimney HTR basis (this is shown in Figure 88) for two 
openings (nominal diameter 60 mm) this leads to a burn rate of about 1.1 kg C/h. This could mean 
the destruction of up to 10 fuel assemblies per hour. However, this effect would occur only after the 
various layers of the bottom reflector are burned through (these are about 2 m thick). This leads to a 
period of at least 10 hours before fuel is affected. This delay allows the implementation of simple and 
effective countermeasures to prevent air intrusion. 
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Figure 88: Mass flow depending on the leakage cross section and on the temperature in the core 
(measured from the reactor module) 
For larger leak cross sections, which are discussed for hypothetical accidents here, the 
abovementioned shall apply. For larger leak cross sections, which are discussed for hypothetical 
accidents here, the abovementioned shall apply. From such considerations it can be concluded that 
for an HTR system it must be ensured by design and construction of the primary circuit enclosure, 
that air infiltration is very unlikely and if the amount remains very limited. In particular, prestressed 
reactor vessels meet these requirements in a particular way. For interventions, that is, interventions 
where air leak can be stopped, very long periods of time at all HTR concepts remain.  In particular, 
such interventions are feasible because the facilities remain under all possible incidents virtually 
contamination free and accessible for long periods of time. 
 
7.1.6. Accident case D: concrete structures of the reactor system are destroyed; 
the reactor is covered with rubble 
Due to a terrorist attack or the crashing of a large aeroplane, or as a consequence of a very strong 
earthquake with a strength much larger than the design value, the concrete structure of a modular 
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HTR could be totally destroyed. It must be assumed that the reactor pressure vessel is covered with 
rubble and that therefore the conditions for the self-acting removal of decay heat are changed. 
Figure 89 briefly illustrates this situation. 
Although the conditions and integrity of the reactor pressure vessel and the core structures are 
totally unknown, under the assumption that the reactor pressure is intact calculations of 
temperature fields deliver the dependencies shown in Figure 89. Even in this extreme case the 
maximum fuel temperature stays below 1 600 °C. The temperature of the reactor pressure vessel 
would (depending on the heat transport capabilities of the rubble structure) reach 600 °C to 1 000 °C 
(Rütten, 2007) (Hauck, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 89: Accident case D — concrete structures are destroyed, reactor is covered with rubble: (a) model 
for calculations; (b) results of calculations for the time dependence of relevant temperatures 
Generally the outer parts of the core become hotter than in the accident cases discussed before. 
However, under the assumption of an intact reactor pressure vessel it can be stated that even this 
extreme disturbance of the decay heat removal system does not cause the reactor to heat up 
towards temperatures that would destroy the fuel elements. Even in this case the fission-product 
release would be limited. 
Another interesting point is linked to very strong seismic events is that a change in the density of the 
pebble bed core could happen. In the normal non-compacted state the packing fraction of the pebble 
bed is assumed to have an average value of 0.61. The results of seismic event simulations in a large 
test facility showed that, depending on the magnitude of horizontal acceleration and the acceleration 
period, very small changes in the packing factor occur. For an acceleration of 0.3 g, for example, 
characteristic values of a maximum 2 % change of density are reasonable. Hence, this is of no 
relevance for the reactivity balance and for the cooling conditions of a modular HTR. 
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7.2. Self-acting decay heat removal 
7.2.1. Overview of the concept 
Self-acting decay heat removal uses physical means, namely conduction, convection and radiation, to 
remove decay heat without using active or passive machinery. Figure 90 explains the principle of 
heat transport from the core to the environment. In case of severe accidents in the modular HTGR a 
total loss of coolant and a total loss of active decay heat removal is assumed. In this case the self-
acting removal of decay heat takes place and a possible meltdown of the reactor core is avoided as 
the fuel temperatures do not reach concerning temperatures. In fact, theoretically no fission-product 
release from the fuel elements occurs (Mertens, et al., 1985) (Schenk, et al., 1986) (Schenk, et al., 
1989). This inherent feature cannot fail because of accidents due to internal and external reasons. 
 
Figure 90: Stationary radial temperature profile in case of self-acting decay heat removal in a modular 
HTR (Tmax in the hottest part of the core) 
Some further explanations on the concept, as far as heat transport mechanism and limitations of 
temperatures in the components are considered, are contained in Table 42. 
Table 42: Heat transport mechanism and temperature limits: (a) heat transport mechanism in different 
structures; (b) limiting parameters for the concept (e.g. HTR Module, 200 MWth) 
Position Conduction Radiation Free convection 
Core ● ● ● 
Reflector ●   
Reflector -> thermal shield  ● ● 
Thermal shield ● ●  
Thermal shield -> reactor vessel  ● ● 
Reactor vessel ●   
Reactor vessel -> cooling 
system 
   
Reactor vessel -> concrete ● ● ● 
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Parameter Condition Characteristic value 
Fuel temperature 𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 < 𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙(max. ) 𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙(max. ) < 1 600℃ 
Temperature of the reactor 
pressure vessel 
𝑇𝑟𝑝𝑣 < 𝑇𝑟𝑝𝑣(max. ) 𝑇𝑟𝑝𝑣(max. ) < 600℃ 
Temperature of the concrete 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 < 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐(max. ) 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐(max. ) < 400℃ 
Heat removal ?̇? > ?̇?(𝑚𝑖𝑛. ) ?̇?(𝑚𝑖𝑛. ) ≈ 800𝐾 
 
The main requirement is that the heat is released from the core by these self-acting mechanisms in 
such conditions that the maximum fuel temperature stays below a value of Tmax. Currently Tmax has 
the value of 1 600 °C for coated particle fuel (TRISO particles). In these conditions the fission 
products stay almost completely inside the coated particle. If a reactor releases the decay heat by 
self-acting processes and the maximum fuel temperature stays below this permitted level 
(< 1 600 °C) the reactor system is called thermally stable. Some results from annealing experiments 
using irradiated pebble bed fuel elements with TRISO particles are explained in Figure 91. 
The top figure shows the release of 85Kr as a function of the temperature, the lower figure the 
release of 90Sr, 137Cs and 85Kr depending on the heating time at a temperature of 1 600 °C. 
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Figure 91: Release fraction of fission products from pebble bed fuel elements containing TRISO-coated 
particles 
The release fractions of noble gases or of iodine dependent on temperature and time are indeed very 
low even after a long period of annelation of the solid fission products, such as for 137Cs and 90Sr. 
The principles of heat transport, characterised here, can never fail if the system is designed in the 
right way and if the parameters of the core and the core internals are chosen corresponding to the 
requirement of temperature limitation. 
 
7.2.2. Valuation of parameters influencing the decay heat removal concept 
As already indicated in Figure 92, the heat removal depends on several parameters that are 
connected to the core design and the layout of the internal structures that influence the fuel 
temperatures in normal operation, shutdown or emergency cases. 
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Also as already indicated, heat removal depends on several parameters that are connected to the 
core design and the layout of the internal structures that influence the fuel temperatures in normal 
operation, shutdown or emergency cases. 
The influence of the main parameters characterising the working of this principle can be discussed on 
behalf of the qualitative estimations of self-acting decay heat removal shown in Figure 92. 
 
 
Figure 92: Schematic system for balancing decay heat production and dissipation from the core 
 
Energy balance of the core: 
𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑃𝐷(𝑡) − ∫ 𝑗?̅?𝑓̅(𝑎𝑐)
          (60) 
Energy in the core: 
𝐸(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑐 ∙ 𝑇(𝑟,̅  𝑡) ∙ 𝑑𝑉(𝑉𝐵)
        (61) 
Decay heat production: 
𝑃𝐷(𝑡) = ∫ ?̇?𝐷
′′′̇ (?̅?
(𝑉𝐶)
, 𝑡) ∙ 𝑑𝑉         (62) 
Energy balance of the core: 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
 ∫ 𝜌 ∙ 𝑐𝑝 ∙ 𝑇(𝑟,̅  𝑡) ∙ 𝑑𝑉(𝑉𝐶)
 = ∫ ?̇?𝐷
′′′̇ (?̅?
(𝑉𝐶)
, 𝑡) ∙ 𝑑𝑉 − ∫ 𝑗 ̅𝑑𝑓̅(𝐴𝐶)
     (63) 
Average value of the core temperature: 
?̅?(𝑡) = ∫
𝑇(𝑟,̅ 𝑡) ∙𝑑𝑉 
𝑉𝐶(𝑉𝑐)
          (64) 
Decay heat production: 
∫ 𝑞𝐷
′′′̇ (?̅?
(𝑉𝐶)
, 𝑡) ∙ 𝑑𝑉 = ?̇?𝐷
0′′′̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ∙ 𝑓𝐷(𝑡) ∙ 𝑉𝑐  = ?̇?𝐷
0′′′̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∙  𝑉𝑐  ∙ 0.062 ∙ 𝑡
−0.2    (65) 
Equation of the time dependence of temperature: 
?̅?  ∙ 𝑐?̅?  ∙ 𝑉𝐶  
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑡
= ?̇?𝐷
0′′′  ∙ 𝑉𝐶  ∙ 0.062 ∙  𝑡
−0.2 − 𝑘 ∙  𝐴𝐶  ∙ (?̅? − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣)    (66) 
 
 
 𝐴𝐶 
𝑑𝑓      
𝐼  
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣  
𝑉𝐶 Core 
?̅?(𝑡) 
𝑃𝐷(𝑡) 
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This differential equation provides a rough estimate of the time dependence of the average 
temperature in the core and shows the influence of the main parameters: ?̅?  ∙ 𝑐?̅?. k, 𝐴𝐶, 𝑉𝐶. The 
solution of the dependence of the average temperature in the core can be derived using the 
following equations. 
From the approximation of the decay heat function by an exponential function: 
𝑡−0.2 ≈ 𝐴 ∙ exp (−𝑎 ∙ 𝑡)         (67) 
the constants c1 and c2: 
𝑐1 = ?̇?0
′′′̅̅ ̅̅  ∙  𝐴 𝜌 ∙ 𝑐𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅⁄           (68) 
𝑐2  = 𝐾 ∙  𝐴𝐶 𝑉𝐶⁄  ∙  
1
𝜌∙𝑐𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
          (69)
          
and the starting condition: 
𝑡 = 0: ?̅?(𝑡 = 0) = ?̅?          (70) 
one gets the solution: 
𝑇(𝑡) = 𝑇𝑢 (1 − 𝑒
−𝑐2 ∙ 𝑡) + (𝑇0̅̅̅ − 
𝑐1
𝑐2− 𝛼
) ∙ 𝑒−𝑐2 ∙𝑡 + 
𝑐1
𝑐2− 𝛼
 ∙ 𝑒−𝛼 ∙ 𝑡    (71) 
 
The qualitative solution of this is illustrated in Figure 93. 
 
Figure 93: Qualitative picture of the above-derived solution 
It can be assumed that during the first phase of the accident most of the decay heat is stored in the 
core and the surrounding graphite structures. The transient of an average temperature, adiabatic 
condition, can be expressed as follows: 
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𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑡
 = ?̇?𝑐
′′′̅̅ ̅̅  ∙  
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝑡
 ∙  
1
𝜌 ∙𝑐𝑝
 ∙ 0.062 ∙ 𝑡−0.2        (72) 
?̅? (𝑡) = 𝑇0̅̅̅(𝑡)  ∙  
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝑡
 ∙  
1
𝜌𝑐𝑝
 ∙
0.062
0.8
𝑡0.8        (73) 
 
With values of: 
?̇?𝑐
′′′̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 3 𝑀𝑊 𝑚3,⁄  𝑉𝐶 𝑉𝑡⁄ ≈ 0.7, 𝑝 ∙ 𝑐𝑝  ≈ 2 𝐽 𝐾⁄       (74) 
the maximum temperature transient at the beginning of the accident is calculated to be in the order 
of: 
𝑑?̅? 𝑑𝑡⁄  ≈ 100 °𝐶 ℎ⁄           (75) 
After 𝑡 = 10 hours an average value of ?̅? ≈ 1 000 °C is reached if the initial temperature of the 
system was 500 °C. Hence, the core of an HTGR is very robust against ‘loss of cooling’ accidents. 
A more detailed evaluation of the solution derived above delivers for the time 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 a value for ?̅?𝑚𝑎𝑥., 
where: 
𝑃𝐷 𝑃𝑡ℎ ≈  0.4 %⁄  (after around 30 hours for 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥), 
?̇?𝑐
′′′̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  = 3 𝑀𝑊 𝑚3⁄ , 𝑘 = 10 𝑊 𝑚2𝐾⁄ , 𝐴𝐶 𝑉𝑐⁄ = 150 𝑚
2 66 𝑚2 = 2.3 𝑚−1⁄  
a value of: 
?̅?𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣  ≈ 1 000 °𝐶 
Further important results of this simple estimate are: 
q̇c′′′̅̅ ̅̅   = 
PD
Pth
≈ 1.2 ∙ 10−2 MW m3⁄          (76) 
?̅?  ∙  
𝐴𝑐
𝑉𝑐
 (?̅?𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑇𝑢) ≈ 2 ∙ 10
−2 MW m3⁄         (77) 
Thus, after some time (t*), the heat losses from the surface are larger than the decay heat 
production. In the time span before, the decay heat is mainly stored in the ceramic fuel elements 
without any danger of them being destroyed. Additionally, there is a radial temperature profile inside 
the core and the structures of the reactor. 
To get an impression of what parameters influence this radial heat transfer the following estimate 
may help considering the stationary heat transport inside the core. One can assume a specific point 
in time, for example the time at which the maximum fuel temperature occurs, and apply the 
stationary heat transport equation: 
0 = ∫ q̇D
′′′
(VC)
(r̅, t)  ∙ dV − ∫ j̅  ∙  df̅
(Ac)
        (78) 
The application of Gauss’s law delivers: 
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∫ 𝑗 ̅(𝐴𝐵)
∙ df = ∫ 𝑑𝑖𝑣 𝑗̅ ∙  𝑑𝑉(𝑉𝐵)
         (79) 
The radial dependence of temperature is a result of the differential equation: 
?̇?𝐶
0′′′ = 0.062 ∙ 𝑡∗−0.2 + 𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓  ∙  ∆?̃? = 0        (80) 
where Δ is the Laplace operator and λ𝑒𝑓𝑓 an effective heat conductivity in the core, in which all 
processes of conduction, radiation and free convection are included. 
The ordinary differential equation: 
𝑑2?̃?
𝑑𝑟2
+
1
𝑟
∗
𝑑?̃?
𝑑𝑟
+ ?̅̇?𝐷
′′′
∗
0.062∗𝑡∗
−0.2
𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓
= 0        (81) 
has to be solved with the boundary conditions: 
?̅?(𝑟 = 𝑅) = ?̅?𝑟, ?̅?(𝑟 = 0) = ?̅?0        (82) 
As a result the radial temperature profile in the core can be determined as: 
?̅?0 − ?̅?𝑟 ≈ ?̅̇?𝑐
′′′
∗ 𝑓𝐷(𝑡
∗) ∗ 𝛽 ∗
𝑅2
4?̅?𝑒𝑓𝑓
        (83) 
where 𝛽 is the peak factor: 
𝑓𝐷(𝑡
∗) ≈ 0.4 % for 𝑡∗ = 30ℎ 
?̅?𝑒𝑓𝑓 is suitable effective heat conductivity inside the pebble bed. Here an average value for ?̅?𝑒𝑓𝑓 is 
assumed. 
Figure 94 contains a qualitative figure of the radial temperature profile in the reactor at a specific 
time, for instanced at 𝑡 = 𝑡∗. 
 
Figure 94: Qualitative dependence of a radial temperature profile in the core (at 𝒕 = 𝒕∗ with 𝒇𝑫(𝒕
∗)) 
 
 
- r - r 
?̃?(𝑟) 
?̃?(𝑟 = 0) = ?̃?0 
−?̃?(𝑟 = 0) = ?̃?0 
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As a result the differential equation to estimate the radial dependence of the temperature at a 
special time 𝑡∗ can be calculated. This can be done applying some typical values of the HTR Module 
(Lohnert, 1990) such as: 
𝛽 = 1.6, ?̅̇?′′′ = 3
𝑀𝑊
𝑚3
, 𝑓𝐷(𝑡
∗) = 4 ∗ 10−3, 𝑅 = 1.5 𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̅?𝑒𝑓𝑓 = 15𝑊/𝑚𝐾 
The computation of this formula results in a temperature difference across the core of 
approximately: 
∆𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 720°𝐶 
This value has to be taken into consideration to get an impression of the peak temperature inside the 
reactor. Taking into account a temperature of 800 °C on the reﬂector boundary, the maximum 
temperature is around 1 500 °C in the hotspot region of the HTR Module after 30 hours. This 
temperature is well below the maximum temperature limit of the fuel elements of 1 600 °C. Detailed 
three-dimensional computer calculations deliver results similar to those explained before. The heat 
transport between the gaps inside the reactor structures can also be estimated with simple models. 
Figure 95 illustrates the heat removal in small gaps in the reactor structures. 
 
 
Figure 95: Heat transport across gaps in the core 
 
Here the heat removal is mainly driven by conduction through gas and heat radiation. In case of 
depressurisation the conduction through the primary coolant in the gaps is negligible, therefore, for 
example, only radiation and free convection have to be taken into account. 
The transport by radiation is described by the following equation: 
?̇?
𝐴
⁄ = ?̇?′′ = 𝜀 ∗ 𝐶𝑠 ∗ ((
𝑇1
100
)
4
− (
𝑇2
100
)
4
) 
with the values in the core structures of modular HTR (200 MWth) being: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
RPV 
Core barrel RPV Core barrel 
T
1
 
T
2
 
       ?̇?'' 
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𝜀 = 0.6, 𝐶𝑠 = 5.6
𝑊
𝑚2𝐾4
, ?̇?∗ ≈
600𝐾𝑊
150𝑚2
=
4𝐾𝑊
𝑚2
 
This brief calculation leads to a temperature 𝑇1 of approximately 433 °C for the pressure vessel if the 
outside of the core barrel is 𝑇2 = 600 K. 
A gap in the core structures between relevant structural zones (graphite reflector/thermal shield; 
thermal shield/reactor pressure vessel) delivers a temperature difference in the order of 100 °C each. 
Finally, the decay heat must leave the surface of the RPV without overheating this component. A 
rough estimation of the heat balance for the time 𝑡∗ delivers: 
𝑃𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑓𝐷(𝑡
∗) = 2𝜋 ∗ 𝑅2 ∗ 𝐻𝑐 ∗ ?̅? ∗ (𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑉 − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣)      (84) 
in which ?̅? is the heat-transfer number at the outer surface of the reactor pressure vessel. 
Applying characteristic values of an HTR Module (200 MWth): 
𝑅2 = 3𝑚, ?̅? = 10
𝑊
𝑚2𝐾⁄ , 𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑉 − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣 ≈ 300𝐾, 𝑓𝐷
(𝑡∗) ≈ 0.4 %    (85) 
the following limiting value is derived: 
𝑃𝑡ℎ
𝐻𝑐
⁄ ≈ 22 𝑀𝑊 𝑚⁄           (86) 
as a permitted linear power rating for self-acting heat transfer from the surface of the RPV. If the 
limiting maximum fuel temperature of 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 < 1 600
oC is applied the core height of the HTR Module 
reactor is limited to 9.4 m. A thermal power of 200 MW fulfils this boundary condition. The 
temperature difference in the RPV wall itself is relatively small: 
∆𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑉 = ?̇?
′′ ∗
𝑠
𝜆
          (87) 
in which: 
?̇?′′= the heat flux through the wall; 
𝑠 = the wall thickness; and 
𝜆 = the heat conductivity of steel. 
With a heat ﬂux of 4.0 𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  at time 𝑡∗ 𝑠 = 0.1𝑚, 𝜆 = 30 𝑊 𝑚𝑘⁄ , ∆𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑉 results in a value of 
13 °C, which causes no intolerable additional stresses as secondary loads. 
From the considerations given above it can be stated that the following features of the reactor core 
are essential for the self-acting decay heat removal so as to prevent core melting and the 
superheating of fuel elements above tolerable temperature limits: 
 low power density (?̅̇?′′′) in the core; 
 high effective heat conductivity (𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓) in the core; 
 short distance (𝑅) for the transport of heat inside the core; 
 high heat-storage (𝜌𝑐𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) capability of the core; 
 high temperature stability of the core materials; 
 high heat-transfer numbers (?̅?) through the core structures; 
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 high ratio of surface to volume (𝐴𝑅 𝑉𝑅⁄ ) for the core; 
 permanent outer heat sink outside the RPV. 
Additionally, there are some further requirements for the integrity of the fuel elements in case of 
extreme accidents: 
 avoid large amounts of air ingress into the primary system or use corrosion protected fuel 
elements — this first requirement can be fulfilled by a suitable design of the inner concrete 
cell together will a self-acting closure of the cell after depressurisation; 
 use of a core in which unwanted rises of fuel temperatures because of strong nuclear 
reactivity transients are impossible; 
 avoid the ingress of large amounts of water or steam into the core after accidents in the 
steam generator — this can be ensured by a suitable design of the steam generator system, 
for instance in such a way that the steam generator is placed below the core. 
If the very extreme accident case is considered in which the total outer surface of the reactor 
pressure vessel is insulated or covered by rubble, which could be the case after an extremely strong 
earthquake, the following simplified estimate helps to identify the important parameters for the 
transient behaviour of the system (Figure 96). 
 
 
Figure 96: Simplified model to evaluate the system in a very extreme accident 
The energy balance delivers the relation for this case in the following form: 
𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
∫ 𝜌 ∗ 𝑐𝑝 ∗ 𝑇 ∗ 𝑑𝑉 = 𝑃𝐷(𝑡) − ?̇?𝐿(𝑡)𝑉𝑣
       (88) 
An average temperature ?̅? of the system with a volume 𝑉𝑅 of the reactor is defined by: 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
∫ 𝜌 ∗ 𝑐𝑝 ∗ 𝑇 ∗ 𝑑𝑉 ≈ ∑ 𝜌𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑝𝑖 ∗ 𝑉𝑖 ∗
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑉𝑅
       (89) 
 
 
 
𝑇5 
𝐴 
Insulation 
or rubble 
?̅? 
𝑆𝑖𝑠 
𝜆𝑖𝑠 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣 
𝛼𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 
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𝑖 indicates the different parts of the reactor (core, internal structures, RPV), which may store heat. 
The decay heat is approximated in the form: 
𝑃𝐷(𝑡) = 𝑃0 ∗ 0.0622 ∗ (𝑡
−0.2 − (𝑡0 + 𝑡)
−0.2)       (90) 
The heat losses can be described by the simplified expression: 
?̇?𝐿 = 𝐴 ∗ (?̅?𝑠 − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣) ∗ ?̅?         (91) 
in which ?̅?𝑠 is the surface temperature of the vessel and 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣  is the temperature outside the total 
configuration. The heat-transfer number 𝛼 mainly contains the heat conductivity 𝜆𝑖𝑠  and the mean 
thickness 𝛿𝑖𝑠 of the insulating material, as well as the heat-transfer coefficient or the outside of the 
total arrangement: 
1
?̅?
+
1
𝜆𝑖𝑠 𝛿𝑖𝑠⁄
+
1
𝛼𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠
          (92) 
𝐴 is the surface of the total configuration of the rubble, 𝛼𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 characterises the heat-transfer 
coefficient on the outside of this material zone, caused by radiation and free convection of air. In a 
first approximation 𝑇𝑠 might have the same value as ?̅?. 
Thus, the final differential equation results in the form: 
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑃𝑡ℎ
∑ 𝜌𝑖∗𝑐𝑝𝑖
∗𝑉𝑖𝑖
∗ 0.062 ∗ 𝑡−0.2 −
?̅?∗𝐴
∑ 𝜌𝑖∗𝑐𝑝𝑖
∗𝑉𝑖𝑖
∗ (?̅? − 𝑇𝑢)      (93) 
A solution to this differential equation delivers functions is shown in Figure 97. 
 
 
Figure 97: Qualitative values of temperature of reactor pressure vessel and fuel dependent on time 
The maximum increase in temperature in a first phase can be estimated by the following equation: 
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑃𝑡ℎ
∑ 𝜌𝑖∗𝑐𝑝𝑖
∗𝑉𝑖𝑖
∗ 0.062 ∗ 𝑡−0.2         (94) 
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Again some values for the structures of the HTR Module may be used for better illustration: 
𝑃𝑡ℎ = 200𝑀𝑊, ∑ 𝜌𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑝𝑖 ∗ 𝑉𝑖 = 4 ∗ 10
8 𝑊𝑠
𝐾⁄𝑖       (95) 
This results in a transient of approximately 5 K/h after 30 hours. After that time, a major part of 
decay heat enters the wall of the reactor pressure vessel, which acts as a main heat sink. Assuming a 
decay heat fraction of 0.3 % of the thermal power and a storage capacity of 50 MJ/K, a temperature 
transient of approximately 4.5 K/h results. Assuming an adiabatic system, the vessel would fail after 
500 hours due to melting of the steel. 
From the beginning of the accident a part of the heat is passed to the rubble and released into the 
environment. Non-adiabatic limiting temperatures of the system can be derived from the following 
equation: 
𝑃𝐷 ≈ ?̇?𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 ≈ ?̅? ∗ 𝐴(𝑇(∞) − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣)        (96) 
If the decay heat is assumed to be 400 KW for a longer time (corresponding to 2 ‰ in case of an HTR 
Module, 200 MWth) the outer surface 𝐴 to be approximately 1 000 m2 and the heat-transfer 
coefficient ?̅? to be 0.5 W/m2K the adiabatic temperature 𝑇(∞) ≈ 800𝐾 is obtained. 
Calculations using more dimensional computer codes have already shown this. One of the important 
results is the fact that even in these extreme accident cases the maximum fuel temperature is very 
similar to the accident cases discussed before. However, the outer structures and their heat 
conductivities are very important for the transient. If the surrounding infrastructure is not completely 
destroyed, man-made interventions in time (e.g. additional cooling using nitrogen) could cool the 
system earlier. 
These results show in a very convincing manner that the concept of self-acting decay heat removal 
works even in case of extreme accidents. In all accident scenarios the maximum fuel temperature 
stays below the tolerable 1 600 °C. Furthermore, there should be enough time to apply very simple 
emergency cooling procedures. Some examples for these measures are: 
 injection of nitrogen into the reactor pressure vessel, if this is possible, by direct access of 
machines; 
 injection of nitrogen into the rubble; 
 spraying with water. 
The ‘grace period’ would be in the order of some days, before damage (e.g. from air ingress) would 
have to be considered. 
 
7.2.3. Inﬂuence of uncertainties relating to the different steps of the transport 
chain for decay heat removal on the maximum fuel temperature 
If a maximum fuel temperature of 1 600 °C is assumed as the tolerable temperature limit in a ‘total 
loss of active cooling’ accident a safety margin between this value and the calculated value needs to 
be assumed. Therefore, uncertainties of calculation for the maximum temperature have to be 
analysed and considered. By applying a simple approximation: 
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𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙(𝑚𝑎𝑥) = 𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙(𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙) + ∆𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙       (97) 
a value of +∆𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ≈ 100°C is considered to be a suitable additional safety margin. For the nominal 
value the temperature of the hottest fuel element can be derived as follows: 
𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙(𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙) = ?̇?∗̅̅ ̅ ∗ 𝛽 ∗ 𝑓𝐷(𝑡
∗) ∗ 𝛷(𝑟𝑖, 𝜆𝑖, 𝛼𝑖, )      (98) 
in which: 
?̇?∗̅̅ ̅ = average power density in the core 
𝛽 = peak factor of power density 
𝑓𝐷(𝑡
∗) = factor of the decay function, of approximately. 3 × 10–3 after time 𝑡∗ ≈ 30ℎ for the HTR 
Module of around 200 MWth 
𝛷(𝑟𝑖, 𝜆𝑖, 𝛼𝑖, ) function describing all steps of heat transfer in the core and internals 
𝛷 =
𝑟1
2
4𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓
+
𝑟1
2
∗
(𝑟2−𝑟1)
𝜆𝐺
+
𝑟1
2
∗
𝑟1
𝑟3
∗
(𝑟2−𝑟1)
𝜆𝑆
+
𝑟1
2
∗
𝑟1
𝑟4
∗
1
?̅?𝑠
+
𝑟1
2
∗
𝑟1
𝑟5
∗
(𝑟5−𝑟4)
𝜆𝑆
+
𝑟1
2
∗
𝑟1
𝑟5
∗
1
?̅?𝑎
  (99) 
Uncertainties can be correlated to this function by expressions such as the one given below: 
∆𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 = ∑
𝜕𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙(𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙)
𝜕𝜉𝑖
∗ ∆𝜉𝑖𝑖         (100) 
Regarding the uncertainty of the fuel temperature in relation to the nominal value this would result 
in the following equations: 
∆𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙
𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙
≈
∆?̇?′′′̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
?̇?′′′̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
+
∆𝛽
𝛽
+
∆𝑓𝐷(𝑡
∗)
𝑓𝐷(𝑡∗)
+
∆𝛷
𝛷
       (101) 
∆𝛷
𝛷
≈
∆𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓
𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓
          (102) 
∆𝛷 𝛷⁄  is approximated in simpliﬁed form if the uncertainties of the heat conductivity in the pebble 
bed are considered to be the main uncertainties for the function 𝛷. 
The uncertainties relating to the various other factors can be derived in detail from the measured 
curves for the relevant parameters. These are mainly 𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑇) in the core, 𝛼𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑇) in gaps, ∝̅𝑎 (𝑇) or 
the heat release from the reactor pressure vessel and naturally the uncertainties connected with the 
decay heat production. In particular, the factor 𝛽 requires attention as it depends very much on the 
furnace cycle. 
Figure 98 shows exemplary measurements of the effective heat conductivity in the core. 
Furthermore, the heat conductivity of graphite and values of the emissivity are given. The differences 
between the ‘nominal’ values in the curve of 𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑇) and the ‘lower’ values are in the order of 10 %. 
The uncertainty of the emissivity plays an important role for the heat transfer on the outer surface 
and in the gaps. Certain values measured are given in Figure 98. 
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Figure 98: Uncertainties relating to measured parameters for the heat transport in the reactor system in 
case of a ‘total loss of active cooling’ accident: 
 
Figure 98 shows the heat conductivity in the pebble bed (top), and for the reflector graphite 
(example AVR) the measured values of the ε. 
There are some uncertainties in the deﬁnition of the status of the core at the start of the accident, 
which have to be analysed in detail. In particular, the height of the peak factor 𝛽 depends on the type 
of the fuel cycle (e.g. the number of passes through the core clearly inﬂuences this parameter). 
Due to the described uncertainties in calculations temperature measurements in the reactor core are 
desirable. In light-water reactors the temperature in the core is approximated using time-dependent 
hot channel factors. The pebble-bed reactor uses online refuelling so that, in contrast to an LWR, 
blind elements can be used to measure the temperature in the core. 
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In the AVR, for instance, blind elements have been fed to the reactor in order to determine the 
temperature in the core. These pebbles were equipped with melting wires. Figure 99 shows one of 
these elements. 
 
Figure 99: Spheres for temperature measurements in the core of the AVR (with melt-wires — the X-ray 
below shows the molten wires) 
Table 43 provides specific information on the melting temperatures of the speciﬁc wires shown in 
Figure 99. Each element contained 20 wires. After they had passed the reactor and were removed 
from the fuel-handling cycle, they were post examined and the molten wires allowed the maximum 
temperature that the element examined experienced while passing the reactor core to be estimated. 
 
Table 43: Characteristics of the wires shown in Figure 99 
Sample number Metal alloy 
components 
Composition Melting temperature 
(°C) 
1 Al/Fe 99.2/0.8 655 
2 Ag/Cu/In 60/27/13 700 
3 Ag/Cu 72/28 780 
4 Ag/Cu/Pd 68.4/26.6/5 810 
5 Ag/Au/Cu 20/60/20 840 
6 Ag/Cu 47/53 878 
7 Ag/Cu/Pd 52/28/20 900 
8 Ag/Cu 35/65 920 
9 Ag/Cu/Pd 54/21/25 940 
10 Ag 100 960 
11 Au/Cu 46/54 982 
12 Ag/Pd 95/5 1 000 
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13 Au/Cu 33.5/66.5 1 020 
14 Au/Cu 25/75 1 050 
15 Au/Cu 10.5/89.5 1 072 
16 Cu/Pd 82/18 1 088 
17 Cu/Ni 90/10 1 120 
18 Cu/Ni 84/16 1 150 
19 Ag/Pd/Mn 64/33/3 1 200 
20 Pd/Cu 70/30 1 280 
 
In some regions of the reactor (especially in the outer core) higher temperatures than previously 
calculated have been obtained (Figure 100). The difference between measurements and calculations 
were partly in the order of 150 °C. Explanations were given by considering, first, the inﬂuence of the 
graphite noses, second, of bypasses in the core structures or, third, by a large bypass on the cold side 
of the total gas ﬂow. 
 
 
Figure 100: Aspects of temperature measurements in the AVR: (a) temperatures obtained from melt-wire 
experiments; (b) calculated maximum temperature in core 
These elevated temperature values during normal operation were characteristic for the AVR, where 
fresh fuel elements were put into core regions with the highest gas temperatures (counterﬂow of 
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fuel elements and cooling gas). For future pebble-bed HTR concepts the method tested here is an 
excellent concept to measure in core temperatures during operation. 
Table 44 gives a rough overview of the uncertainties in case of a ‘total loss of active cooling’ accident 
(e.g. HTR Module, 200 MWth). The nominal value of the maximum fuel temperature is calculated to 
be as high as 1 450 °C. The maximum value is determined to be as high as 1 615 °C. In practice a 
value of around 100 °C to 150 °C as an additional safety margin seems to be adequate for the design 
and the licensing process. 
 
Table 44: Estimates of the inﬂuence of uncertainties on the fuel temperature in case of a ‘total loss of 
cooling’ accident 
Parameter Dimension Characteristic 
value of 
design 
Uncertainties Possible 
upper value 
Remark 
Power density 
by decay heat 
production 
MW/m3 
 
0.01 + 10 % 0.011 After around 
30 hours 
Temperature 
difference in the 
core (𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓) 
°C 700 + 10 % 770 Including 
surface 
effects 
Temperature 
difference in the 
reflector 
°C 100 + 20 % 120 Irradiation in 
40 years 
Temperature 
difference gap 1 
(𝛼𝑎) 
°C 120 + 20 % 144 Reflector/ 
thermal 
shield 
Temperature 
difference gap 2 
°C 120 + 20 % 144 Thermal 
shield reactor 
vessel 
Temperature 
difference on 
outside RPV 
°C 350 + 10 % 385 Surface 
cooler works 
Total °C 1 450 165 1 650 Including 
𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 =
500C 
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8. Appendix A 
8.1. Irradiation tests in MTRs and in AVR 
The irradiation testing of German HTGR fuels began in 1972 and has lasted for four decades. Table 45 
provides a historical overview of the significant irradiation tests, categorised by the primary 
objectives of the individual tests. 
Two features present in each of the major R & D programmes are that irradiation testing occurred in 
both accelerated neutron environments and real-time HTGR environments. All the important particle 
variants have been evaluated in this manner since the beginning of the fuel development effort. 
Accelerated neutron environments were made available in European MTRs: 
 Dragon Reactor (DR) — England; 
 FRJ2 Reactor — Germany; 
 BR2 Reactor — Belgium; 
 R2 Reactor — Sweden; 
 High Flux Reactor (HFR) — Netherlands; 
 Siloë Reactor (SL) — France. 
The real-time environment is represented by the AVR in Jülich, Germany. 
Fuel spheres intended for AVR irradiation testing were manufactured in large numbers with the 
purpose of bulk testing in a real-time HTGR environment. Small fuel-sphere lots were specially 
manufactured for the German LEU Phase 1 irradiation test programme and for the proof test fuel for 
the HTR Module. Irradiation testing of Phase 1 fuel elements began in European MTRs in May 1982 
and continued until November 1990 (Mehner, et al., 1990). 
Real-time testing in the AVR began with AVR 19 in July 1982, followed by AVR 21 in February 1984 
and AVR 21-2 in October 1987. Irradiation testing of the HTR Module proof test fuel in HFR Petten 
began with HFR-K5 and K6 in June 1990 and continued until May 1994 (Nickel, et al., 2002). 
Table 45: Historical overview of German irradiation tests in the development of coated particles from 1972 
to 2010 (IAEA 2012) 
R & D programme Old LEUs HEU programme for process-heat and gas 
turbine applications 
LEU 
programme 
1972-76 1977-1981 1982-2010 
 Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3  
Coated particle UO2 TRISO 
UO2 BISO 
(Th, U) O2 
BISO 
(Th, U) O2 
TRISO 
UC2/UCO 
TRISO + ThO2 
TRISO 
UO2 TRISO 
Test goal 
Coated particle tests 
Particle performance HFR-M5 
DR-S6 
BR2-P24 BR2-P25 BR2-P23 HFR-P4 
SL-P1 
Fission product 
transport in intact 
particles 
DR-S4 FRJ2-P22 FRJ2-P23 - FRJ2-P27 
Release from kernel - FRJ2-P25 FRJ2-P25 FRJ2-P25 FRJ2-P28 
Chemical effects FRJ2-P16 - - HFR-P3 HFR-P5 
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Fuel element tests 
Fuel element 
performance 
DR-K5 HFR-K1 R2-K12 
R2-K13 
R2-K12 HFR-K3 
FE fission product 
transport 
- - FRJ2-K11 FRJ2-K10 FRJ2-K13 
FRJ2-K15 
Large-scale 
demonstration 
AVR 6 AVR 14 
AVR 18 
AVR 15 
AVR 20 
AVR 13 AVR 19 
AVR 21 
Proof tests     HFR-K5 
HFR-K6 
High burnup tests     FRJ2-K15 
HFR-EU1 
High temperature 
test 
    HFR-EU1bis 
 
After a 10-year pause, irradiation testing resumed in 2004 with the European Union-sponsored test 
HFR-EU1bis (Fütterer, et al., 2008) (Fütterer 2008) (September 2004 to October 2005) and in 2006 
with HFR-EU1 (Laurie, et al., 2010) (September 2006 to February 2010). In both of these tests, fuel 
elements from the AVR 21-2 production (GLE-4/2 elements) were subjected to accelerated 
irradiation conditions in the HFR. Test HFR-EU1 also contained two Chinese spherical fuel elements 
from the HTR-10 production (Tang, et al., 2010). 
 
8.2. Irradiation envelope 
All of the irradiation tests listed in Table 45 (with the exception of large-scale demonstration tests) 
were conducted in the accelerated neutron environments of MTRs as opposed to a real-time HTGR 
neutron environment like the AVR. The European MTRs utilised for the accelerated testing of the 
modern LEU UO2 TRISO fuel typically have higher thermal, epithermal and fast neutron fluxes than an 
actual HTGR. In such an environment, fissile fuel burnups and accumulated neutron fluences can be 
achieved in 1-2 years, as opposed to 4 years in an HTGR. Thus, ‘accelerated’ refers to an irradiation 
under higher thermal and/or fast neutron flux environments for the purpose of speeding up the 
normal rate of fuel burnup and fast fluence accumulation. 
Table 46 lists the nominal maximum operating conditions for the primary parameters — operating 
temperature, fuel burnup and fast neutron fluence. These parameters are listed in the order of their 
importance in defining the irradiation environment a fuel specimen is subjected to in an irradiation 
test. Table 47 lists these irradiation test operating parameters for all the MTR accelerated irradiation 
tests conducted on modern LEU UO2 TRISO-coated particles. Table 47 also contains the BOL and EOL 
85mKr release rates that are indicative of in-reactor fuel performance. 
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Table 46: The nominal maximum HTGR design operating conditions, for which the MTR irradiation tests 
were patterned 
Operating parameter General HTGR 
design (Phase 1) 
HTR Module 
Spherical element central temperature (°C) 1 068 870 (cycled) 
Burnup (% FIMA) 10.1 8.9 
Fast neutron fluence (1025 n/m2, E > 16 fJ) 2.7 2.1 
 
The presence of active temperature-monitoring systems in all of the MTR accelerated irradiation 
tests made it possible to record temperatures and to measure the release rates of gaseous fission 
products from the fuel under irradiation. Sampling the helium and neon purge gas on the outlet side 
of the test capsules, followed by quantitative gamma-spectrometry of the gas sample, makes it 
possible to identify and quantify the fission gas isotopes of Kr and Xe present as a function of 
irradiation time. 
Using this technique, and knowing the sample volume and purge gas flow rate at the time of 
sampling, a measure of the release rate (Ri) for a specific gas isotope from the irradiated fuel can be 
determined. Comparing the measured release rate to the computed birth rate (Bi) for specific fission 
gas isotopes provides a measure of the steady-state release behaviour of fuel under irradiation. 
Monitoring the fission gas R/Bs is the standard methodology of assessing in-reactor fuel 
performance. 
A comparison of the nominal range of fuel burnup versus operating temperature limits for various 
HTGR designs with those achieved in MTR and AVR tests is shown in Figure 101, and these data are 
also presented in Table 47. The later HFR-EU1 and HFR-EU1bis tests are not shown here because data 
are still under review (Fütterer, et al., 2008) (Laurie, et al., 2010) (Tang, et al., 2010). 
Test specimens irradiated in HFR-K3/3, middle positions of HFR-P4/legs 1, 2 and 3 and FRJ2-K13/2 
achieved burnups above the nominal maximum burnup limit at operating temperatures well above 
the maximum limit. For those specimens irradiated in SL-P1, HFR-K3/2 and FRJ2-K15/1 and 3, the 
maximum burnup limits were exceeded in nearly all cases. However, the operating temperatures 
were not above the maximum limit in most instances. For the specimens irradiated in FRJ2-P27/1, 2 
and 3, FRJ2-K13/1 and 2 and HFR-K3/1, the nominal burnup maximum was above 7 % FIMA, but did 
not exceed the nominal HTR Module maximum limit; however, they were accumulated at operating 
temperatures that exceeded the nominal maximum limit. 
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Figure 101: Irradiation envelope of fuel burnup versus mean operating temperature for LEU UO2 TRISO 
particles in accelerated irradiation tests in European MTRs and in AVR prior to 2000 
 
The in-reactor operational test data are presented in Table 47. Test specimens irradiated in HFR-K3/1 
and 4 and HFR-P4/legs 1 and 3 well exceeded the nominal maximum fluence and temperature limits. 
For those specimens in HFR-K3/2 and SL-P1/1, the nominal fast neutron fluence limit was exceeded, 
but the operating temperatures did not exceed limits. For specimens irradiated in FRJ2-K13/1 and 2, 
FRJ2-P27/1, 2 and 3 and FRJ2- K15/2, the fluence limits were not exceeded: the fluences were all 
accumulated at temperatures higher than the nominal maximum operating temperature limit. It was 
only for FRJ2-K15/1 and 3, where the nominal maximum limits for fast neutron fluence and operating 
temperature, although above 800 °C, were not exceeded. 
Figure 101 shows that HTGR irradiation requirements are fully enveloped by experimental results 
from the German fuel development programme database. However, the actual performance limits of 
the LEU UO2 TRISO-coated particle had not been established in the 1980s. The recent HFR-EU1bis 
and HFR-EU1 irradiation tests were designed to explore irradiation loads that might reach these 
limits, but these tests are still under evaluation. 
In 2004, irradiation testing of modern German HTGR fuel resumed with experiment HFR EU1bis 
(Fütterer 2008) in the HFR at Petten. Sponsored by the European Commission, the primary objective 
of HFR-EU1bis was to demonstrate the feasibility of LEU UO2 fuel particle failure under normal 
operating conditions with extended operating temperatures up to and beyond 1 250 °C and peak fuel 
burnup to 16 % FIMA. The HFR-EU1bis experimental test rig contains five GLE-4/2 spherical elements 
in a single capsule. 
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Table 47: In-reactor operating parameters for the MTR irradiation tests conducted on modern high-quality 
LEU UO2 TRISO fuel particles irradiated in the German fuel development programme 
Irradiation test 
element 
Operating 
temperature 
range (°C) 
subscr. transient 
Burnup range 
(% FIMA) 
Fluence 
(1025 n/m2, 
E > 16 fJ) 
85mKr R/B 
BOL EOL 
MTR irradiation tests, Phase 1, LEU UO2 TRISO fuels 
SL-P1*** 740-790 8.6-11.3 5-6.8 5.8 × 10–7 1.2 × 10–6 
HFR-P4/ 
leg 1 
leg 3 
 
915-940 
1 050-1 075 
 
11.1-14.7 
9.9-14.7 
 
5.5-8 
5.5-8 
 
3.5 × 10–9 
3.6 × 10–9 
 
8 × 10–8 
8 × 10–9 
HFR-K3/ 
1 
2-3 
4 
 
1 020-1 200 
700-900 
1 020-1 220 
 
7.5 
10.1-10.2 
9 
 
4.0 
5.9 
4.9 
 
1 × 10–9 
9 × 10–10 
2 × 10–9 
 
2 × 10–7 
1 × 10–7 
3 × 10–7 
FRJ2-K13/ 
1-2 
3-4 
 
985-1 150 
980-1 150 
 
7.5-8 
7.6-7.9 
 
< 0.2 
< 0.2 
 
2 × 10–9 
8 × 10–10 
 
1.6 × 10–8 
7 × 10–9 
FRJ2-K15/ 
1 
2 
3 
 
800-970 
980-1 1501 280 
800-9901 280 
 
14.1 
15.3 
14.8 
 
< 0.2 
< 0.2 
< 0.2 
 
2.0 × 10–10 
2.5 × 10–10 
2.0 × 10–10 
 
1.2 × 10–8 
5 × 10–9 
3 × 10–9 
FRJ2-P27/ 
1* 
2 
3 
 
880-1 080 
1 220-1 320 
1 080-1 130 
 
7.2-7.6 
8.0 
7.2-7.6 
 
1.4 
1.7 
1.3 
 
1.0 × 10–6 
8.6 × 10–7 
2.0 × 10–8 
 
1.6 × 10–6 
1.0 × 10–5 
1.2 × 10–7 
HTR Module proof tests 
HFR-K5/ 
1 
2 
3 
4* 
 
800-9231 200 
800-9091 250 
800-9031 260 
800-9211 200 
 
7.8 
10.1 
10.3 
9.3 
 
4.0 
5.8 
5.9 
4.9 
 
4.8 × 10–10 
2.7 × 10–10 
2.5 × 10–7 
 
1.7 × 10–7 
3.0 × 10–7 
3.6 × 10–7 
HFR-K6/ 
1 
2 
3 
4** 
 
800-1 0901 200 
800-1 1301 250 
800-1 1401 260 
800-1 1301 240 
 
8.3 
10.6 
10.9 
9.9 
 
3.2 
4.6 
4.8 
4.5 
 
5.0 × 10–10 
3.0 × 10–10 
4.5 × 10–7 
 
2.0 × 10–7 
3.0 × 10–7 
9.0 × 10–7 
 
* One manufacturing defect, no additional failures during irradiation. 
** Two manufacturing defects, no additional failures during irradiation. 
*** Five manufacturing defects, no additional failures during irradiation. 
The irradiation began in September 2004 and was terminated in October 2005 after 250 full-power 
days. Average operating temperatures were in the range of 900 °C to 1200 °C, and peak values well 
beyond 1 250 °C were achieved. The EOL noble fission gas R/B data were much higher than expected, 
ranging from 3 × 10–6 to 8 × 10–6 for the short-lived Kr and Xe isotopes. Post-irradiation examination 
testing began in 2006 followed by accident simulation testing in the years 2008 to 2012. 
In 2006 the irradiation experiment HFR-EU1 began irradiation in Petten. This experiment consists of 
two independent irradiation test capsules. The upper capsule contains two Chinese spherical 
Page 176 
 
elements from recent HTR-10 production. The lower irradiation capsule contains three German GLE 
4/2 spherical elements, the same as HFR-EU1bis. The irradiation of HFR-EU1 began in September 
2006 and continued into February 2010. The results were reported recently (Laurie, et al., 2010) 
(Tang, et al., 2010). 
 
8.3. MTR irradiation analysis 
The beginning-of-life 85mKr R/B values for the MTR irradiation tests that contained reference 
60 mm-diameter spherical elements (HFR-K3, K5, K6, FRJ2-K13 and FRJ2 K15) ranged from 2 × 10–10 
to 4 × 10–9 (Table 47). These R/B values are extremely low and characteristic of as-manufactured fuel 
specimens with no defective fuel particles and very low levels of uranium contamination in the fuel 
element matrix. The end-of-life 85mKr R/B values for these same irradiation test capsules were also 
very low, ranging from 3 × 10 -9 to 3 × 10–7 (Table 47). These three MTR irradiation tests with 
reference spherical fuel elements contained an inventory of 159 880 LEU UO2 TRISO-coated particles. 
For all of the MTR tests on Phase 1 LEU UO2, including those tests with non-reference-sized fuel 
elements (SL-P1, HFR-P4, and FRJ2-P27), a total of 240 452 TRISO-coated particles were irradiated. 
By comparing the measured end-of-life 85mKr R/B values with the prediction of a failed TRISO-
coated fuel particle, the fraction of failed particles responsible for the release can be determined by: 
 
 
 
fii
EOLii
B/R
B/R
          (103) 
 
where: 
  = fraction of failed particles; 
 
EOLii
BR  = measured EOL R/B ratio for isotope i; 
 
fii
BR  = predicted R/B ratio for isotope i in exposed fuel. 
The fractional release from a failed LEU UO2 TRISO particle can be predicted from the equivalent 
sphere  model (Boothe, 1957) (Nabielek, et al., 1974) (Krohn, 1982). Thus, the number of failed 
particles present is just the product of the failure fraction and the particle population that the release 
measurement represents. 
The 85mKr was determined at EOL fuel-kernel temperatures obtained from thermocouple 
measurements and thermodynamic calculations at the respective burnup and fluence levels. 
Knowledge of the initial thorium and uranium contamination values and the number of initially 
defective particles was considered in the evaluation of the derived failure fraction. 
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Table 48: LEU UO2 TRISO-coated particle fuel performance in accelerated MTR irradiation tests based on 
EOL Kr R/B values and the temperature-dependent fractional release values for an exposed oxide fuel 
kernel 
Irradiation 
test 
element 
BOL EOL 
85mKr 
 
Equivalent 
failed 
particles 
85mKr 
 
Contribution 
due to 
contamination 
Equivalent 
in-reactor 
failed 
particles 
One-sided 
upper 95 % 
confidence 
limit of 
irradiation 
induced 
failure 
fraction 
SL-P1 with 19 572 particles in 12 mini spheres 
1 5.8 × 10–7 ~ 5 1.2 × 10–6 ~ 60 %* ~ 4 ≤ 4.7 × 10–4 
HFR-P4 with 39 144 particles in 24 mini spheres 
1 
3 
3.5 × 10–9 
3.6 × 10–9 
~ 0 8 × 10–8 
8 × 10–9 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 0 
~ 0 
 
≤ 7.7 × 10–5 
HFR-K3 with 65 600 particles in 4 spherical fuel elements 
1 
2,3 
4 
1 × 10–9 
9 × 10–10 
2 × 10–9 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 0 
2 × 10–7 
1 × 10–7 
3 × 10–7 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 0 
 
 
≤ 4.6 × 10–5 
FRJ2-K13 with 65 600 particles in 4 spherical fuel elements 
1,2 
3,4 
2 × 10–9 
8 × 10–10 
~ 0 
~ 0 
1.6 × 10–8 
7 × 10–9 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 0 
~ 0 
 
≤ 4.6 × 10–5 
FRJ2-K15 with 28 680 particles in 3 spherical fuel elements 
1 
2 
3 
2.0 × 10–10 
2.5 × 10–10 
2.0 × 10–10 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 0 
1.2 × 10–8 
5 × 10–9 
3 × 10–9 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 0 
 
 
≤ 1.0 × 10–4 
FRJ2-P27 with 21 856 in 9 annular compacts and 6 coupons 
1 
2 
3 
1.0 × 10–6 
8.6 × 10–7 
2.  × 10–8 
~ 1 
~ 0 
~ 0 
1.6 × 10–6 
1.0 × 10–5 
1.2 × 10–7 
~ 65 %* 
~ 10 %* 
~ 100 % 
~ 1 
~ 4 
~ 0 
 
 
≤ 4.8 × 10–4 
Total for entire Phase 1 with LEU UO2 population (240 452)  ~ 9 ≤ 6.5 × 10
–5 
Total for LEU UO2 population in 60 mm-diameter fuel spheres (159 880) ~ 0 ≤ 1.9 × 10
–5 
HFR-K5 with 58 400 particles in 4 spherical fuel elements 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4.8 × 10–10 
2.7 × 10–10 
‘ 
2.5 × 10–7 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 1 
1.7 × 10–7 
3.0 × 10–7 
‘ 
3.6 × 10–7 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 0** 
 
 
 
≤ 5.1 × 10–5 
HFR-K6 with 58 400 particles in 4 spherical fuel elements 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 × 10–10 
3 × 10–10 
‘ 
4.5 × 10–7 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 2 
2.0 × 10–7 
3.0 × 10–7 
‘ 
9.0 × 10–7 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 100 % 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 0 
~ 0** 
≤ 5.1 × 10–5 
Total for proof test LEU UO2 population (116 800) ~ 0 ≤ 2.6 × 10
–5 
* A portion of EOL noble gas release is due to the breeding of fissile material into the initial uranium 
and thorium contamination in fuel matrix and capsule graphite materials. 
** The initial evaluation predicted ~ 1 equivalent particle failure. However, the fission gas release 
analysis conducted on HFR-K5/K6 strongly suggests that the increase in noble gas release at EOL is 
likely due to the breeding of fissile materials into the initial uranium and thorium contamination 
in fuel element matrix and irradiation capsule graphite materials. 
R
B( )BOL
R
B( )EOL
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Employing this methodology, a total of nine in-reactor LEU UO2 TRISO particles were determined to 
have failed out of all the LEU UO2 TRISO particles irradiated (240 452) in the accelerated MTR tests of 
Phase 1 production material. All nine of these failed particles were from MTR irradiation tests SL-P1 
and FRJ2-P27 and contained in special, non-reference fuel elements (20 mm-diameter spheres, 
cylindrical compacts or coupons). No in-reactor failed particles were detected in the non-reference 
elements in HFR-P4. 
Based on the R/B data at EOL for the three MTR tests (HFR-K3, FRJ2-K13 and -K15) that contained 
only reference 60 mm-diameter fuel elements, no in-reactor particle failures were observed. These 
11 reference fuel elements contained a total of 159 880 LEU UO2 TRISO particles and, with zero 
failures, this represents a failure fraction of ≤ 1.9 × 10–5 at the upper 95 % confidence limit according 
to Equation 2. 
 
8.4. HTR Module proof test analysis 
A comparison of initial R/B values monitored in HFR-K5 and HFR-K6 shows a significant difference for 
fuel elements 1, 2 and 3 compared to element 4 in both tests (Table 48 and Figure 102). The BOL 
85mKr R/B values in the top capsules are < 5 × 10–10 for both tests, compared to 2.5 × 10–7 and 
4 × 10–7 in HFR-K5/4 and K6/4, respectively. These differences of four orders of magnitude in R/B 
values are a result of as-fabricated defective fuel particles present in element 4 for each irradiation 
capsule. Other releases of fission gases are from contamination in the A3 sphere matrix and in the 
graphite cups that surround the spheres. 
 
Figure 102: Measured 85mKr release rates during the irradiation of tests HFR-K5 and HFR-K6 
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In both HFR-K5 and K6 the upper capsules 1, 2 and 3 with very low BOL R/B values are representative 
of elements with no defective fuel particles and very low levels of uranium and thorium 
contamination in the fuel matrix. The fuel element HFR-K5/4 with a 85mKr R/B value of 2.5 × 10–7 at 
the start is representative of one equivalent defective fuel particle from manufacture. In HFR-K6/4 
with a BOL 85mKr R/B value of 4.5 × 10–7 there are approximately two equivalent defective particles. 
This is within the limits of defective particles from manufacture (six elements with zero defects plus 
one element with one defect plus one element with two defects, i.e. three defects in 116 800 
particles represent a 2.6 × 10–5 defect fraction and this is within acceptable limits). 
The effect heavy-metal contamination in fuel-sphere matrix material has on fission gas release rates 
was also investigated (Röllig, 1977) (Röllig, 1993) (Merwe, 2004) (Merwe, 2004b) (Merwe, et al., 
2007) to explain the higher-than-expected EOL R/B data observed in the proof tests. Natural uranium 
(~ 99.28 wt % 238U + 0.72 wt % 235U) and thorium (232Th) are present as natural contamination. The 
fertile isotopes (232Th and 238U) capture neutrons and breed fissile materials such as 233U, 239Pu and 
241Pu. This phenomenon is of importance in the accelerated irradiation environments of an MTR 
where flux levels in the epithermal region are greatly accelerated compared to real-time HTGR 
environments (~ 2 to 5 times higher). 
The analysis demonstrated that, for the HFR-K6 experiment, fuel elements increased their equivalent 
initial fissile contamination fraction of 7.2 × 10–8 by factors of 15 to 20 by the end of the 634 effective 
full-power days of irradiation. This increase is attributed to the production of 233U, 239Pu and 241Pu 
fissile materials in the fuel matrix and in the graphite crucibles that surround each fuel element and 
hold them in place during irradiation. Similar results were obtained for the elements in HFR-K5. The 
88Kr release predicted for fuel elements 2 and 3 in HFR-K6 is compared to the online 88Kr R/B 
measurements in Figure 9 with close agreement. Similar results were also established for the short-
lived xenon gas isotopes (Merwe, 2004) (Merwe, 2004b) (Merwe, et al., 2007). 
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Figure 103: Detailed comparison of measured and calculated 
88
Kr release rates for fuel elements HFR-
K6/2 and 3 throughout the 634 full-power days of irradiation. Also shown are the measured temperatures 
at the spheres’ surface. Release source terms are from contamination 
For the fuel elements HFR-K5/4 and HFR-K6/4, which contained as-manufactured defective fuel 
particles, the amount of free uranium not contained within a SiC barrier is much larger at the start of 
irradiation. The free 235U due to one defective fuel particle at BOL is ~ 1 000 times that due to matrix 
contamination. 
Zero in-reactor particle failures were observed in HTR Module proof tests HFR-K6 and HFR-K6 out of 
a total irradiation population of 116 800 LEU UO2 TRISO-coated particles. This represents a failure 
fraction of ≤ 2.6 × 10–5 at the upper 95 % confidence limit as shown in Table 48. 
 
8.5. AVR real-time irradiation testing 
The 46 MW(th) AVR in Jülich, Germany operated from 1967 through 1988 and generated 
1.7 × 109 kWh of electric power. During its operation the AVR provided invaluable information on 
spherical fuel element development, fuel particle development with many particle variants (kernel 
material, enrichments, coating designs) and HTGR fuel cycles (Sauer, 1990). Nearly 290 000 spherical 
fuel elements of five different types, containing more than 6 × 109 coated fuel particles, were 
inserted into its core over its operating lifetime from 1967 to 1988, Figure 104. Spheres with high-
quality TRISO particles of type GO-2, GLE-3 and GLE-4 came late to the AVR with around 50 % at the 
end. 
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Figure 104: Distribution of spherical fuel element types in the AVR core as a function of operating history 
(Verfondern, 2007) 
 
For a 7-year period from 1982 to 1988, these fuel element types were inserted into the AVR and 
experienced real-time HTGR operating conditions. At periodic intervals over this period, a number of 
irradiated elements would be randomly drawn from the core for post-irradiation evaluation and 
accident condition testing. In 7 years of irradiation, a total of 240 GLE-3 and GLE-4 elements were 
withdrawn and evaluated at the Jülich Research Centre. Peak burnups of the withdrawn elements 
were 9.8 % FIMA for the GLE-3 elements and 13 % FIMA for the GLE-4 elements. Peak accumulated 
fast fluences were ~ 2.9 × 1025 m-2, E > 16 fJ for the GLE-3 elements and ~ 2.3 × 1025 m-2, E > 16 fJ, for 
the GLE-4 elements. Post-irradiation evaluations include fission product inventory measurements 
(burnup), out-of-reactor gas release measurements and accident simulation testing. 
Assessing the operating temperatures experienced by the fuel elements as they traverse, on multiple 
passes, through the AVR pebble-bed core during their irradiation lifetime has been a difficult 
situation. Predictions based on model calculations were always available, but no experimental 
measurements were made until the mid 1980s. In 1986 a ‘melt-wire experiment’ was conducted 
during the period relevant to when the GLE-3 and GLE-4 fuel elements were present in the AVR. This 
experiment inserted into the AVR specially designed graphite matrix spheres which incorporated a 
set of 20 quartz capsules, each containing a single melt-wire (Figure 99). The melt-wires were 
fabricated from specific alloy compositions that would melt if specific temperatures were exceeded. 
A total of 190 of these monitoring spheres were added into the AVR core through standard fuel 
loading procedures: 102 to the centre and 22 to each of the four outer feed lines. 
Upon discharge, 140 of the monitoring spheres were X-rayed to assess the momentary maximum 
peak temperatures experienced during their passage through the AVR: 15 % of the monitoring 
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spheres experienced operating temperatures ≥ 1 244 °C, at which all the melt-wires in the quartz 
capsules had melted (Derz, et al., 1990) (Gottaut H., 1990) (Stoker, et al., 2010). 
Based on the melt-wire measurement results, the underlying temperature distribution was extracted 
by constructing a quantile–quantile (Devore 2004) plot based upon the probability properties of the 
histogram distribution. Two Gaussian distributions with peak temperatures of 1 100 ± 66 °C and 
1 220 ± 100 °C were found that define the variation of momentary maximum fuel element surface 
temperatures in the AVR between the inner core and outer core locations. Peak central 
temperatures were calculated to be 37.3 °C and 75.6 °C higher for the inner and outer locations, 
respectively. Both are significantly higher than the coolant gas exit temperature because of 
substantial core bypass flows. The resulting temperature distributions are shown in Figure 105. 
 
 
 
Figure 105: Distribution of AVR inner core maximum fuel element surface temperatures and outer core 
maximum fuel element surface temperatures as obtained from the 1986 melt-wire tests 
 
To assess the EOL performance of GLE-3 and GLE-4 AVR fuel elements, a methodology was 
developed based upon fission gas release measurement during the temperature increase in the early 
phase of accident condition testing (Schenk, 1977) (Schenk, 1978) (Schenk, 1983) (Schenk, et al., 
1988) (Schenk, et al., 1990) (Schenk, et al., 1993). The heat-up process begins at room temperature, 
progresses over a series of heating ramps to specific temperatures (300 °C, 1 050 °C and 1 250 °C) 
and hold periods until the desired accident simulation temperature is reached. Two of these hold 
points, 1 050 °C and 1 250 °C, are designed to equilibrate the irradiated fuel particles in the fuel 
element at or near their prior irradiation temperature. This allows the fuel to develop a stable 
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internal environment before being heating to an elevated temperature not previously experienced 
by the fuel particles. The 1 050 °C hold point was considered the mean working temperature for fuel 
specimens from accelerated MTR irradiation tests, and the 1 250 °C hold point was considered the 
typical working temperature for AVR fuel elements. 
During heating, the test facility is purged with a sweep gas and continuously monitored for release of 
the long-lived 85Kr noble fission gas, half-life 10.76 years. Detection of any significant activity in the 
sweep gas is an indicator of failed or defective fuel particles present in the irradiated fuel element 
(Figure 106). 
 
 
Figure 106: Release of 
85
Kr measured during accident simulation testing of GLE-3 spherical fuel elements 
irradiated to various burnups in the AVR. The first part of the two-digit number refers to the consecutive 
AVR sampling event, and the second is a sequential s 
Table 49 is a detailed list of 29 GLE-3 fuel elements that have been subjected to accident simulation 
testing. Of these, 24 were used to analyse AVR EOL irradiation performance. Five were excluded 
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because of the lack of detailed 85Kr release data at testing temperatures near those expected in the 
AVR. 
Table 49: 
85
Kr fractional release measurements made during the 1 250 °C+ hold temperature on AVR type 
GLE-3 fuel elements prior to accident simulation tests at higher temperatures 
Fuel element 
(AVR sample 
No/specimen No) 
Burnup 
(% FIMA) 
Measurement 
temperature (°C) 
of 85Kr release  
85Kr release 
fraction 
Peak temperature 
(°C) of accident 
simulation test 
Isothermal accident simulation tests 
AVR 70/33 1.6 1 250 3.8 × 10–6 1 800 
AVR 73/21 (ITU) 2.5 NI NDR < 1 600 °C 1 800 
AVR 71/22 3.5 1 250 4.5 × 10–8 1 600 
AVR 74/18 (ITU) 4.8 1 600 5.9 × 10–6 1 600 
AVR 74/10 5.5 1 250 < 8.0 × 10–7 1 800 
AVR 74/11 6.2 1 250 1.3 × 10–7 1 700 
AVR 76/18 7.1 1 250 1.6 × 10–8 1 800 
AVR 88/41 7.6 1 250 1.3 × 10–8 1 800 
AVR 88/33 8.5 1 250 < 4.2 × 10–8 1 600/1 800 
AVR 82/20 8.6 1 250 5.5 × 10–8 1 600 
AVR 88/15 8.7 1 250 6.3 × 10–8 1 600/1 800 
AVR 82/9 8.9 1 250 1.3 × 10–8 1 600 
HTR Module ‘depressurised loss of forced cooling’ (DLOFC) event profile 
AVR 91/31 9.0 1 500 1.0 × 10–8 1 700 
AVR 89/13 9.1 1 490 6.7 × 10–8 1 620 
AVR 85/18 9.2 1 495 2.6 × 10–8 1 620 
AVR 90/5 9.2 1 495 5.3 × 10–8 1 620 
AVR 90/2 9.3 1 495 9.2 × 10–8 1 620 
AVR 90/20 9.8 1 500 5.7 × 10–8 1 620 
Ramp accident simulation tests 
AVR 71/7 1.8 1 250 3.1 × 10–7 2 000 
AVR 70/19 2.2 1 200 1.9 × 10–6 2 400 
AVR 74/8 2.9 1 250 1.4 × 10–7 2 500 
AVR 73/12 3.1 1 250 < 1.4 × 10–7 1 900 
AVR 74/6 5.6 1 250 1.3 × 10–7 2 100 
AVR 76/28 6.9 1 250/NI NDR < 1 750 °C 2 100 
AVR 76/19 7.3 1 250 2.3 × 10–7 1 900 
AVR 76/27 7.4 1 250 4.6 × 10–7 2 100 
AVR 80/16 7.8 1 250/NI NDR < 1 900 °C 2 000 
AVR 80/14 8.4 1 250/NI NDR < 1 900 °C 2 500 
AVR 80/22 9.1 1 250/NI NDR < 1 600 °C 1 900 
Accident simulation tests on MTR and HTR Module proof test elements 
HFR-K3/1 7.7 1 250 < 5.6 × 10–8 1 600 
HFR-K3/3 10.2 1 250 1.5 × 10–7 1 800 
FRJ2-K13/2 8.1 1 250 5.3 × 10–7 1 600 
FRJ2-K13/4 7.8 1 250 4.5 × 10–8 1 600/1 800 
HFR-K6/2 (ITU) 9.7 1 050 1.0 × 10–8 1 600 
HFR-K6/3 (ITU) 9.8 1 050 3.2 × 10–6 1 600 
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Figure 107 presents the fractional release data for these elements whereby the heat-up 1 250 °C hold 
temperature reproduces EOL conditions. The release data represent AVR EOL irradiation conditions 
and are characteristic of fuel element performance. Eleven of the GLE-3 elements were ultimately 
subjected to isothermal tests from 1 600 °C or 1 800 °C, six elements were subjected to a simulated 
HTR Module design basis depressurised event temperature profile up to 1 620 °C or 1 700 °C and 
seven elements were subjected to ramp tests ranging from 1900 °C to 2 500 °C. 
Included in the figure, for comparison purposes, are the 85Kr fractional release measurements made 
on six MTR and HTR Module proof test elements, also subjected to design basis accident simulation 
testing. The fractional release data were similarly obtained during the 1 250 °C hold temperature 
during the heat-up phase of test simulation. 
 
 
Figure 107: Post-irradiation fission gas release fractions at 1 250 °C measured during heat-up prior to 
accident simulation tests with GLE-3 fuel elements containing LEU UO2 TRISO particles of various 
burnups. The horizontal lines show predicted krypton release fractions 
The 85Kr fractional release data in Figure 105 and Figure 106 are indicative of the EOL fuel 
performance for the GLE-3 elements irradiated in the AVR. For the 11 GLE-3 elements subjected to 
isothermal accident tests the release data were measured at the 1 250 °C hold period during the 
ramp-up to test temperature and are directly representative of EOL AVR performance. For those 
elements subjected to a constant heating ramp to temperatures > 1 900 °C, only release data in the 
temperature range of 1 250 °C to ~ 1 400 °C were used to estimate EOL AVR performance. And 
finally, for those elements subjected to a design basis HTR Module depressurisation event 
temperature profile, only the release data along the temperature curve where the furnace 
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temperature was between 1 490 °C and 1 500 °C were used as representative of EOL AVR 
performance. 
Based on the 85Kr fractional release data from 24 accident simulation tests, the EOL performance of 
the GLE-3 fuel elements at the time of discharge from the AVR are excellent. Most of the release 
fractions, with a few exceptions, are < 10–6 in the temperature range of 1 250 °C to well beyond 
1 400 °C. The 85Kr release fraction of a single LEU UO2 TRISO particle at these temperatures is 
~ 6 × 10–5 and the release fractions measured from the 24 separate GLE-3 elements are lower by one 
to three orders of magnitude. The AVR GLE-3 element fractional release data also compare well with 
85Kr release data obtained from accident simulation testing of MTR irradiation and HTR Module proof 
test specimens. 
Collectively, the 24 GLE-3 elements represent a population of 393 600 LEU UO2 TRISO-coated 
particles and — with no in-reactor failures — their EOL performance is representative of a failure 
fraction of ≤ 7.6 × 10–6 at the one-sided upper 95 % confidence limit. It should be noted that zero in-
AVR particle fuel failure has not always been the case. The test and evaluation method described 
here had previously identified AVR GLE-1 fuel with near 50 % particle failure in the 1970s (Wimmers, 
1977). 
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9. Appendix B 
9.1. Experiments regarding self-acting decay heat removal in modular 
high-temperature gas-cooled reactors 
9.1.1. Overview 
After the total loss of active cooling in a modular HTR the decay heat is transported solely through 
processes of conduction, radiation and free convection from the core to the environment. This chain 
of heat transport includes several steps in the reactor and depends in a complex way on various 
parameters of the reactor design. Figure 108 shows a simplified overview of the relevant structures 
and the chain, as well as of parameters, which influence the heat transport and the temperature 
profile. 
 
Figure 108: Stationary radial temperature profile in case of self-acting decay heat removal in a modular 
HTR (Tmax in the hottest part of the core) 
The maximum temperature in the hottest fuel elements is given by a dependency of the type: 
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑑 + ?̅̇?𝑐
′′′
∗ 𝛽 ∗ 𝑓𝑛(𝑡
∗) ∗ 𝛷(𝑟𝑖, 𝜆𝑖, 𝜀𝑖, 𝛼𝑖)     (104) 
where: 
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 = maximum temperature in the hottest fuel elements; 
𝛷 = function describing the heat transport through the whole reactor system; 
𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑑 =  temperature of the environment (temperature in surface cooling system or in the air outside 
the inner concrete cell); 
?̅̇?𝑐
′′′
 = average power density in the core; 
𝛽 = peak factor of power density; 
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𝑓𝑛(𝑡
∗) = factor of decay heat function (in a modular JTR of around 200 MWth) around 3.0E-03 after 
30 hours. 
The function Φ contains a description of the total chain of heat transport which, oriented on the 
designation in Figure 109, denotes as follows: 
𝛷 =
𝑟1
2
4𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓
+
𝑟1
2
∗
(𝑟2−𝑟1)
𝜆𝐺
+
𝑟1
2
∗
𝑟1
𝑟3
∗
(𝑟2−𝑟1)
𝜆𝑆
+
𝑟1
2
∗
𝑟1
𝑟4
∗
1
𝛼𝑆̅̅ ̅̅
+
𝑟1
2
∗
𝑟1
𝑟5
∗
(𝑟5−𝑟4)
𝜆𝑆
+
𝑟1
2
∗
𝑟1
𝑟5
∗
1
𝛼𝛼̅̅ ̅̅
 (105) 
The relevant parameters of the heat transport chain need experimental validation. The main data 
influencing the temperature proﬁle is briefly introduced in Figure 109. 
 
Figure 109: Parameters which influence the chain of the self-acting transport of decay heat in a modular 
HTGR 
The following experiments were carried out to validate data relevant to self-acting decay heat 
removal in modular HTGRs. 
 Measurements of 𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑇) in the pebble bed after total loss of active cooling: this was done 
in a lot of relatively small laboratory tests and in a large integral test (SANA). 
 Transport of the heat through the thick-walled graphite reflector: 𝜆𝐺 depends on 
temperatures and irradiation doses. Many results are available from the irradiation 
programmes. Different qualities of graphite have been qualified regarding these 
characteristic loads. 
 The natural convection, which occurs in a reactor under full helium pressure after loss of 
forced convection, was measured in the LUNA experiment. The dependence of convection in 
internal gaps and in the core is known for different gases and conditions of temperature and 
pressure. 
 In the gaps between the graphite reflector and the thermal shield, and between the thermal 
shield and the inner side of the reactor pressure vessel, there is heat transport by 
conduction, radiation and free convection. Measurements in the large PASCO (passive 
cooling of containment) test facility and measurements of the emission coefficients ε for 
various materials are available. 
 The heat release from the surface of the reactor pressure vessel mainly by radiation and free 
convection was measured in various large facilities. Results from the INWA facility, for 
instance, helped gain broad experience on the release of decay heat from the surface of 
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reactor pressure vessels and on the function of the concrete (cast-iron) cell surrounding the 
reactor as an outer heat sink. 
 Many results for the release of heat from the surface of the reactor pressure vessel and the 
function of the outer surface cooler were gained from experiments conducted by the 
Japanese Atomic Energy Agency (JAERI). 
 Measurements on Castor and Mosaik vessels for spent fuel elements enlarged the 
knowledge of decay heat removal by natural convection and radiation from the surface of 
the reactor pressure vessel. 
 In case of storage of decay heat in the concrete of the inner cell, knowledge of material 
behaviour and the behaviour of large concrete blocks with load by heat flux is necessary. 
Large experiments with different types of concrete were carried out. 
 In very extreme cases the liner or surface heat exchanger cooling could fail too; the 
reflooding was tested in connection with the experiments on concrete at very high 
temperatures. 
 Heat transport by free convection inside the reactor building and transport to the outside 
(environment) were tested in the PACOS facility. 
 The total chain of heat transport was tested in the AVR reactor in an integral experiment. 
This was carried out with a reactor status with pressure and without pressure. Relevant 
temperatures in the reactor structures were measured. 
Figure 110 gives an overview of the experiments and their purposes, as discussed before. It is clear 
that the main steps of the chain of heat transport have been tested corresponding to the 
experimental conditions and the specific situation in a modular HTGR. All these experiments provide 
proof for the validity of the concept of self-acting decay heat removal. 
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Figure 110: Overview of experiments to evaluate the concept of self-acting decay heat removal of a 
modular HTR 
The experiments delivered enough data to calculate the temperature distribution and to deﬁne the 
temperatures in the fuel elements. Moreover, histograms to describe the time- and space-dependent 
distribution of temperature loads on all fuel elements can be derived with high accuracy. In addition 
to the abovementioned experimental evaluations, a value is added to take statistical effects on the 
maximum fuel temperature into account: 
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙) + ∆𝑇        (106) 
The value of ∆𝑇 in most analyses until now has been approximately 100 °C; some variations of this 
value are possible corresponding to the requirements of different licensing bodies. 
A maximum temperature 100 °C higher than the nominal value causes higher fission-product releases 
from the fuel. These differences are in the order of approximately 50 % for the relevant isotopes 
137Cs and 90Sr. If effective filtering of the helium, leaving the primary system in case of an accident, is 
possible, this does not change the release from the plant. This is fulfilled in the case of a non-bursting 
primary enclosure. 
It can also be fulfilled by burst protection or by a totally prestressed primary enclosure. The materials 
for this concept are concrete, cast iron or cast steel. 
 
9.2. Heat transport in the reactor core 𝝀𝒆𝒇𝒇(𝑻) 
9.2.1. Laboratory experiments 
The temperature dependence of the heat conductivity in the pebble bed is important to calculate the 
temperature distributions in the core in case of the accidents discussed here. The temperature 
difference between the centre and the surface of the core is estimated by the following equation: 
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑇𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓~
?̇?𝑐
′′′∗𝛽∗𝑓𝑛(𝑡
∗)∗𝑟1
2
4∗𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
        (107) 
𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is a suited average value over the radial temperature proﬁle here. 𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  values at lower 
temperatures are important for the structure of the histogram of the fuel temperature too. This 
aspect is important when estimating fission-product releases during the entire time of an accident. 
In the course of the development of HTGRs 𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  has been measured several times (Barthels, et al., 
1984) (Breitbach, 1978) (Barthels, et al., 1984) (Robold, 1982) in laboratory experiments. A 
characteristic example is shown in Figure 111. A heating and a cooling system generates a 
temperature field, which allows the definition and measurements of heat conductivities in small 
regions with temperature distributions. 
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Figure 111: Measurement of (𝝀𝒆𝒇𝒇(𝑻)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) in a laboratory experiment with 6 cm graphite balls: (a) arrangement 
for measurement of (𝝀𝒆𝒇𝒇(𝑻)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  in a pebble bed; (b) result for the effective heat conductivity in a pebble bed 
(𝝀𝒆𝒇𝒇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑻)) 
The results of this type of experiment are summarised in Figure 111. There are some deviations, 
which are explained by the specific conditions of different experiments. Furthermore, theoretical 
models delivered results which ﬁt into the field of available experiments relatively well. An analytical 
expression of the temperature dependence, which describes the results relatively well, is denoted as: 
𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑇) = 2.549 ∗ 10
−4 ∗ 𝑇1.545 + 1.5     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑇 ≤ 1 300 °𝐶   (108) 
𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑇) = 2 ∗ 10
−3 ∗ (𝑇 − 135)1.29 + 0.003  𝑓𝑜𝑟 1 3000𝐶 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 2500 °𝐶  (109) 
Here the following dimensions are valid: 𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓 [𝑊 𝑚𝐾⁄ ] and 𝑇[°𝐶]. The uncertainty of these 
equations is estimated to be as high as ± 10 %, and there are indications that the actual value is even 
higher (Fricke, 1987). 
The value of 𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓 is also influenced by natural convection processes in the pebble bed. The inﬂuence 
of irradiation is also included in the equation given above. Figure 112 shows these inﬂuences in 
comparison to irradiated fuel element graphite. 
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Figure 112: Dependencies of 𝝀𝒆𝒇𝒇 from temperature and irradiation status 
 
9.2.2. SANA experiment 
Since the heat conductivity and the temperatures in the core are so important for the concept of the 
self-acting decay heat removal, a large-scale experiment was carried out in the SANA-test facility 
(SANA = Selbsttätige Abfuhr der Nachwärme (self-acting removal of decay heat)). 9 500 graphite balls 
6 cm in diameter were heated using electrical heating to simulate the decay heat in a reactor core. 
Inserted ceramic heating elements in the pebble bed (see channels Figure 113 (left) made it possible 
to establish radial and axial temperature profiles (Lange, 1995) (Niessen, et al., 1994) (Niessen, et al., 
1995) (Niessen, 2001) (Niessen, et al., 2001) (Stöcker, 1997). 
 
Figure 113: SANA-test facility: (a) cross section; (b) picture 
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Table 50: Data on the experiment 
Parameter Dimens
ion 
Value Remark 
Maximum electric power KW 50 Different heating elements 
Height of furnace m 1  
Diameter of furnace m 1.5  
Diameter of graphite balls mm 60 Smaller balls have been tested too 
Number of graphite balls  9 500  
Maximum bed temperature °C 1 600 Normally max. 1 200 °C 
Gas filling  Helium Nitrogen too 
 
The boundaries were cooled. More than 100 thermocouples in the arrangement of pebbles made it 
possible to measure the time- and space-dependent temperature proﬁles. It was possible to reach 
maximum temperatures of 1 200 °C inside the pebble bed. 
The main tasks of the experiments were: 
 measurement of time-dependent three-dimensional temperature distribution; 
 determination of effective heat conductivity as a function of the temperatures in the core 
structures; 
 evaluation of permitted heat flux densities at different boundary conditions; 
 collecting data for programme validations (e.g. Thermix/Direkt, TINTE); 
 statements concerning natural convection phenomena. 
Many experiments were carried out varying the temperature, heating power and the filling gas in the 
facility. Helium, nitrogen and mixtures of both gases were used. 
Figure 114 shows characteristic stationary temperature proﬁles in a specific height of the 
arrangement. On the basis of this type of temperature proﬁle 𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑇) was derived from the 
experiments. 
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Figure 114: Characteristic results of measurements of stationary temperature proﬁles in the SANA facility 
(heating power 50 KW; N2 as filling gas; no radial insulation) 
The temperatures close to the heating elements partly reached 1 400 °C in this experiment. From the 
measured proﬁles it was possible to get the dependence 𝜆𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑇) to temperatures of approximately 
1 000 °C. 
The comparison between measurements and calculations displays close agreement (Figure 115) 
Radial temperature profile 
Axial temperature profile 
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Figure 115: Comparison between measured and calculated values in the SANA facility (power 30 KW; 
helium as filling gas; without insulation) 
An important aspect was the influence of natural convection. There was a remarkable difference 
between helium and nitrogen. In case of nitrogen or air in the pebble bed the influence of the filling 
gas has to be taken into account, as Figure 116 may indicate. 
 
Figure 116: Results of free-convection measurements: transport of heat by natural convection; difference 
between nitrogen and helium 
Radial temperature profile 
Axial temperature profile 
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The total effective heat conductivities in the pebble bed with gas filling are shown in Figure 116. The 
figure shows the differences for helium and nitrogen. Helium delivers somewhat higher values 
compared to nitrogen. The resulting measurements are systematically higher compared to the values 
obtained in the theoretical analysis (Zehner/Schlünder theory). 
In summary it can be stated that in the experimental data that are available, the concept of heat 
transport inside the pebble bed is evaluated and the possibility of calculating the temperature 
distribution and maximum temperatures in accidents is given. Additionally, a similar large 
experiment for the self-acting transport of heat is carried out in the PBMW project. The first results 
are in accordance with the available data. 
 
9.2.3. LUNA experiments 
The LUNA (Loop zum Naturkonvektionsumlauf im Primärkreis des HTR = loop to test circulation by 
natural convection in the primary circuit of HTRs) experimental facility was built and operated with 
the following goals: 
 to gain experience in the ﬁeld of natural convection; 
 to get data for the validation of computer programs; 
 to get more information on special effects (inﬂuence of the position of the heat sink in the 
circuit conditions of change of flow through the hot pebble bed, influences of the type of 
media in the circuit). 
The experiment contained an electrical heated pebble bed and a heat exchanger, which could be 
arranged at different heights relative to the heat source. 
The heating furnace had a diameter of 0.7 m and a height of 1.23 m. It was ﬁlled with 100 000 
pebbles made of steel (diameter 19.5 mm). The porosity of the pebble bed was approximately 60.4 % 
corresponding to the conditions in the real core of a pebble-bed reactor. 
The heater could reach a power output of 200 KW. This power made it possible to reach 
temperatures of 300 °C at 40 bar. In the pebble bed 80 thermocouples allowed the radial and axial 
temperature proﬁle to be measured. In the different experiments with variations of the position of 
the heat sink and the type of gas (air, helium) the relevant temperatures and the mass flow in the 
circuit were measured. The data then enabled the application of computer programs and the 
necessary validation of these instruments. Figure 117 provides an overview of the LUNA facility. 
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Figure 117: Experimental facility LUNA: (a) overview; (b) view into the pebble bed 
Figure 118 shows results that could be obtained. 
(a) It could be shown that the mass flow in the cycle is larger in case of air compared to helium. 
(b) Measurements and calculations show close agreement. Cooling of the pebble bed by natural 
circulation was relatively fast, as indicated in Figure 118 (b) and (c). 
The position of the heat sink had a major inﬂuence on the height of the mass flow and on the 
direction of the flow (Figure 118 (d)). The position of the heat exchanger below the geodetic height 
of the heat source was a change of direction from the beginning of the cooling process. This is an 
important aspect for the design of modular HTRs. The relevant experiences from the LUNA 
experiments can be summarised as follows: 
 mass flow and direction of the flow depend on the medium and the positions of the heat 
source and the heat exchanger; 
 under specific conditions stagnation and change of flow direction are possible; 
 a deep arrangement of the heat sink in any case causes an upward flow through the pebble 
bed; 
 the results enabled the validation of existing programmes and the overestimation of 
measurements, and showed that the pre-calculations could be confirmed by the 
experiments. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
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(c) 
 
(d) 
 
Figure 118: Measurements and calculations — results of the LUNA facility: (a) mass ﬂow dependent on 
time; (b) temperature dependent on time (air at 36 bar); (c) temperature dependent on time (helium at 
37 bar); (d) mass flow in circuit in case of different positions of the heat sink 
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9.3. Heat transport through the shield of the core 
9.3.1. Heat transport of the graphite reflector including the influence of 
irradiation (𝝀𝑮(𝑻, 𝑫)) 
The decay heat conducted from the core will be transported through the graphite structures of the 
reflector surrounding the core (Delle, et al., 1983, 1984). 
In the graphite reflector a heat flux corresponding to the following relationship is necessary to 
remove the decay heat from the core: 
?́?(𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ≈ 𝑃𝑡𝑛 ∗ 𝑓𝐷(𝑡) ∗ 2𝜋 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ 𝐻       (110) 
D = outer diameter of the core; 
H = height of the core. 
In case of self-acting decay heat removal, ∆𝑇 is the temperature difference in the graphite, ∆𝑆 is the 
thickness of reﬂector and 𝜆𝐺 is the heat conductivity of the graphite, which is dependent on the 
temperature and the irradiation dose. For a conservative analysis one has to assume that the 
graphite has been irradiated over the whole time at full operational power (e.g. 30 years, Figure 
119). 
 
Figure 119: Aspects of heat transport in the side reflector of a modular HTR in case of self-acting decay 
heat removal 
The left side of Figure 119 shows the average heat flux depending on the radial position in the 
reflector; the right side shows the radial dependence of the fast heat flux in the graphite reflector. 
Corresponding to the explanation in Figure 119 a stepwise analysis of the different layers of the 
reflector and the relevant graphite data is required. Many irradiation experiments have delivered 
these values and are available in form of data libraries. Figure 120 shows data for a characteristic 
material with rising neutron inﬂuence while the heat conductivity is reduced at high temperature by 
a factor of 2. In many cases, the temperature distribution in the reactor together with the 
dependence on the changes by radiation, 30 to 50 years of operation have to be taken into account 
to evaluate the temperature differences in the graphite reflector as part of the heat transport chain 
(Haag, et al., 1990). Generally these irradiation effects are important for a relatively thin layer of the 
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thick-walled graphite reflector (approximately the first 1 m close to the core) and regions relevant to 
core structure. 
The dependence of the heat conductivity can be described by an equation of the following type 
(Delle, et al., 1990). 
𝜆(𝑇) = 𝛼0 +
𝛼1
𝑇2⁄ + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−1 250
𝑇
⁄ )      (111) 
An example of a suitable reflector graphite is ATR-2E. 
The irradiation causes a reduction in the values of heat conductivity as shown in Figure 120. The 
effect is relatively strong at low temperatures, while at high temperatures annealing effects play a 
role. 
 
Figure 120: Behaviour of irradiated graphite relevant for the description of ‘loss of active cooling’ 
accidents and action of self-acting decay heat removal: heat conductivity dependent on fast neutron dose 
and temperature (irradiation at 950 °C) 
For the decrease in the fast neutron flux in the radial direction the dose is given by the equation: 
𝐷(𝑟) = 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛴 ∗ 𝜏)        (112) 
𝛴 ≈ 0.011𝑐𝑚−1 can be applied for (hands-on) estimates. This results in a reduction in the fast 
neutron flux by a factor of more than 104 at a reﬂector thickness of 1 m. 
Applied to the case of self-acting decay heat removal in a modular reactor, characteristic data for the 
heat flux entering into the graphite reﬂector and the temperature difference across this component 
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can be obtained. With a decay power ?̇?𝐷 and core dimensions (radius R and average height H) the 
average and the maximum heat ﬂuxes are given by: 
?̇?′′̅̅̅̅ =
?̇?𝐷
(2𝜋 ∗ 𝑅 ∗ 𝐷)
⁄ ; ?̇?′′(𝑚𝑎𝑥) = ?̇?′′̅̅̅̅ ∗ 𝛽, 𝛽 ≈ 1.6    (113) 
This delivers a value of around 6 KW/m2 at a time of 1 day after a ‘loss of cooling’ accident at the 
boundary of the core as an average value and ~ 10KW/m2 as the maximum load. However, these 
values would decrease during an accident as the decay heat decreases. 
With a value of 100 W/(mK) for the heat conductivity of unirradiated graphite this results in an 
average temperature difference of 50 °C across the graphite reﬂector in the radial direction. 
Changes in the heat conductivity after many years of operation and irradiation would make this value 
increase in case of accidents. Again, the graphite zone near the core especially plays a major role 
regarding changes of heat conductivities. 
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Figure 121: Aspects of heat transport through the graphite reflector in case of ‘loss of cooling’ accidents: 
(a) radial dependence of neutron flux (e.g. AVR; 1.85 m under core upper surface); (b) axial dependence of 
neutron flux (e.g. AVR; on core axis); (c) positions of the reflector 
 
Table 51: Characteristic of fast neutron dose at different positions of reﬂector (e.g. HTR Module; after 30 
years of operation) 
Point Temperature (℃) Fast flux 𝑛 𝑐𝑚2⁄  Fast dose 𝑛 𝑐𝑚2⁄  
P1 250 7 × 1013 2 × 1022 
P2 500 5 × 1013 1.5 × 1022 
P3 700 1 × 1013 3 × 1021 
P4 250 6 × 1013 2 × 1022 
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P5 300 1 × 1010 1 × 1019 
 
 
9.4. Heat transport in gaps between reactor internal structures by 
radiation and free convection — general experiences from laboratory 
experiments 
 
9.4.1. General experiences from laboratory experiments 
Natural convection of air, helium or mixtures of helium and air play a major role during all processes 
of decay heat removal in modular HTGRs. 
In the chain of heat transport from the core to the environment there are several steps which 
contain heat transfer mainly by radiation and free convection. This is the case at the following 
positions (Figure 122): 
 in the gap between the graphite reﬂector and the thermal shield; 
 in the gap between the thermal shield and the wall of the reactor pressure vessel; 
 in the space between the reactor pressure vessel and the cooling panels of the surface 
cooler; 
 on the outside of the inner concrete cell; 
 on the inside of the reactor containment building; 
 on the outside of the reactor containment building. 
 
 
 
Figure 122: Positions where natural convection plays a role 
The numbers used in Figure 122 denotes the different components and structures. 
(1) Core. 
(2) Graphite reflector. 
(3) Thermal shield. 
(4) Gap with structures between thermal shield and reactor pressure vessel. 
(5) Reactor pressure vessel. 
     
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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(6) Cavity between reactor pressure vessel and surface cooler. 
(7) Inner concrete cell with surface cooler. 
(8) Room of the containment building with inner structures. 
(9) Concrete wall of the containment building. 
(10) Environment. 
Corresponding to these heat-transfer requirements, different heat transport mechanisms are 
relevant here (Figure 123): 
 heat transport between two surfaces with different temperatures (and different emissivities) 
of surfaces; 
 heat release from a hot surface to a surrounding medium, such as release to the atmosphere 
in the building; 
 heat penetrating into structures from a hotter atmosphere. 
Normally the heat flux in these gaps can be described by equations of the following type (Figure 
123(a)). 
?̇? = (𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 + 𝛼𝑟𝑎𝑑) ∗ (𝑇1 − 𝑇2) 
The temperature difference (𝑇1 − 𝑇2) is responsible for heat transfer by radiation and by internal 
free convection of helium or helium/air mixtures in case of accidents. 
 
 
Figure 123: Heat transport mainly by free convection and radiation — three important situations in the 
chain of heat transport of a modular HTR: (a) between two surfaces in the reactor internals; (b) from hot 
surfaces to the atmosphere of the reactor containment building to concrete structures 
For the heat transfer by radiation, the temperatures of the radiant and of the absorbing surface and 
the coefficients of environment are relevant (Schürenkremer, et al., 1983) (Schürenkremer, 1984). 
𝛼𝑟𝑎𝑑 ≈ 𝜑(𝑇1, 𝜀1) ≈ 𝐶12 ∗
𝐶𝑠(𝜀1∗𝑇1
4−𝜀2∗𝑇2
4)
= 𝐶12 ∗ 𝐶𝑆 ∗ 𝛽𝑇(𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝜀1)   (114) 
The factor 𝐶12 covers the emissivity and is, for parallel flat surfaces, deﬁned as: 
   
 
  
 
Graphite 
reflector 
Thermal 
shield 
Surface of reactor 
pressure vessel 
Free 
convection 
and radiation 
Conduction 
Free 
convection 
radiation 
∝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣+∝𝑟𝑎𝑑 ∝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣+∝𝑟𝑎𝑑 
Conduction 
Free 
convection 
 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
𝑇1 
𝑇2 𝛿1 
𝛿2 
𝛿𝑆 
𝑇𝑆 
Concrete 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣. 
𝑇𝑆* 
?̇?1´´ 
Page 207 
 
𝐶12 = 𝐶𝑠 (
1
𝜀1
+
1
𝜀2
− 1)⁄         (115) 
in which 𝐶𝑠 is the radiation constant with the value 5.77 W/(m
2K4). The emissivity of graphite has a 
value of 0.9. For steel one can apply 0.6 to 0.85 for ε depending on the status of surfaces. 
The function 𝛽𝑇 is shown in Figure 124 depending on the temperatures of the surfaces: 
𝛽𝑇(𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝜀1) = (𝜀1 ∗ 𝑇1
4 − 𝜀2 ∗ 𝑇2
4) (𝑇1 − 𝑇2)⁄      (116) 
A temperature difference of 100 °C allows in the region of 460 °C a 𝛽𝑇 value of 2, and therefore a 
heat flux of around 5 KW/m2 in the core structures (graphite/thermal shield). 
For small differences between 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 at elevated temperatures the following approximation can 
be used: 
𝛽𝑇 ≈
4
100
∗ (
𝑇𝑎𝑣
100
)
4
, 𝑇𝑎𝑣 = 0.5 ∗ (𝑇1 + 𝑇2)      (117) 
 
Figure 124: Dependence of the function 𝜷𝑻(𝑻𝟏, 𝑻𝟐, 𝜺𝟏) (𝜺𝟏, 𝜺𝟐 = 𝟏) 
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For the heat transfer by free convection many empirical equations are available. 
The convective heat transfer in the gaps depends mainly on the temperature proﬁle, on the 
characteristic dimension 𝑠𝑖 and on the types of materials used. Additionally, the inﬂuence of pressure 
has to be considered: 
𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 = 𝑓(𝑇1, 𝐻, 𝑠1, 𝑝)    
Some common equations for the convective heat transfer are summarised in Table 52 (Hell, 1979) 
(Hottel, et al., 1964). 
 
Table 52: Some relations for the natural convection of air 
For vertical walls 𝛼 = 𝑐1 ∗ √(𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣) ∗ 𝐻
4
, 𝑐1 = 1.39 𝑎𝑡 0
0𝐶 𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙 1.14 𝑎𝑡 3000𝐶 
For horizontal plates 𝛼 = 𝜆 4⁄ ∗ 137 ∗ √𝐺𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑟
3
, 𝐺𝑟 = 𝑔 ∗ 𝑙3 ∗ 𝛽 ∗ ∆𝑇 𝑟2, 𝑃𝑟 = 𝑟 𝑎⁄⁄  
For horizontal pipes 
𝛼 = 𝜆 𝑑𝑎⁄ ∗ 0.372 ∗ √𝑔 ∗ 𝑑𝑎
3 ∗ (𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣) 𝑟2⁄ ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣  
9.4.2. PASCO experiment to measure 𝜶𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒗(𝑻) and 𝜶𝒓𝒂𝒅(𝑻) 
For some new reactor concepts specific cooling systems to remove the decay heat from the 
containment have been proposed. For example, in the PWR AP1000 the heat will be released 
through a gap between the steel of the containment and the outer thick concrete wall. This heat 
transport needs effective free convection in the gap. 
To get enough information on this type of reactor containment cooling by free convection of air the 
large PASCO test facility has been in operation in Germany. The major reason to construct the facility 
was the innovative containment of future pressurised water reactors. The results, however, are 
relevant for the different steps of heat transfer in a modular HTGR insofar as gaps are considered. 
Figure 125 shows the PASCO experimental facility (Cheng, et al., 1996) (Cheng, et al., 1996) (Cheng, 
1998) (Hennies, et al., 1990) (Kucerza, et al., 1993) (Neitzerl, 1992). 
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Figure 125: PASCO test facility to measure the release of heat from hot surfaces by radiation and free 
convection and to determine flow velocities 
 
The principle for cooling the containment, which is part of the AP1000 concept, is that in the gap 
between a steel shell and a concrete wall a mass flow of air exists, and that this mass flow transports 
the decay heat, which is transferred through the wall of the steel shell to the environment. 
Alternatively, water can be added on the top of the containment. In this way the cooling effect would 
be enhanced. A filter on top of the flow path removes radioactive substances, which could be 
contained in the air flow due to leakages of the steel shell. The heat transport from the shell between 
the steel liner and the concrete wall outside was analysed using the large PASCO experiment. 
The test facility was operated to obtain further data on the described idea. PASCO consisted of a 
channel with a height of 8 m. The cross section of the channel was 1 m × 0.5 m. 
One side was heated by electrical resistance heating; the other side was insulated. The air inlet was 
at the bottom of the facility in a channel with a 90° bend. The heat flux was variable in the axial 
direction. The temperature of the heated wall was between 100 °C and 175 °C corresponding to the 
conditions in containment. The temperature distribution in the wall, the flow regions and the air 
velocity were measured. 
From many experiments average heat-transfer numbers were derived. Based on the definition one 
gets a value of around 17 W/m2K for ?̅?, if a heat ﬂux of 1.5 KW/m2 is applied. In the value for ?̅? given 
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above (around) 15 W/m2K is caused by radiation. The value for ?̅? by free convection fits in very well 
with results from other experiments. For vertical walls a good approximation, already mentioned as; 
𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ≈ 1.28 ∗ √∆𝑇 𝐻⁄
4
       (118) 
could be derived. Here α is given in W/m2K, ∆𝑇 in °C and 𝐻 in m. 
For the example chosen here (H = 8 m, ∆T = 130 °C), 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 =2.5W/m
2K. This corresponds well to the 
values measured in the PASCO facility. 
In total, these types of experiments delivered results such as the one given in Figure 126 for the heat-
transfer coefficients and for possible heat ﬂuxes. 
 
Figure 126: Heat-transfer coefficients and possible heat fluxes 
Using total heat-transfer coefficients of around 15 W/m2K at a surface temperature of the reactor 
pressure vessel of a modular HTR of 350 °C, one gets a heat flux of nearly 4.5 KW/m2 which 
sufficiently high to remove the decay heat totally after 30 hours following a ‘loss of coolant’ accident 
has happened (given for modular HTR, 200 MWth). 
The overall experiences from all these experiments on heat transfer by natural convection and by 
radiation delivers a clear picture for the application of modular HTRs. In the hot core structures gaps 
cause temperature differences in case of self-acting transport of decay heat. 
For example, between the thermal shield and the inside of the reactor pressure vessel a heat flux of 
approximately 5 KW/m2 has to be transferred after a time of 30 hours (after the start of a ‘total loss 
of cooling’ accident). With a heat-transfer coefficient of 30 W/m2K at this higher surface temperature 
this results in a temperature difference of approximately 100 °C between the hot surfaces of the 
graphite reflector and the thermal shield as one important step. 
If the surface cooler fails too, the heat is released from the surface of the inner concrete cell of the 
environment in the reactor containment building by radiation and free convection. 
Assuming a value of around 1 000 m2 for the surface one gets an average heat flux from there to the 
containment building atmosphere (after a long time) of around 300 W/m2. If the heat-transfer 
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coefficient is in the order of 5 W/m2K the surface temperature of the concrete would in this case be 
around 80 °C. 
 
9.5. Heat transfer from the surface of the reactor pressure vessel by free 
convection and radiation 
9.5.1. INWA experiment 
A very important step in the chain of heat transport is the release of the decay heat from the surface 
of the reactor pressure vessel to the surrounding concrete cell (including the surface cooler). The 
‘normal’ solution for modular HTRs is the use of a forged-steel vessel for the reactor and a water-
cooling system for the outer surface cooler. Alternatively, prestressed vessels made either from cast 
iron with an inner liner or from cast steel without a liner are attractive solutions. Furthermore, the 
concrete structures of the inner cell can be modified in such a way that they contain cast-iron blocks 
with borings. These borings allow natural convection to remove the decay heat. Figure 49 shows this 
principle with a prestressed cast-iron vessel for a 200 MWth modular HTR. This vessel is prestressed 
by many axial and radial tendons and can therefore never burst. The ‘leak before break’ criterion is 
fulfilled by the design of this vessel, which consists of many cast-iron blocks and a liner for the gas 
tightness of the system. The surrounding system of cast-iron blocks with borings for air flow allows 
the removal of approximately 600 KW if the water cooling of an additional surface cooler has failed. 
It was necessary to get more information on some important questions and data for simulation 
calculations: 
 temperatures dependent on time in different structures of the pressure vessel and of the 
outer cell (for different size of applied heat fluxes); 
 behaviour of structural elements under thermal loads  
 measurement of cooling capacity of outer structures; 
 measurement of more dimensional temperature fields to get data for computer programs; 
 integral demonstration of the concept of self-acting decay heat removal. 
The large INWA (Inaktives Wärmeabfuhrsystem (inactive system for decay heat removal)) test facility 
has been built and operated to get information on the influence of the main parameters (Beine, 
1991) (Geis, et al., 1993) (IAEA, 1994) (IAEA, 2001) (Kugeler, et al., 1991) (Kugeler, et al., 1994) (Wolf, 
et al., 1994). 
Corresponding to Figure 127, a segment of the reactor pressure vessel and of a concrete cell have 
been tested. For the reactor pressure vessel an inner liner was applied. The concrete cell was 
modified in such a way that it contained cast-iron blocks and concrete. Additionally, free convection 
cooling of these blocks was planned. 
The figure shows a perspective view of the INWA test facility which corresponds to a 20°-section of a 
proposed prestressed cast-iron reactor pressure vessel for the 200 MWth Siemens/KWU HTR 
modular pebble-bed reactor design (HTR Module). The test facility was constructed with all the 
details of a realistic vessel and with a cast-iron/concrete composite structure with circumferential 
tendon reinforcement at real scale. The height of the section was chosen to be about 2 m (a fraction 
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of the total axial systems extension). Therefore, free-circulation conditions in the embedded tubes 
had to be simulated accordingly by appropriate forced-convection conditions. 
 
Figure 127: Internals of the INWA-test facility 
 
The numbers shown in Figure 127 (dimensions in mm) with a cast-iron wall are explained below. 
(1) Electric heater and core vessel. 
(2) Liner with liner-support structure. 
(3) Pressure vessel wall. 
(4) Axial prestressing cable. 
(5) Cover plate for hoop pressurising cable. 
(6) Cover plate for hoop pressurising cable. 
(7) Cast-iron block of the reactor cell. 
(8) Cooling system. 
(9) Reinforced concrete. 
(10) Box for sprinkler system. 
(11) Insulation. 
(12) Refractory support. 
In order to provide an ultimate heat sink in case of the failure of both redundant and free-circulation 
piping systems, a ﬁlm cooling device was installed in order to descend on the outside reactor cell 
composite surface. The complete INWA facility was embedded within 500 mm-thick thermal 
insulation. Also, the supporting base structure was carefully designed for its insulating properties. All 
of these precautionary measures were necessary to keep the heat losses from the INWA facility as 
low as possible. The thermal power is provided by an electric heater. This heater consists of four 
independently controlled heating circuits to ensure a surface temperature that is as uniform as 
possible. 
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The decay heat was simulated by a flux through the liner. There was a maximum electrical heating 
power of 10 kW, which allowed heat fluxes up to 10 kW/m2. The concept included a special outer 
concrete cell design with a high iron content. This design was chosen to allow effective conduction 
and storage of heat in the cell. The total arrangement was surrounded by very thick insulation to 
minimise heat losses. During the experiments heat ﬂuxes oriented on the estimates for ‘loss of 
cooling’ accidents were applied. Figure 128 shows the time dependence of the heat ﬂuxes in typical 
experiments. It partly simulates extreme conditions of heat ﬂuxes. A value of around 3-5 kW/m2 is 
characteristic after 30 hours in a modular HTR (200 MWth) Here the depressurisation of the primary 
system was assumed, and in the first phase of the accident a heat flux value of 5 kW/m2 would be 
characteristic. After several hundred hours the value was reduced to 2 kW/m2. 
 
Figure 128: Time dependence of heat flux on the liner surface of the INWA test facility (a power of 4 kW 
corresponds to a heat ﬂux of/4 kW/m
2
) 
 
Figure 129 shows a measured radial temperature proﬁle at different points of the arrangement. 
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Figure 129: Radial dependence in the reactor pressure vessel and concrete cell structures (at the time 
when the highest temperature of the vessel occurs) 
This was the basic information for 3D calculations of temperature distribution and flow. 
Measurements and calculations were in close agreement. The calculated temperatures of the liner 
showed an even higher level of accuracy. 
Certain time dependencies of different temperatures in the structures which occurred in a test with a 
heat ﬂux corresponding to Figure 128 are shown in Figure 130 and Figure 131. The temperature of 
the liner never reached a temperature higher than 550 °C, even in case of very high heat ﬂuxes. 
 
Figure 130: Time dependence of the temperatures during experiments in the liner-surface of the INWA-
test facility (a power of 4 kW corresponds to a heat ﬂux of 4 kW/m2). 
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Figure 131: Heat-transfer numbers by natural convection measured in INWA test facility dependent on the 
height for the cases of normal operation and of ‘loss of active cooling’ accidents 
The heat-transfer coefficients by natural convection on the surface of the cast-iron block which 
simulated the wall of the reactor pressure vessel are shown in Figure 131. The results were obtained 
at approximately 2 W/m2K for the case of depressurisation, i.e. a ‘loss of active cooling’ accident. 
Relevant experience gained from the experiments can be summarised as follows. 
The maximum temperature on the inside of the reactor pressure vessel would stay below 500 °C, 
even if the water cooling of the concrete cell is not available. On the outer side of the wall of the 
vessel the temperatures would stay below 350 °C. The liner system would reach a temperature of 
less than 500 °C (Figure 130). 
The heat transport from the surface of the reactor pressure vessel to the concrete/cast-iron cell 
consisted of (roughly) 90 % from radiation and 10 % from free convection. This was shown by direct 
special measurements. 
From these experiments an effective heat-transfer coefficient for the heat release from the surface 
of the reactor pressure vessel of 25 W/m2K was derived. This agrees very well with the available data 
from other experiments. Heat ﬂuxes of more than 3 KW/m2 can be tolerated (Figure 131). The 
computer programs for the heat transport are suitable for describing the processes with sufﬁcient 
accuracy. 
In total the experiment has shown that this concept of a reactor pressure vessel and of the outer 
concrete cell is very well suited to fulﬁlling the requirements of the principle of self-acting decay heat 
removal. It would not need water cooling in the outside concrete structure. Some important 
conclusions are explained by Figure 132. 
This concept of an inner concrete cell with the possibility of cooling by free convection with air can 
be applied in connection with a forged-steel reactor pressure vessel or a prestressed cast-steel 
vessel. Additionally, later cooling of the structure by nitrogen injection is possible. 
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Figure 132: Some important results of tests carried out at the INWA test facility  (a) time dependence of 
temperatures of liner and concrete (heat flux: 4 KW/m
2
); (b) heat flux dependent on the temperature of the 
outer wall (here: 50 °C) and the surface of the cast-iron vessel 
 
9.5.2. JAERI experiment (Japan) 
In some modular HTR designs an outer-surface cooling system is provided to remove the decay heat 
which has been removed from the surface of the reactor pressure vessel by radiation and free 
convection. The action and efﬁciency of such a surface cooling system was tested by an experiment 
carried out by JAERI in Japan. Here different conditions and different heat loads were tested. Figure 
133 shows a cross section of the installation. An electrical heating system that generated a speciﬁc 
distribution of the heat ﬂux in the axial direction was installed in the vessel. The temperature 
distribution which occurred at the surface of the vessel and in the gap between vessel and cooling 
system was measured (Hishida, et al., 1989) (IAEA, 2001) (Takeda, et al., 1994) (Takeda, et al., 1996). 
Furthermore, the flow distributions in the gap and the heat ﬂuxes in different sections of the 
arrangement were measured dependent on time. 
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Figure 133: Schematic diagram of the JAERI test facility for the measurement of heat ﬂuxes and 
temperature distributions 
 
The flow sheet of the cooling system and the arrangement of cooling surfaces are indicated in Figure 
134. It was possible to heat the vessel in different sections and to apply cooling in different positions 
of the surface. 
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Figure 134: Schematic ﬂow sheet of the JAERI-test facility 
 
Table 53: Important data on the test facility 
Parameter Dimension Value 
Maximum heat input KW 100 
Height of the vessel M 3 
Diameter of the vessel M 1 
Working fluid  Helium, nitrogen 
Pressure Pa 1.3 
Maximum temperature of the 
heater 
°C 600 
Surface cooling panels m2 ~ 4 
Maximum flow of water m3/h 10 
 
Some characteristic results of many experiments are given in Figure 135, Figure 136 and Figure 137. 
They show the axial distribution of the heat ﬂux and the measured pressure vessel temperatures. 
Page 219 
 
 
Figure 135: Case A: 94 KW; nitrogen; 1.1 MPa; cooling water in cooling system 
 
Figure 136: Case B: 77.5 KW; helium; 0.47 MPa; cooling water in cooling system 
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Figure 137: Cooling panel operated with air (8 KW; helium; 1 MPa; air coolant ) 
The evaluation of the experimental results delivered the following. 
Between the surface of the reactor pressure vessel and the cooling panel a temperature difference of 
around 250 °C is present, corresponding to an effective heat-transfer coefficient α of 25 W/m2K. This 
value includes radiation with a share of around 85 % to 90 % and free convection with a share of 
around 10 to 15 %. 
It was possible to derive an empirical equation for the free convection of air: 
∝𝑎𝑓𝑓 (𝑇𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙) ≈ 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 ∙ 𝑇𝑊
′′         (119) 
The Nusselt number for the cylindrical arrangement was found to be: 
𝑁𝑢 = 0.286 ∙ 𝑅𝑎0.258 ∙ 𝑃𝑟0.06 ∙ 𝐻−0.238 ∙ 𝐾0.442     (120) 
𝑅𝑎 is the Raleigh number, 𝑃𝑟 is the Prandtl number, 𝐻 is the height and 𝐾 is the ratio of the 
diameter of the concentric cylinders. 
In the course of the work at JAERI a broad experimental programme to evaluate the heat transfer 
and the ﬂow behaviour in the gap between the reactor pressure vessel and the surface cooling 
system was carried out. 
Simpliﬁed equations to describe the experimental results are: 
𝑁𝑢 = 0.1974 ∙ 𝑅𝑎0.25 𝑓𝑜𝑟 106 ≤ 𝑅𝑎 ≤ 108      (121) 
𝑁𝑢 = 0.312 ∙ 𝑅𝑎0.33 𝑓𝑜𝑟 1096 ≤ 𝑅𝑎 ≤ 5.5 ∙ 108     (122) 
The α number for free convection is then given by: 
∝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣= 𝑁𝑢 ∙ 𝜆/𝐷         (123) 
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D is a characteristic geometrical parameter; here it is the diameter of the vessel. 
A value of from 3 to 4 W/m2K can be derived from the experiments for the conditions of an HTR 
Module. The share of heat transfer by radiation was estimated from the following equations: 
𝑄12 = 𝐴1 ∙ 𝜀 ∙ 𝐶𝑠 ∙ 𝐶12 ∙ (𝑇1
4 − 𝑇2
4)       (124) 
𝜀 =
1
1
𝜀1
+
𝐴1
𝐴2
(
1
𝜀𝑧
−1)
          (125) 
The factor 𝐶12 depends in a complex manner on the geometry of the system and on the emissivity ε 
of the surfaces. 
Index 1 characterises the inner and index 2 the outer surface of the cylindrical arrangement. 
The values of emissivity ε and the surface depend on the conditions of the components, as previously 
discussed. Table 54 provides an overview of some values measured and known information from the 
literature. 
 
Table 54: Values of emissivity of some different materials in the self-acting decay heat removal chain 
Material Value of ε Temperature (℃) Remark 
Steel 0.88 425 Oxidised, polished 
Steel 0.92 800 Oxidised, polished 
CrNi steel 0.85 440 Oxidised (25 % Cr, 20 % Ni, 
51 %Fe) 
CrNi steel 0.90 795 polished 
Graphite 0.80 630  
Concrete < 0.80 20  
Concrete > 0.80 100  
 
The results are, for example, suited to optimising the structure of the cooling panels. Hot parts can 
be identiﬁed and modiﬁcations of the cooling concept are possible. 
 
9.5.3. Heat release from the surface of the CASTOR vessel 
In addition, many experiments have been carried out on heat transfer by radiation and free 
convection from the surfaces of storage vessels loaded with spent fuel elements. In these cases the 
characteristic surface temperatures of the cast-iron or cast-steel vessels were below 100 °C. In 
particular, for heat release from concrete structures (with a relatively high steel content) these 
results delivered additional helpful information (Deutsches Atomforum eV, Kerntechnische 
Gesellschaft eV, 2001) (Hauck, 2003) (KLE, Kernkraftwerk Lippe-Ems GmbH, 1998) (RSK, 2002) 
(Schartmann, 2000) (von Heesen, et al., 1983). 
Figure 138 shows the concept of those storage systems and indicates the relevant temperature 
proﬁles in the radial and axial directions. 
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Figure 138:Principle of heat transport in storage vessels for spent fuel elements: (a) the principle of a 
storage vessel with surface cooling; (b) the radial temperature proﬁle; (c) the axial temperature proﬁle; (d) 
some data and relations for temperature differences 
Some results of measurements of heat transport from the surface are shown in Figure 139. These 
were carried out during the licensing process for storage vessels and showed as result that there is a 
dependency between the Nusselt and Rayleigh numbers: 
𝑁𝑢 = 𝐶 ∙ 𝑅𝑎′′′          (126) 
The Rayleigh number is deﬁned by the product of the Prandtl and Grasshoff numbers: 
𝑅𝑎 = 𝑃𝑟 ∙ 𝐺𝑟          (127) 
The Prandtl and Grasshoff numbers are deﬁned by the equations:  
Pr  = 𝜂 ∙ 𝐶𝑝/𝜆, 𝐺𝑟 = 𝑔 ∙  𝛽 ∙ ∆𝑇/𝐿
3/(𝑣2)      (128) 
The parameters are given as follows: 
𝑔 = gravitational constant (m/s2); 
𝛽 = isobaric thermal expansion coefﬁcient (1/K); 
∆𝑇 = characteristic temperature difference (K); 
𝐿 = characteristic length (m); 
𝑣 = kinematic viscosity (m2/s); 
𝜂 = dynamic viscosity (kg/ms); 
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𝐶𝑝 = speciﬁc heat capacity (Ws/kg K); 
𝜆 = heat conductivity (W/mK). 
 
 
Figure 139: Results of measurement of heat transfer by free convection on the surface of storage vessels 
 
As a practical example, for a surface temperature of 90 °C one gets a value of 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ≈ 2 𝑊 𝑚
2𝐾⁄ . 
The total heat-transfer coefficient including radiation will be in the order of 8 to 10 W/m2K. This will 
allow a heat ﬂux of approximately 500 W/m2 from the surface of the vessel. A storage vessel for 
spent LWR fuel elements, for example, can be designed for a total power of approximately 40 KW. 
These results are also consistent with further data obtained for heat transfer on the hot surfaces of 
storage vessels for the intermediate storage of glass coquilles. 
These practical experiences of heat transfer from hot surfaces can be used for heat release from the 
inner concrete cell and from the outer surface of the reactor containment building. 
9.6. Heat transport in the outer structures around the reactor pressure 
vessel 
9.6.1. Overview of different design options 
The design of the outer heat sink to remove the decay heat requires some attention. As shown in 
Figure 140 different possibilities dependent on the type of the reactor pressure vessel and the design 
of the surrounding inner concrete cell exist. Assuming that the surface cooler may fail the design of 
the outer cell becomes increasingly important to guarantee transport of the decay heat. 
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Figure 140: Possibilities to set up reactor vessel and outer cell systems with good heat-transfer and heat-
storage capabilities 
 Corresponding to the present concepts of modular HTRs the heat is transported from the 
surface of the RPV (made of steel) to a surface cooler and to the concrete cell behind the 
cooler (Figure 140(a)). If the surface cooler fails the concrete absorbs the heat directly and 
stores it. After a relatively long period of time the heat is transferred from the surface of the 
concrete to the air inside the building. Finally, the heat is transferred through the wall of the 
building to the environment. 
 Cast-iron blocks can be embedded in the concrete cell to store the heat if the cooler fails. 
Additional holes inside the cast-iron blocks allow air to ﬂow by free convection. Therefore, 
the temperature of the RPV stays below 400 °C even if the water cooler fails (Figure 140(b)). 
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 The RPV (made of steel) can be substituted with a prestressed RPV made of cast-iron or cast-
steel rings and blocks. The prestressing is done by a lot of axial and radial tension cables. 
Therefore, this type of vessel cannot burst here. The outer heat sink can be set up as in the 
case discussed before (Figure 140(c)). 
 If the established PCRV (prestressed concrete reactor vessel) is used, the self-acting decay 
heat removal will also work if the cold helium temperature in the vessel is limited (for 
example to 250 °C). The insulation of the concrete vessel under these conditions should be 
thin enough to allow the heat flux to become high enough to cool the core structures. The 
cooling system of the liner usually removes the heat. If this system also fails the heat 
penetrates to the concrete structures. As a lot of large-scale experiments have shown, some 
special types of concrete can even be heated up to 1 000 °C without severe damage (Figure 
140(d)). 
 If this heating of concrete is to be avoided it is possible to integrate cast-iron blocks into the 
cylindrical wall of the PCRV. Holes allow air to cool these metallic structures sufficiently by 
free convection. In this way it is very unlikely that there will be any intolerable temperature 
rises in the concrete (Figure 140(e)). 
For the different design options experimental results are available. The results allow the evaluation 
of the safety aspects of these solutions in case of a ‘total loss of active cooling’ accident. 
 
9.6.2. Behaviour of the surface cooling system 
The surface cooling system consists of heat exchanger panels that are well known as they have been 
studied in conventional boilers over long periods of time. Table 55 shows the concept, applied in 
some modular HTGRs and coal-ﬁred boilers. 
The design requirements of a surface cooler are much easier to fulﬁl than that in large steam 
generators for the production of hot steam. The capacity of the necessary system is given by 
𝑄𝐷 = 𝑃𝑡ℎ ∙ 𝑓𝐷(𝑡) = ?̇?
′′ ∙ 𝐴 = ?̅? ∙ (𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑉 − 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑙) ∙ 𝐴 = ?̇?𝐻2𝑂 ∙ 𝐶 ∙ (𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖𝑛)  (129) 
For example ?̇?′′ ≈ 3 𝐾𝑊 𝑚2, 𝐴 ≈ 300𝑚2, 𝑄 ≈ 900𝐾𝑊⁄  are characteristic values for the surface 
cooling system of the HTR Module (200 MWth). 
Table 55 provides some data that allow a comparison between the concepts. It shows that the 
surface cooler can easily be set up as proven solutions in conventional energy technology are 
available (Spilker, 1989) (Steag, 1988). In these installations the heat fluxes and wall temperatures 
are much higher than they are in the case of the HTGR surface cooler. Therefore, this component for 
modular HTGRs can be designed with a very high safety factor. 
Table 55: Comparison of some data on the surface cooler of the modular HTR and the surface cooler of a 
coal-fired boiler 
Parameter Dimension Surface cooler of HTR 
Module 
Burning chamber of 
coal-fired boiler 
Maximum power MW < 1 500 
Maximum 
temperature of the 
fluid 
°C < 80 ~ 360 
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Maximum pressure bar ~ 10 180 
Average heat flux KW/m2 5 100 
Area of the cooler m2 200 10 000 
Maximum wall 
temperature 
°C < 100 370 
Lifetime  hours 3e + 5 3e + 5 
Material  13CrMo44 13CrMo44 
 
9.6.3. Heat storage and transport in the concrete structures of the inner reactor 
cell 
If the outer surface cooler fails as well, the decay heat is transported to the concrete structure of the 
inner cell and is stored there. As a consequence the temperature of the reactor pressure vessel, of 
the internal structures and the outer parts of the core would increase. However, the maximum 
temperature in the core and in the control part would undergo only negligible changes. Figure 141 
outlines the heat transport in this accident, which is regarded as ‘beyond design-basis accidents’ 
(BDBA). 
 
Figure 141: Heat transfer if the surface cooler fails 
A major matter for concern is, if the stability of the concrete is given, whether the temperature of 
the concrete increases, especially in supporting regions. Temperatures of more than 300 °C can occur 
(Lohnert, 1990) (Siemens/ Interatom, 1988). Figure 142 shows the time dependence of the 
temperature of the concrete if the surface cooler has failed. A characteristic value for the heat-rate 
of the concrete in the ﬁrst phase of the accident would be: 
∆𝑇𝑐 ∆𝑡 ≈⁄ 80℃/𝑑𝑎𝑦 
Subsequently, the temperature increase of the concrete becomes smaller as the decay heat 
production decreases (Figure 142(e)). Besides using concrete for the inner cell surrounding the 
reactor pressure vessel there are other possibilities for setting up this structure. The release of heat 
from this component can be improved by using structures which display better energy storage 
behaviours. Moreover, the heat could be released via natural convection of air (blocks of cast iron 
integrated into the concrete, for example, would fulfil both requirements). This would limit the 
system temperature of the outer heat sink to relatively small values. 
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Figure 142: Heating of the inner concrete cell after failure of the surface cooler 
The top left figure shows the reactor pressure vessel in the relevant position, top middle the 
dependency of the temperature in axial direction from time, top right the dependency of the 
temperature in the radial direction from time, bottom left the rising temperatures in the first 
30 hours and bottom right the rising temperatures over a long period of time. 
The behaviour of concrete in case of high temperatures has been measured in many experiments, 
especially on large test specimens in connection with the development of prestressed concrete 
reactor pressure vessels and the qualiﬁcation of the liner cooling as an alternative decay heat 
removal system. The results that can be derived from these experiments are that special qualities of 
concrete stay intact at temperatures of approximately 600 °C. Even at these high temperatures the 
samples showed relatively good strength values (Figure 143) (ISF/KFA-Jülich, 1984) (Schneider, et al., 
1981). 
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Figure 143: Strength of concrete at higher temperatures 
 
The heat conductivity of concrete and the modulus of elasticity also stay at tolerable values at high 
temperatures (Figure 144). However, they are reduced by a factor of 2 if the temperature rises to 
around 300 °C. The values at elevated temperatures are still sufficient to design a structure which 
can support the RPV. 
 
 
Figure 144: Changes to important parameters of concrete at high temperatures: (a) heat conductivity; (b) 
modulus of elasticity 
 
9.6.4. Behaviour of large concrete structures at high temperatures 
In case of accidents during which the surface cooler also fails, the heat penetrates into the concrete 
of the inner cell and is stored there for some time. Parts of these structures would gain temperatures 
of approximately 450 °C, for example in the area where the reactor pressure supports are situated. 
Figure 145 provides a brief overview of the situation. 
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Figure 145: Time dependence of temperatures supporting concrete structures of modular HTRs (‘total 
loss of active cooling’ and ‘failure of surface cooler’ accidents) 
In this case the questions of whether the concrete stays stable and the reactor pressure vessel 
support stays intact are relevant for the safety of the reactor. 
Various experiments on the behaviour of concrete in the case of small bodies have been carried out 
and enable the evaluation of this question. Nevertheless, it was decided to run a large experiment to 
test the concrete behaviour at very high temperatures in an integral experiment (Altes, et al., 1983) 
(Altes, et al., 1987) (Altes, et al., 1989) (Altes, et al., 1989). 
Large concrete blocks with a volume of roughly 1 m3 were heated to 1 200 °C (Figure 146). Heat 
ﬂuxes of around 5 KW/m2 were applied to reach these temperatures. These heat ﬂuxes are 
comparable to those which could occur in a modular HTR. 
The concrete blocks had a liner, together with liner cooling and insulation on the side where the heat 
flux was applied. The temperature was measured in many positions to get an exact temperature 
profile. 
Two concepts were tested in detail: 
 THTR concrete with basaltic material and metallic fossil insulation; 
 HTR 500 concrete with calcinitic material and fibre insulation. 
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Figure 146: Experimental facility to test large concrete blocks at high temperatures 
The upper figure shows the vertical section through the test facility and the lower one the detail of 
the concrete block (corresponds to THTR concrete with liner, liner cooling and metallic foil 
insulation). 
The samples were heated to high temperatures for more than 1 000 hours. During this time the 
temperature distribution and the release of gases and steam were measured continuously. After the 
experiments were ﬁnished the material was analysed and information was delivered on the status of 
the concrete. 
Figure 147 shows characteristic time dependencies of the temperature of cover plates of released 
water. After approximately 400 hours of operation time, all at very high temperatures (1 000 °C), 
nearly 100 kg of water (relating to m3 of concrete) was released. 
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Figure 147: Some results of tests on large concrete blocks 
The upper figure shows the time dependence of the cover plates of a test specimen during a heating 
experiment and the lower one the totally released mass of water from the concrete during heating 
up; calculated and measured values. 
The release of water and gas was relatively small despite the operation at very high temperatures. 
The state of the concrete block after a long heating time at a maximum temperature of 1 200 °C 
basically did not change. As the ﬁgure indicates, the structural stability of the concrete block was 
preserved. 
The ability of the concrete to absorb the heat and to store it for a long time was demonstrated 
convincingly by these experiments. It was an important question relevant for the behaviour of 
prestressed concrete reactor pressure vessels in case of an extreme ‘loss of cooling’ accident. These 
results are important to predict the behaviour of modular HTRs during extreme ‘loss of cooling’ 
accidents when parts of the inner concrete cell may reach a temperature of approximately 500 °C. A 
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further question was whether it would be possible to feed water into the liner cooling system after a 
long delay time. It was shown that this would be possible even after 300 hours. 
The re-ﬂooding and re-establishing of the water cooling was possible without any damage to the 
cooling tubes. Temperature decreases in the cooling process of approximately 10 °C/min were 
carried out without problems. It would be possible to restart the water cooling of the surface cooler 
or of the liner cooling of a prestressed concrete reactor pressure vessel even after a long period of 
time if failures of these components occurred. 
 
9.6.5. Cooling of the surface of the reactor pressure vessel by interventions 
As already discussed, the temperature of the reactor pressure vessel could rise up to a large extent in 
case of accidents with failure of a damaged surface cooler. 
The experiments on the liner cooling of large concrete blocks at much higher temperatures have 
demonstrated this possibility. Figure 148 shows the temperatures and mass flows measured for 
these experiments. (Kim, 1991) (Rehm, et al., 1984) 
 
 
Figure 148: Results of experiments reflooding a liner cooling system 
If the surface cooler were out of operation the maximum temperature of the cooling pipes would be 
around 300 °C after 2 weeks. In this time it should be possible to re-establish the water supply for 
cooling. If necessary the reactor pressure vessel can be cooled directly with water or nitrogen. The 
amount of coolant can be estimated as: 
?̇?𝐷 ≈ 𝑚 ∗ 𝑟̇           (130) 
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where 𝑟 is the evaporation heat. 
In the case of water around 0.4 kg/s (~ 1.5 t/h) is needed to remove a decay heat of 600 KW (after 
2 days). Using liquid nitrogen the demand is 5 kg/s (~ 20 t/h). 
 
9.7. Heat transport inside the reactor building — integral experiments 
If the surface cooler has failed the inner concrete cell will be heated and free convection will be the 
major process of heat transport (some radiation from surfaces with higher temperatures may play a 
role too). The heat is removed from the hot surfaces of the inner cell to the atmosphere of the 
reactor building and from there to the inner side of the walls. Different situations in which free 
convection occurs have to be considered (Figure 149): 
 on vertical walls (a), 
 on horizontal walls (b), 
 on pipes and components with a cylindrical surface (c). 
Mainly the heating of pipes and channels, which contain cables for control and instrumentation 
equipment requires attention and usually speciﬁc precautions for protection. 
 
 
Figure 149: Different situations of heat transfer by free convection in the containment building 
Figure 149 shows, from left to right, free convection from a hot vertical wall to the environment, 
from the environment to colder structures and from the environment to colder pipes or components. 
These situations of heat transfer can be described by empirical equations. In the case of vertical walls 
the following equation can be used: 
𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 = 𝐶 ∗ √
𝑇𝑤−𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣
𝐻
4
         (131) 
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𝐻 is the height of the wall and 𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣 is the temperature difference between the wall and the 
environment of the reactor building. As shown in Table 56 the factor C shows little dependence on 
the applied temperatures in case of free convection. 
Table 56: Temperature dependence of factor C 
T (°C) 50 100 150 200 250 300 
C 1.31 1.26 1.22 1.19 1.16 1.14 
 
For the outside of the concrete cell a value of 𝛼 ≈ 2.2 𝑊 𝑚2𝐾⁄  is characteristic of a temperature 
difference of 150 °C and a height of 10 m. 
The heat ﬂux for release of decay heat to the atmosphere of the reactor building would then be 
around 330 W/m2. Together with a surface area of around 1 500 m2 for the outside of the inner 
concrete cell, this corresponds to a heat release of 500 KW. This is the decay heat production after 
1 week. Therefore, the storage capacity of the cell chosen must be large enough. 
The heat transfer from the reactor containment building atmosphere to the inside of the building 
wall delivers similar values. Since the surface is much larger than that of the inner concrete cell, the 
amount of heat which can be transferred is much larger than mentioned before. 
If horizontal surfaces are considered, α depends on the angle between vertical and inclined surface 
(angle φ) (Teuchert E., 1992): 
𝛼𝜑 𝛼⁄ = 𝑓(𝜑), 𝑓(𝜑) ≈ 1 … 0.83      (132) 
𝜑 = 90𝑜 would for instance result in 𝑓(𝜑) ≈ 0.83. 
Cylindrical components or pipes are connected to heat transfer by free convection, corresponding to 
the following equation: 
𝑁𝑢 = 0.47 ∗ √𝐺𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑟 =
𝛼∗𝑑𝑎
𝜆
4
        (133) 
in which: 
𝐺𝑟 = the Grasshoff-number 
𝑃𝑟 = the Prandtl number 
For air the following equation can be used: 
𝛼 = 𝐶∗ ∗ √
𝑇𝑊−𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣
𝑑𝑎
4
         (134) 
The factor 𝐶∗ for horizontal piping is given in Table 57; the average temperature is defined as: 
(𝑇𝑊 + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣) 2⁄ .          (135) 
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Table 57: Temperature dependence of the factor 𝑪∗ in the equation for free convection around a body of 
diameter 𝒅𝒂 
T (°C) 50 100 150 200 250 300 
C 1.18 1.16 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.02 
 
A cylindrical structure with a diameter of 1 m, for example, arranged in the building, gets a heat-
transfer number of around 3.5 W/m2K for a temperature difference of 150 °C. 
These values allow a relatively precise heat balance for the reactor building and all internal structures 
if the decay heat is transported in case of extreme accident (BDBA case). In any case, for a modular 
HTGR with a power of 200 MWth the values of α are high enough to remove the total decay heat 
after a few days. Moreover, further measures could be used to enlarge the heat-transfer area inside 
the containment building. 
 
9.8. Heat release from the reactor building to the environment 
Usually, the transport of heat through the walls of the reactor building to the environment requires 
the use of cooling loops. As indicated in Figure 150 several possibilities are available: 
 cooling loops with pumps are installed at cooling towers outside (Figure 150(a)); 
 cooling loops can be operated only by natural convection without a pump for circulation 
(Figure 150(b)); 
 cooling loops can be used with natural convection, which can be improved by water injection 
if necessary (Figure 150(c)); 
 heat pipes can be used to transport the heat directly from the inside of the building to the 
outside (Figure 150(d)). 
 
Figure 150: Concepts to remove the decay heat from the reactor containment building 
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From upper left to lower right the following concepts are shown: 
(a) water cooling of the surface cooler using pumps and forced convection; 
(b) water cooling of the surface cooler using natural circulation of media; 
(c) water cooling of the inner side of the reactor containment building and natural circulation of 
media; 
(d) heat pipes for the transport through the walls of the reactor containment building. 
Cooling of the concrete walls using water or nitrogen is another option which is well established in 
conventional plants. Boiling-water reactors for instance have an injection system to ensure fast 
insertion into the containment (Rehm, et al., 1984). 
In addition, cooling by intervention after a long time period is possible. Reflooding of the surface 
cooler would be an example of this. It allows fast cooling of the concrete structures and of the 
reactor pressure vessel. 
The chain of heat transport from the RPV to the inner wall of the containment includes heat 
conduction, thermal radiation and free convection. In the end the wall of the reactor containment 
building is only slightly heated. Figure 151 briefly illustrates the heat transfer to the wall of the 
containment building. 
 
Figure 151: Alternative cooling concepts for reactor containment buildings 
From upper left to lower right the following concepts are shown: 
(a) free convection of air in borings in the wall of the reactor containment building (with cast-
iron blocks); 
Page 237 
 
(b) free convection of air together with water in the wall of the reactor containment building 
(with cast-iron blocks); 
(c) principle of heat transfer to the inner surface of the reactor containment building and 
release to the environment; 
(d) heat ﬂux through the wall of the containment building. 
The heat transferred from the inner atmosphere in the building to the inner side of the wall can be 
estimated as: 
?̇? = ?̅?𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ (𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖)        (136) 
in which: 
𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 = corresponds to the temperature of the inner atmosphere; 
𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 = is the inner surface area; 
𝑇𝑖 = is the temperature on the inner side of the building. 
With characteristic values of 𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 ≈ 800𝑚
2, ?̅?𝑖 ≈ 2𝑊/𝑚
2𝐾 and 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖 ≈ 50℃ a value of 
approximately 800 KW is received. This is the decay heat of a 200 MWth HTR Module after several 
days. After that the decay heat is stored in the concrete and later released to the environment. 
 
9.9. Integral experiments on the AVR reactor, demonstration of the concept 
of self-acting decay heat removal 
9.9.1. Loss of active cooling (reactor under full pressure) 
In the 1970s the AVR was also used to carry out important experiments regarding the concept of self- 
acting decay heat removal (ATW, 1968) (Engelhard, 1972) (Krüger, et al., 1988) (Schulten, et al., 
1976) (VDI, 1990) (Ziermann, et al., 1997). 
Both helium blowers were switched off during normal operation of the reactor at full power. With 
these measures the active core cooling was totally interrupted. The four shutdown rods were 
blocked, which also simulated the total loss of the active shutdown capability of the reactor. As a 
result of these two independent failures, which simulated a very extreme accident, the thermal 
power of the reactor decreased immediately (Figure 152) and led to a reactor shutdown by physical 
means. 
The reason was the strong negative temperature coefficient of the reactor caused by the 
temperature-dependent change in the resonance absorption. 
The changes of temperature indicated in Figure 152 are mainly caused by internal convection 
processes. There were some low-level oscillations in the power as the reactor became critical again 
after 23.5 hours as a result of xenon decay. However, the power then was just 1.8 MW. It was 
dissipated without any difficulties via the steam generator. This was possible because of natural 
convection, which took place because of the speciﬁc arrangement of the AVR steam generator above 
the core. 
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It was shown that the heat balance for the plant was fulﬁlled in the form: 
𝑃𝐷 = 𝑃𝑎 ∗ 𝑓𝐷(𝑡) = ?̇?𝑠𝑡
∗ ∗ (ℎ𝑠𝑡
∗ − ℎ𝐹𝑊) + ?̇?𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠      (137) 
?̇?𝐻𝑒 = (ℎ𝑠𝑡
∗ − ℎ𝐹𝑊) ≈ ?̇?𝐻𝑒
∗ ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑒 ∗ (𝑇𝐻𝑒𝑚
∗ − 𝑇𝐻𝑒𝑚)     (138) 
?̇?𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 ≈ 𝐴 ∗ ?̅? ∗ (?̅?𝐻𝑒 − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣)        (139) 
The asterisk should indicate that this is the status after a time of 23.5 hours (if no shutdown process 
is carried out and the reactor is ‘self-controlled’), ?̇?𝐻𝑒 is the mass flow by natural convection and 
?̇?𝑠𝑡
∗  is the necessary flow of feed water. The temperature difference between steam and feed water 
(ℎ𝑠𝑡
∗ − ℎ𝐹𝑊) can be assumed to correspond to the evaporation heat of steam. 
The rises in temperature in the reactor structures did not cause any problems. For example, the 
thermal shield got approximately 50 °C hotter compared to the temperature during normal 
operation, the temperature of the bottom reﬂector rose by nearly 100 °C and the temperature in the 
graphite noses rose by approximately 200 °C for a short time of 5 hours compared to the 
temperatures during normal operation. After that time the graphite noses cooled down again. 
Based on the temperature distributions measured in the structures the temperature distributions in 
the core have been calculated. Figure 152 shows some results which indicate that the fuel 
temperatures never exceeded values above 1 100 °C in the case of AVR operation with an average 
helium outlet temperature of 850 °C. 
Generally a temperature span of approximately 100 °C has to be added to cover uncertainties in the 
data which are important for the heat transport in the core. However, the resulting maximum fuel 
temperature still stays under the speciﬁed maximum temperature for operation. This was 1 250 °C 
for THTR BISO fuel. 
It was estimated that the additional ﬁssion-product release from the fuel would be negligible for this 
accidental situation compared to release during normal operation. 
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Figure 152: Loss of active cooling + loss of all shutdown rods (blocked 
The left figure gives an overview of the reactor system, the top right shows the time dependence of 
the power and the lower right shows the time dependence of some important temperatures in the 
reactor structure. 
Page 240 
 
 
Figure 153: Calculated temperature distribution inside the AVR during loss of decay heat removal 
accident (calculations for the assumption ‘loss of control and loss of active decay heat removal’, reactor 
under full helium pressure) 
 
9.9.2. Loss of active cooling (reactor under normal helium pressure of 1 bar) 
One of the most severe accidents in a modular HTR is the total loss of active cooling including the 
depressurisation of the primary circuit. In this case the explained concept of self-acting decay heat 
removal acts and removes the decay heat solely by principal physical processes such as heat 
conduction, heat radiation and free convection of air or an air/helium mixture. The maximum fuel 
temperatures in this accident stay below 1 600 °C. 
An experiment was carried out in the AVR to demonstrate this system behaviour. It was shown that 
the core and the structures have the capability to store the decay heat, to transport the heat and to 
release the heat via the surface of the reactor pressure vessel. In 1988 this experiment was 
performed in the following manner. In the ﬁrst phase the cooling gas was pumped out of the primary 
system, because a rapid depressurisation was not licensed at that time. The plant was then operated 
for some time with a thermal power of 4 MW. In this way a stationary status was reached in the core 
that showed a temperature proﬁle at full-power operation and an average helium outlet 
temperature of 950 °C. 
After that a reduced power level caused by ﬁssion was established to simulate decay heat. In total, 
accident conditions were set up which corresponded to those of a reactor operating at full power in 
which an accident would happen. 
In Figure 154 the decay heat curve is shown. After 1 hour at a power of approximately 500 kW, 1 % of 
the nominal power was available as decay heat. After 2 days most of the energy was transported to 
the steam generator. 
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Figure 154: Decay heat production in the AVR during total loss of active cooling with a depressurised 
core 
In the reactor structures the time dependence of temperatures has been measured. Figure 155 
shows the position of the thermocouples. They were arranged near the core, for example on the 
graphite noses. Later some test graphite balls with melt-wires were put into the pebble bed together 
with the normal fuel elements. 
 
Figure 155: Positions of thermocouples to measure temperatures in the internal structures of the AVR: (a) 
vertical section; (b) horizontal section 
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The vertical cross section is shown on the left of Figure 155 and the horizontal cross section on the 
right. The numbers denote the following. 
(1) Pebble bed. 
(2) Control rod borehole. 
(3) Reflector nose. 
(4) Carbon brick layer. 
(5) Graphite reflector. 
In Figure 156 the results of the measurements are given. The curves show that the hottest parts of 
structure, the noses for the shutdown rods above the core, became colder. The temperature of the 
graphite structure in the noses (situated in the middle of the core) increased by approximately 
300 °C. The temperature decreased after 100 hours. 
Temperature increases in the side reﬂector were in the order of 150 °C (maximum) and occurred 
after approximately 25 hours. After that time this temperature also decreased. 
The core bottom, which was relatively cold at the beginning of the accident, became hotter and 
reached a temperature of approximately 500 °C after 100 hours. In total the core bottom structure 
acted as an efﬁcient heat sink over a long time. 
The possible influences of free convection and heat transport to the steam generator were analysed 
as well. For this purpose the main ﬂaps on the blowers were closed and opened. The difference was 
negligible. In fact, based on this result it was stated that the contribution of the steam generator as a 
heat sink was very small in this experiment. The main mechanisms to remove the decay heat from 
the core were conduction, radiation and free convection in the core internal structures. The results 
measured were compared with 3D computer calculations and the overall estimate was very good. 
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Figure 156: Results of a ‘loss of coolant and loss of pressure in primary system’ experiment in the AVR 
(46 MW; THe = 950 °C) 
 
On the basis of the measured temperature distributions in the structures and the power density 
temperature ﬁelds inside the pebble bed have been calculated. Figure 157 shows the radial 
dependence of the time-dependent proﬁle. It corresponds to the axial position in the middle of the 
core. Following these calculations no fuel elements were hotter than 1 300 °C in this accident. 
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Figure 157: Temperature distribution inside the AVR reactor system in a ‘loss of coolant’ accident 
(calculations for the assumption: total loss of coolant and loss of active decay heal removal) 
 
Analysis indicates that only 5 % of the fuel elements stayed at temperatures between 1 250 °C and 
1 300 °C for less than 50 hours. All other fuel elements stayed at lower, partly much lower, 
temperatures. The release of ﬁssion products from the fuel elements is therefore relatively small. 
The concept of self-acting decay heat removal was demonstrated convincingly by this experiment. 
The results were a large contribution to the knowledge concerning the accident behaviour of 
modular HTRs. To successfully transfer this knowledge on newly build HTR, the materials and 
dimensions of the core structure should be designed similar. The results of these experiments have 
been used for the validation of different computer programs. Figure 158 shows that the results of the 
computer programs were in close agreement with the experiments. 
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Figure 158: Time-dependent temperature distribution in the AVR during ‘total loss of active decay heat 
removal’ accident, depressurisation of primary circuit: temperature (maximum values at centre line) 
depending on time 
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Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of 
free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
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